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Abstract 
The United States Army became the dominant U.S. government agency for post-
World War II occupation planning.  Despite President Roosevelt’s own misgivings, 
shared by several influential members of his Cabinet, the Army nonetheless prevailed in 
shaping occupation policy in accordance with its understanding and priorities.  The 
Army’s primacy resulted from its own cultural and organizational imperatives, to include 
its drive towards professionalization and its acceptance of legalized standards for 
conflict in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.  Other related factors included 
the Army’s ability to create coherent internal doctrine, the training and experience of its 
leaders, the relative weakness of comparative civilian agencies, the real-world 
experiences of civil affairs in North Africa in 1942-43, and the personality and leadership 
style of President Roosevelt himself.  As a result, the Army created internal training and 
education, doctrine, and organizations that operated both at the strategic and tactical 
level to implement military government in accordance with the Army’s institutional 
understanding.  The Army’s planning and implementation of military government in 
Germany, Austria, and Korea show the effects of the Army’s dominance in planning and 
implementing the postwar occupations.  Furthermore, in these three occupations (unlike 
Japan’s), of particular concern were how the Americans interacted with their Soviet 
counterparts in the occupied territories at the beginning of the Cold War.  As these three 
occupations reveal, American military government in those locations, as well as the 
actions of the occupants themselves, profoundly shaped American interests in those 
countries and thus profoundly shaped American policy during the early Cold War.   
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Chapter 1 - Introduction: The American Army, Strategic 
Culture, and the Post-World War II Occupations 
In the immediate aftermath of World War II, the United States Army became the 
principal executor of American postwar governance policy throughout the world.  It 
administered the military occupations of not only the defeated Axis powers of Germany 
and Japan but also of Austria, Korea, and many nations liberated by American military 
forces in their drives across Europe and the Pacific.1    Generals such as Lucius Clay in 
Germany, Douglas MacArthur in Japan, Mark Clark in Austria, and John Hodge in 
Korea presided over occupied territories as American viceroys.  And because of these 
occupational responsibilities, the Army’s influence over American foreign policy in the 
early Cold War period was profound, though in ways not usually understood.2   
President Roosevelt had deep misgivings about postwar occupations being run by 
the Army.  And Roosevelt was not alone: many within his administration and outside of 
it opposed such military rule as well.  George Kennan said, “[T]he ruling of distant 
peoples is not our dish…there are many things we Americans should beware of, and 
among them is the acceptance of paternalistic responsibility to anyone, be it even in the 
form of military occupation, if we can possibly avoid it.”3  Many in the public indicated as 
such.  An article in the October 1943 issue of Harper’s magazine asked:  “Somehow the 
job [postwar occupation] must be done.  But why should it be done by the Army?  The 
Army is specialized in destroying enemy armies.  Why should it be presumed to be 
specialized in the most complex and gigantic task of reconstruction the world has ever 
seen?”4  Even high ranking officials in the Army were skeptical about the prospect of 
American soldiers governing vast expanses of territory.  General George C. Marshall 
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expressed such concern in a discussion with the chief of the Civil Affairs Division, Major 
General John Hilldring:  
Our countrymen, our fellow citizens, are not afraid of us.  They don’t  
harbor any ideas that we intend to alter the government of the country or  
the nature of this government…We are completely devoted, we are a member of a 
priesthood really, the sole purpose of which is to defend the Republic. …  And I 
don’t want to permit the enormous corps of military governors that you are in the 
process of training and that you are going to dispatch all over the world, to damage 
this high regard in which the professional soldiers in the Army are held by our 
people, and it could happen … if you don’t understand what you are about.5 
 
Despite such resistance and skepticism, at war’s end, the Army administered the 
occupation of both liberated and conquered countries, and that administration would 
have major implications for the United States in the postwar world. 
The literature on the postwar occupations, particularly of Germany and Japan, is 
vast and deep, ranging from major works of synthesis to monographs on particular 
topics, but these studies tend to focus on the specific occupation experiences 
themselves; and they do not connect either backwards in time to reveal how the Army 
came to those occupations or outwards in scope to reveal how the Army’s particular 
doctrine, leadership, and implementation of policy had larger foreign policy 
consequences.6   There is also a significant body of literature on the high diplomacy of 
the war years, especially the Allied conferences at Yalta and Potsdam.  Undoubtedly, 
these conferences of the Allied national leaders resulted in many of the key decisions 
that led to the construction of the postwar world.7   But these conferences provided 
broad and often rather unclear guidance that required interpretation by an administrator.  
And for the United States, it was the American Army that specifically became the 
predominant administrator of postwar policy, and as a result not only enacted, but 
greatly influenced policy outcomes.   
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As the historical evidence indicates, the Army became the dominant US 
government actor in postwar occupation policy due to a variety of factors and 
circumstances that go beyond diplomatic documents or even the apparent national 
interests of the United States.  This study attempts to examine the factors and 
circumstances within the Army’s own institutional culture, to include its historical 
understanding of how postwar military governance was conducted prior to World War II, 
its creation and implementation of doctrine, training, and organization, and its ability as 
a governmental agency to represent its interests in the bureaucratic realm with not only 
other U.S. governmental organizations, but with organizations in allied governments as 
well.  As the concluding chapters on the particular occupations in Germany, Austria, and 
Korea reveal, the subsequent occupations thus were not simply driven by policy-making 
decisions from the United States Government that reflected a unified “national interest.”  
Those occupations were driven just as much if not more by the Army’s understanding of 
how postwar governance should be conducted in a multinational environment that 
included America’s postwar superpower rival, the Soviet Union.8  The emergence of a 
postwar foreign policy in the first years of the Cold War owed much to the actual 
decisions of the Army implementing postwar governance policy that it largely shaped 
and, in significant ways, actually created. 
The Army’s Strategic Culture Prior to and During World War II 
To understand the American Army’s approach to postwar governance during and 
after World War II, one must first understand its traditional distinction between warfare 
and politics.  Commentators have noted that at least for much of its history, the 
American Army did not view war as a Gestalt—as a whole comprising concrete and 
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abstract elements. Rather, it traditionally looked at war in a more linear way, with “ends, 
ways and means arranged hierarchically and linked to discrete levels of command. 9”  At 
the risk of generalization, the pre-World War II Army’s view reflected a far more 
“Jominian” than “Clausewitzian” approach in its extreme rationalization of conflict and in 
its desire to delineate carefully between what did and did not constitute conflict.10  
According to this thinking about high-level policymaking, or what might be called grand 
strategy, the Army throughout much of its history operated in an instrumental fashion, 
with higher strategy dictating, and the Army thus acting as the instrument or vessel to 
enact that strategy.  This Jominian approach stressed a maximum amount of order and 
control, often in the form of rules and laws, to include laws that regulated armed conflict.   
At the same time, the approach called for a binary view of war and politics. Military 
sociologist and theorist Samuel Huntington quoted a 1936 lecture to officers at the 
Army’s Command and General Staff College to highlight this point: 
Politics and strategy are radically and fundamentally things apart.  Strategy begins 
where politics ends.  All that soldiers ask is that once the policy is settled, strategy 
and command shall be regarded as something in a sphere apart from politics… 
The line of demarcation must be drawn between politics and strategy, supply, and 
operations.  Having found this line, all sides must abstain from trespassing.11 
 
Warfare was therefore seen as a method of last resort in which “politics” had failed.  
War had a starting point that indicated such failure, usually involving a formal 
declaration, and an end point, usually in surrender terms and/or a peace treaty.  
Furthermore, true war in the traditional American understanding was conventional, high-
intensity conflict between nation-states.  Therefore, the military took over, and in order 
to achieve victory, decisive and overwhelming force was required, and military, as 
opposed to political requirements, predominated. 
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The separateness of war and politics as a fundamental part of US military culture 
has been subject to debate and challenge.  Recently, much has been written about 
American participation in so-called “small wars” in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries, and some have taken those experiences as evidence to show that 
the American military did practice a kind of armed diplomacy, a deliberate use of force 
that interacted with political goals.12  But even the foremost practitioner of so-called 
“small wars,” the U.S. Marine Corps, itself institutionally did not consider a small war as 
war in its true form.  As its Small Wars Manual stated, “Small wars vary in degrees, from 
simple demonstrative operations to military intervention in the fullest sense, short of 
war.”13   
Indeed, this separation of the apparently purely “political” from the “military” was 
fundamental and axiomatic for senior US Army leaders during World War II.  They 
expressed the view that military objectives were distinguishable from purely political 
ones, and that during wartime and also importantly, in war’s aftermath, the former could 
not be sacrificed to the latter.  It reflected what is sometimes termed the “American way 
of war,” in which the requirements of absolute military victory are paramount, even over 
longer-range political objectives, and it therefore reflected what could also be termed 
the “American way of postwar,” in which the requirements of securing that victory held 
sway over similar political concerns.14  As Secretary of War Henry Stimson wrote, “Even 
in diplomatic questions…the major consideration was almost always the advancement 
of American victory.”15  Army Chief of Staff General George Marshall wrote to General 
Dwight Eisenhower as the war ended on the subject of a British recommendation to 
capture Prague.  He said that he was “loath to hazard American lives for purely political 
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purposes.”16  Indeed, Eisenhower remarked about Berlin that it was nothing but a 
geographical location” and that “[m]ilitary plans…should be devised with the single aim 
of speeding victory… .”17   
This focus on military objectives by senior Army leaders, a reflection of Army 
strategic culture at the time, had consequences relevant to postwar governance policy.  
A narrow focus on military goals actually made certain US Army officials less likely than 
State Department officials to perceive a long range Soviet threat—such a perception 
precisely overly “political.”  Averill Harriman, who served as wartime ambassador to the 
USSR, commented that he believed that both Marshall and Eisenhower were the 
slowest to recognize that there would be future difficulties with the Soviet Union, 
because for them Stalin had kept his military commitments, in particular having attacked 
the Germans in Operation Bagration shortly after the Normandy landings, and that, 
according to Harriman, “neither [was] involved in [the] political phase.”18   
Among several senior US military leaders, the alliance with the Soviet Union 
remained fairly strong as the war concluded, and the wartime capital that Stalin had 
spent provided reasons, in the minds of critical senior leaders, to continue to trust the 
Soviet Union and believe that mutual interests could be maintained in peacetime.  Even 
during the early occupation period, key senior U.S. military leaders were not 
predisposed toward an anti-Soviet viewpoint.  In 1946, Lucius Clay, for example, 
protested the establishment of Radio Liberty in Munich, which provided anti-Communist 
broadcasts, refused to offer support for conservative or moderate parties during the 
crucial elections in heavily Communist Berlin, and was “appalled” by George Kennan’s 
famous 1946 cable that set forth the containment strategy.19   In January of the same 
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year, Eisenhower addressed Congress on the slow pace of demobilization.   Noting that 
there were still over 600,000 soldiers assigned to the European theater, he justified their 
presence there based on the “primary and continuing mission of occupation duties,” and 
listed the Army’s responsibilities for “supervising all the headaches of a changeover 
from war to peace, with the added directive that we must make certain these people are 
so disarmed, both economically and in a military sense, that they cannot make war 
again.” 20  Yet not once in the address did he reference the Soviet Union: there was no 
word of any threat beyond that of the defeated enemies themselves.   
Of course, the military did not remain in total control of the occupations throughout 
the years of military government.  As both V-E and V-J Days receded from view, the 
State Department in particular began to reassert its authority to conduct foreign policy.  
After years of neglect or indifference by Roosevelt, Truman insisted that the State 
Department be a much more forceful agency.  Assistant Secretary of War John McCloy, 
who played a major role in assuring the Army’s dominance in postwar governance 
planning, himself saw as early as October 1945 that U.S. policy had been too 
immediately focused on the “immediate debris of active warfare,” and that there needed 
to be greater emphasis and consultation with native leaders on “matters relating to their 
social, economic, and political restoration.”21  And by the spring of 1946, the State 
Department would establish the position of Assistant Secretary of State for Occupied 
Areas, charged with the responsibility “for coordinating the formulation of policy for 
Occupied Areas” and to “assure that fully coordinated United States Government 
policies are developed by the State Department and supplied the Army, as executive 
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agent… .”22  According to the new Assistant Secretary of State, the establishment of the 
position was a “first step” in reorienting the “relationship between State and War.”23  
Yet by the time the State Department began to reassert its traditional role in foreign 
policy matters, U.S. military government doctrine, organization, and leadership had 
already deeply influenced the environments where that foreign policy would operate.  
Indeed, the Cold War began during the post World War II occupations, and some of its 
most contentious issues were framed by preceding military government planning and 
policies, and by decisions of military government officials, many of whom did not 
necessarily contemplate the worldwide struggle that the Cold War would become.   
Understanding the Army’s Institutional Culture Prior to and During World War II 
The above brief survey of the Army’s strategic culture prior to and during World War 
II, particularly its distinction between war and politics, and between military and political 
objectives, provides context, but is only the starting point for understanding why and 
how the Army came to dominant postwar governance planning, and how that 
dominance thus shaped postwar occupations.  There must further be an understanding 
of the Army’s own particular institutional culture, and how that culture informed thinking 
and practice when it came to planning and conducting postwar military government.  
The overarching strategic understanding that viewed military goals as predominating 
over longer term political goals connected powerfully with the Army culture that also saw 
the need for specifically military government, with uniformed officials serving as 
commanders, high commissioners, and governors of occupied territories.  That culture 
developed internally and through time, through a series of internal decisions that led to 
changes in institutional doctrine, education, training and organization.     
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A thorough understanding of how the Army gained predominance in postwar 
governance following World War II thus requires a close inspection of that doctrine, 
education, training, and organization of the Army before and during World War II.  Such 
a detailed study has been done of other armies.  In her book, Absolute Destruction: 
Military Culture and the Practices of War in Imperial Germany, historian Isabel Hull 
refers to the “continuities in military practices, doctrines, and micrologics” that in the 
case of the German army led to a cultural climate that permitted it to transgress legal 
and moral boundaries before and during World War I.24  Specifically, despite the 
presence of internationally agreed upon norms in the late 19th and early 20th centuries,  
a set of particular circumstances unique to the Germany Army led to the acceptance 
and practice of atrocity both during and after conflict, circumstances which included the 
Army’s experiences fighting French partisans during the 1870-71 Franco-Prussian War,  
the Army’s understanding of “military necessity,”  and its view that  battles of 
“annihilation” were the preferred way to achieve absolute victory.25  Hull’s study thus 
points out how the particular Imperial German Army’s culture, and not only the 
experiences of “total war” or other external phenomenon, drew it to an acceptance and 
justification of atrocity.  
The same level of detailed analysis into the interior practice of the American Army 
before, during, and after World War II reveals a culture that formed its own unique 
conception of postwar occupations, notably different from Germany’s, and 
correspondingly with a different understanding of how to treat civilians in such 
environments.  For example, the 1863 Lieber Code, which provided a basic set of rules 
for the treatment of civilians, was an internally created document, and not externally 
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imposed.  It actually preceded The Hague and Geneva Conventions (and influenced 
them) by several decades.  “Military necessity,” a phrase used in the Lieber Code, was, 
as it was in the Germany Army, a concept of overriding importance, but qualified with 
restraints that, at least in theory and doctrine, did not allow warfare to be practiced in 
extremis against civilian populations.  Furthermore, the primary historical experience 
that shaped the American Army’s conception of post-World War II governance was not 
brutal guerrilla warfare (even though the Army had had its share, particularly during the 
insurgency in the Philippines) but the relatively benign Rhineland Occupation that 
followed World War I.  The Rhineland Occupation was actually atypical in terms of the 
American Army’s experience.  Most of the Army’s occupations followed conflicts that 
were not conventional wars on such a total scale.  Nonetheless, the Rhineland 
Occupation was central to the Army’s understanding of postwar occupations because it 
best fit the paradigmatic conventional war mission that Army leaders believed was the 
Army’s primary function. 
An understanding of how the U.S. Army developed and implemented post-World 
War II governance policy in occupied territories casts light on not only the Army’s own 
culture and history.  At the same time, the Army’s cultural understanding of war did not 
occur in a vacuum but in an interactive environment, where the Army, along with other 
governmental institutions, fought for primacy in administering the postwar occupations.  
In this institutional domain, the Army competed with other agencies in the Roosevelt 
and Truman administrations, and because of a variety of factors, became the dominant 
agency in postwar planning.  Fully examining internal practice and the Army’s 
interactions with other agencies also helps to reveal the overlooked connection between 
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the military objectives of post-World War II occupations and their political consequences 
during the early Cold War.  Politics and ideology, as this study intends to reveal, do not 
necessarily control a nation’s policies or even determine its interests.  They are often 
controlled and determined by subordinates making decisions in the immediacy of events 
and guided by doctrine and policies that reflect a particular agency’s outlook and 
culture. 
In constructing the historical milieu in which this competition occurred, I have relied 
on insights in the fields of military and institutional sociology as well as international 
relations theory, particularly the international relations theory of so-called political 
“constructivism.”26  I acknowledge that history’s contingencies should not be bound by 
theory.  Nonetheless, the theoretical work in these fields has helped frame, illuminate 
and possibly clarify crucial parts of the story of how the Army became the dominant 
agent of postwar occupation.  Throughout and implicit in this study, key theoretical 
concepts in both military and institutional sociology and international relations inform the 
study’s narrative.    
One of the seminal works of military sociology is Samuel Huntington’s famous work 
The Soldier and the State, which contends that in the United States the civil-military 
relationship is defined by a meaningful distinction between military and civilian roles; 
that a key to civilian control is professionalism; and that the American military must 
retain autonomous and independent within its own sphere of expertise in order to retain 
its professional capability.  What has occurred in the history of the American military, 
according to Huntington, is that it has internalized as part of its professional ethos the 
idea of not challenging civilian control of the military.  Part of its very nature as an 
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identity as a “profession” derives from this concept.  In return, civilians largely permit the 
military a wide grant of autonomy in its area of expertise.27  
Huntington’s emphasis on military professionalization helps one understand how the 
Army developed its own professional standards, particularly during the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries.  It is especially useful in understanding the way the Army 
approached postwar occupation after World War II.  It helps to clarify the Army’s 
reconciliation of the political and military dimensions of occupation.  It also illuminates 
the interagency disputes between it and other civilian governmental agencies during 
World War II.  Clearly military government fell into a grayer area than more purely 
military questions such as campaign strategy and battlefield tactics.  Indeed, military 
government bridged, often uncomfortably, the military/political divide the Army’s 
strategic culture emphasized.  Yet the Army itself actively pushed for military 
government as the best method of postwar governance. 
Huntington’s analysis assists in focusing on relevant historical evidence.   An 
examination of Army doctrine, education, and training provided Army officials with an 
expert body of knowledge that would allow them to conduct military government.  The 
Army’s ethos of professionalism, in other words, caused it to build internally a set of 
practices to implement military government.  Yet it did so in a way that nonetheless 
emphasized the military-civilian (and thus the “political”) division.  Specifically, by relying 
on numerous examples through its history, the Army’s theory of military government 
rested on two overarching principles, that while quite basic, were of great import, not 
only because of the repeated emphasis placed upon them by senior military leaders, but 
also because they were a logical corollary to American strategic thinking about the 
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subordination of political to military ends.  First, during the initial phases of occupation, 
“military necessity” meant that military objectives were paramount and more “political” 
ones subsidiary.  Given the totality of World War II and the subordination of political to 
military ends throughout the war, it was not a large step to take to show that the Army 
should have primary “wake of battle” responsibilities to ensure victory was lasting.  But 
there was also a second overarching principle in U.S. Army military government 
doctrine: that principle was the desire to return to local civilians control of the occupied 
area as quickly as possible.  The Army had internalized the concept that to conduct 
prolonged occupations was clearly beyond its expertise.  To depart from this model 
would be just as professionally contradictory as it would be to attempt to usurp the 
notion of civilian control. American military government essentially harmonized military 
interests of assurance of victory with civilian concerns about military takeovers of 
foreign policy.  The particular public statements of trusted agents such as Marshall and 
Eisenhower during and after the war provided reassurance that no such takeover would 
occur.  And indeed it did not.  Though the Army was indeed extremely influential, and 
even the dominant foreign policy actor for the first year, the State Department, as the 
traditional U.S. civilian policy actor, in all cases eventually took over the Army’s 
authority. 
If military sociology, particularly Huntington’s sociological analysis, provides a way 
to understand conceptually how military government emerged the way it did before, 
during and after World War II, institutional sociology, especially the so-called “new 
institutionalism,” provides a way to understand more fully how the Army transformed as 
a result of various societal influences, and how it interacted as an institution with other 
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governmental institutions.  In contrast to models which tend to posit institutions as static 
entities or as based on rational-actor models, new institutional theory looks to 
institutions as not only dynamic and changing entities but as themselves independent 
variables that have cultural significance and that influence individuals within them and 
the societies in which they are located.28   As Walter Powell and Paul Dimaggio state, 
“Institutions do not just constrain options: they establish the very criteria by which 
people discover their preferences.”29   
If this is the case, then it is necessary not simply to look at the “state interests” or 
even national strategy or perceived threats of the United States in determining why the 
postwar occupations were Army-executed.30  It is also necessary to look within an 
influencing institution such as the Army and determine what that institution did during 
that period that may have, in turn, influenced policy and interest.  It is necessary to 
understand the precedent period to understand how that influence came to be.     
This can be done via different sociological approaches that have often been applied 
to the U.S. military.31  Thus, using a sociological typology of social organizations, one 
can examine the pre-World War II and World War II Army in a number of ways.  The 
Army can be analyzed as an institution from the point of view of its structural nature—its 
emphasis on formality, specialized functions, rules, records, and routines.32  It can also 
be examined on its organizational type, such as a business, bureaucracy, or 
profession.33  It can also be analyzed as an interacting organization that competes with 
and negotiates space with other organizations.34  This study employs all three 
approaches.  It analyzes the Army as both a rule-bound and rule-creating entity.  Indeed 
the formulation of military government doctrine is of key importance in understanding 
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how the Army was successful in gaining control over the postwar occupation.  The 
Army’s continuing professionalization, especially in the period between the World Wars 
at its premier educational institution, the Army War College, reveals how the institution 
essentially established the procedures that would govern postwar occupation practice.  
Finally, it also analyzes the Army as a bureaucratic organization that worked alongside 
other governmental organizations whose interests and viewpoints sometimes 
harmonized with yet also frequently clashed with those of the Army.       
Beyond all these perspectives, the Army can be viewed as an organizational 
culture, which consists of “taken-for-granted values, underlying assumptions, 
expectations, collective memories, and definitions present in an organization.”35   These 
values, norms, and underlying assumptions derive from either explicit or implicit 
unwritten “rules.”36   Much post-World War II military government practice was grounded 
both in international rules and internal military rules and regulations.  But these rules 
and regulations were not simply external,  but were interpreted and mediated by cultural 
and institutional practices that were based in the Army’s culture, a culture that was not 
only controlled by coercive mechanisms that compelled obedience, but also informed by 
normative constructions of rules, regulations, and modes of behavior.37  Many of the 
key leaders in the Army, as well as senior civilian leaders in the War Department, were 
men who had formed opinions about fundamental concepts regarding the Army’s role in 
war and peace.  Particularly revealing are not only the actions and motivations of high-
ranking officials, such as Secretary of War Henry Stimson,  Assistant Secretary of War 
John McCloy and the military governors of occupied territories such as Generals Clay, 
Clark, and Hodge, but also of other lesser known officials, such as Provost Marshal of 
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the Army Major General Allen Gullion, Military Government Division Director Colonel 
Jesse Miller and others, to include junior ranking officers and enlisted soldiers, and even 
family members of military personnel.  
Such perceptions were shaped by powerful assumptions about the separation of 
military objectives from political ones, and for the absolute primacy of military necessity, 
particularly in wartime operations.  Indeed, the concept of “military necessity” would 
frequently achieve near-totemic status, a principle that virtually by its evocation would 
override all other concerns.  Indeed, the principal reason why the Army gained primacy 
in the execution of the postwar occupations was its fusion of the concept of military 
necessity into its version of military government.     
In addition to military and institutional sociology, constructivist political theory 
provides useful conceptual insights into how Army cultural imperatives led to its control 
of the postwar occupations.  In recent years, this theory of international relations has 
challenged traditional “realist” notions of how nations interact, and how organizations 
within such nations influence those nations’ behaviors.  Traditional “realist” notions have 
posited nations as autonomous entities that interact with each other based on 
exogenous “interests” and typically downplay or ignore altogether questions about the 
identities, norms, and values that those nations, or organizations within those nations, 
possess.38   
The central theme of constructivist theory proceeds from the premise that the 
identities of the organizations and domestic societies which comprise states, in turn, 
powerfully influence the identities and hence policies and interests of those states.39  
Political identities of states are largely social constructions that often precede and 
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always inform state interests.   State actors bring identities to the table of international 
relations, and those identities are formed through the interaction of organizations within 
those states, to include the interplay of ideas, social structures, and patterns of 
behavior.40  These identities may be consciously formed or not, may arise 
spontaneously or be planned. 41   As political theorist Bill McSweeney points out, 
“Actors acquire identities defined as ‘relatively stable, role-specific understandings and 
expectations about self’ by participating in collective meanings.  Identity is inherently 
relational and identity is the basis of interests.”42  
A constructivist approach allows the reopening of conceived propositions.  Why did 
the United States not seek other ways to conduct postwar occupations?   The particular 
form of military government used by the United States in occupied territories was not 
the inevitable solution.  Roosevelt himself frequently stated he did not think the military 
was appropriate to conduct such operations. Many influential members of his Cabinet 
openly and vigorously opposed a military-run postwar occupation scheme.   At the very 
least, it is arguable that while military forces could have executed postwar policy, it 
would have better served the national interest to have the senior-level executors of the 
postwar occupations be civilians as soon as possible following the control of the 
occupied territories, especially given that one of the main reasons for fighting the war 
was to rid the world of the militarist authoritarianism exemplified by the Axis powers.  
Constructivist theory helps answer why a civilian approach did not occur.  For as 
constructivism makes clear, governmental institutions, even military ones, are not 
simply instruments that the state, in turn, uses to pursue national interests.  Instead, the 
cultural identity of a military institution can shape that institution’s interests, which in turn 
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can shape political and even international interests.43  The identity of a military 
institution within a larger national culture can profoundly influence the policies and even 
interests of that nation.  As French military historian Elizabeth Kier points out, what a 
“military perceives to be in its interests is a function of its culture.”  Likewise, domestic 
political actors, through the assumptions they hold about a military’s role in society, and 
the constraints they impose, will, in turn, shape, even if indirectly, military doctrine and 
policy, and as a result, strategy.44  This does not discount the reality that states and 
their militaries take into account perceived enemy threats.  Rather, an examination of 
military culture and identity reveals that a convergence of several factors, some of which 
involve notions of national security, others of which involve notions of internal 
organizational coherence, and still others of which respond to external pressures and 
concerns, all work together to shape and influence larger strategic policy and perceived 
state interests. 
Kier points out that in determining what a particular military culture looks like, and in 
determining what possible interaction the military culture may have with outside 
agencies, this requires examination of such material as curricula at military academies, 
personal histories of officers, internal communications within the organization, and 
military publications.45  In examining these sources, the particular practices of the 
military organization, as opposed to general conditions and mindsets common to most 
militaries-thus reveal the interplay of forces that shape internal policy as well as 
influence external behaviors. 
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Why and How the Army Became the Lead Agency 
Such theoretical tools help to answer essential questions.   Specifically, why and 
how did the Army become the lead agent in occupation responsibilities and thus come 
to figure so importantly in postwar foreign affairs?  There are several interrelated 
reasons.  The first has to do with a professionalization of the Army that had been 
occurring throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, a professionalization 
that was driven by reformers such as Elihu Root, and was realized in the Army’s 
educational institutions such as its War College, founded by Root in 1903.  Particularly 
at the Army War College, students began researching and proposing strategic ideas 
that went far beyond the normal province of campaigns and battles and ventured into 
civil-military realms, such as the occupation of territories after the termination of conflict.  
These ideas were often elementary and were usually considered peripheral in relation 
to other War College studies—indeed, generally they were appendices to other studies 
that dealt with more traditional warfighting tasks.  Nevertheless, there is an undeniable 
resemblance between what these studies proposed and policies and procedures later 
adopted. 
This professionalization was closely linked with a second reason—the creation of a 
body of law in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries regarding the rules of 
armed conflict.  The United States Army’s own famous Lieber Code of 1863 remarkably 
forecast many of the rules of conduct later embodied in international law, especially in 
the Geneva and Hague Conventions.  The American Army came to link the conception 
of military government with the rules of such government from Lieber to Hague, and it 
also expanded on those notions.  For example, it crafted an interpretation of the 
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fundamental principle of “military necessity,” a notion also encoded within the laws of 
armed conflict-and turned it into a powerful, overriding conception, as evidenced by the 
use of that concept not only abroad but at home, as seen in the sweeping powers given 
to the Army in Hawaii and on the West Coast (within the purview of the Western 
Defense Zone) during the war.   
The Army’s development and creation of internal doctrine is a third key factor.  It 
took these rules and encoded them within its own institution. It used the concepts of 
international law regarding postwar occupation in creating a specific doctrine for its 
forces.  It then used this doctrine to train and organize for military government, setting 
up a program years before any conquest of enemy territories occurred. 
The relatively weak civilian opposition to the Army over primary responsibilities in 
postwar matters is another reason why the Army became dominant in the occupations.  
Whereas the Army was able to organize, train, and plan according to a coherent set of 
doctrinal principles, civilian agencies could not.  Throughout the early years of 
America’s involvement in World War II, Roosevelt and others in his Cabinet set up 
multiple agencies, boards, and committees, and all had roles and responsibilities that 
were meant to be at least equal if not more important than the Army’s.  Yet these bodies 
simply lacked the fundamental cultural underpinnings and coherent internal doctrines 
that the Army had.  Nearly as importantly, they were essentially ad hoc, put together in 
a seemingly rushed and incomplete manner, and often lacked a clear direction, 
especially in relation to corresponding War Department purposes.  Often such 
organizations were at cross-purposes and wracked with internal dispute.   
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The practical failing of civilian organizations in the governance of territories, 
especially during the North African campaign of 1942-43 is another reason for the 
Army’s ultimate prevalence. This reason cannot be viewed in isolation.  Well before it 
officially became the principal agent for postwar responsibilities, the Army had written a 
doctrine, established a training school, and built up a formidable organizational structure 
for the conduct of what it called civil affairs.  It was during the North African campaign 
that the Civil Affairs Division was established within the War Department, largely 
supplanting or making unnecessary many of the civilian agencies that were or could 
have been involved in the postwar governance in occupied territories.   Roosevelt, in 
other words, was able to turn to the Army in large part because the Army had 
mechanisms at hand to deal with the requirements that lay ahead. 
The final reason has to do with the strategic and managerial skill of President 
Roosevelt.  FDR’s role as ultimate decider of which agency would have primary postwar 
responsibility was of great importance.  During World War II, he saw himself as a war 
president and made military officials of greater importance than any others in his 
administration, to the particular diminishment of the Secretary of State.  He assembled 
the so-called War Cabinet that contained lifelong Republicans such as Henry Stimson 
and staunch New Dealers such as Harold Ickes.  FDR did so in large part to assemble a 
coalition to both be reelected in 1940 and to conduct a war that would require unity 
across the political spectrum.  Some historians argue Roosevelt was indeed a masterful 
strategist who deliberately forged consensus at times, and at other times allowed friction 
and debate, all with the view of ultimately leading the country in a united effort to win the 
war.46  FDR deliberately deferred key decisions about who should run the postwar 
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occupations as a way to avoid fracturing consensus: he ultimately chose the military to 
run the occupations as a way to ensure that the populace did not think that the New 
Deal would be exported abroad at the expense of domestic concerns.   Another 
conclusion is that FDR’s motives were not so pure and his actions not so brilliantly 
calculated, that in fact he did not want the Army to run the postwar occupations but that 
because he was an inept manager of the executive branch, the decision fell to the Army 
virtually by default.  Indeed, the historical record apparently indicates that the President 
was both shrewd strategist and poor manager.  The end result of the military running 
the postwar occupations was influenced by both FDR’s strategic and managerial 
abilities.                
What all these reasons reveal is a set of simple yet important principles.  First, 
institutions and their cultures are of tremendous significance.  In order to understand 
how policies ultimately become formulated, one must understand the organizations, and 
the cultures of those organizations, from which they emerged.  Second, not only are the 
organizational cultures significant, but the contexts in which imperatives emerge are of 
equal importance.  It was not simply that the American Army professionalized during the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.  It also did so while there was a 
corresponding legalization of armed conflict.  The two strands of professionalization and 
legalization wove together as Army officers became increasingly educated in areas 
previously ignored or considered beyond the military province.  It is also important to 
understand that a military institution does not simply engage with an “enemy”—usually 
the military of a foreign power.  It also is an agency within the organization of a national 
government and therefore interacts with other agencies in that government as well.  
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Within that domain, considerations often overlooked in standard military analyses—the 
role of domestic politics and of other organizational imperatives and interests—have 
great significance.   
This study makes no claim about which agency ultimately was the correct one to 
conduct America’s postwar occupations.  While it may appear logical to some that the 
Army did so, there are ample reasons to argue otherwise.  What is clear however, from 
the historical evidence is that the Army was able to achieve an internal consensus about 
how to conduct postwar occupations.  Civilian agencies, however, failed to do so.  And 
so the Army became the administrator and, to a large degree, profoundly shaped 
foreign policy in occupied territories in the first years following World War II, the first 
years of the Cold War. 
The Postwar Occupations and the Coming of the Cold War 
There is a second question that also needs to be examined:  how did the 
specifically military character of those occupations influence foreign policy outcomes 
during the post-World War II period, especially the first years of the Cold War?  The 
result of the Army’s domination of early postwar governance policy led to political 
configurations in US- occupied countries that reflected military-oriented approaches and 
solutions.  Whether the country was conquered and its central government destroyed 
(Germany), whether it was a country that was severed from a former enemy, (Austria), 
or whether it was ostensibly liberated (Korea)—in all cases, military governance meant 
that policy would orient around military organizational structures, reflect military 
doctrine, and be led, at least in the occupied countries themselves, by military officers.  
While undoubtedly other U.S. agencies, particularly the State Department, asserted the 
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right and authority to set American strategic policy in those nations, any policy enacted 
occurred via Army military government organization, doctrine, and leadership.   
The period from the surrenders in Europe and the Pacific (May and September 
1945) to mid to late 1946—approximately a year to a year and a half—was one of 
profound uncertainty.  And while the Cold War was definitely starting, relationships 
between the Soviet Union and the United States were straining, but had not yet broken 
down.   What occurred during this period was of special importance, particularly in the 
countries where both the U.S. and U.S.S.R. were occupiers.  In those nations-- 
Germany, Austria, and Korea-- what was often determinative was not necessarily the 
political or ideological constructions that would later be seen as defining the Cold War—
the various pronouncements, doctrines, and agendas from strategic leaders.  Indeed 
during the 1945-46 period, many of these sorts of statements were yet to be made.   
Rather, on-the-ground interpretations of policy, and even on-the-ground decisions 
made by military leaders themselves, shaped, sometimes conclusively, the political 
landscapes in those occupied nations for years to come.  General Lucius Clay’s efforts 
at promoting a kind of federalist election process in the American zone in Germany, 
General Mark Clark’s recognition of the Renner government in Austria, and Lieutenant 
General John Hodge’s (and others’) missteps during the early period of the Korean 
military government, were all examples of how on-the-ground decisions made by U.S. 
Army leaders, often reflecting particularly American Army conceptions of postwar 
governance, were highly influential in the shaping of the postwar, and early Cold War, 
world.  These on-the-ground moves had results both positive and negative to occupiers 
and occupants: if Clark’s pushing for the Renner government contributed not only to an 
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eventually neutralized Austria; Clay’s federalist efforts did contribute to a growing 
political divergence with the Soviet zone, and to the West-East German division.     
Just as important, if not more so, were the actions of the occupants themselves.  
Military government doctrine, organization, and the actions of Army leaders sometimes 
clashed, and sometimes were in conformity with, the needs and desires of the local 
populations.    American military government was most successful when the military 
government doctrinal and organizational model was best suited to the locale of 
occupation, and where the military government leadership responded most fully to local 
actors, as in Austria, and least successful, when the model was poorly suited to local 
conditions and where military leadership was less responsive to local needs.   
An understanding of how the U.S. Army developed and implemented post-World 
War II governance policy in occupied territories thus casts light on not only the Army’s 
own culture and history, but also its role in interagency policymaking during and after 
World War II.  It also helps reveal the connection between military objectives of World 
War II and later political concerns of the early Cold War.  Politics and ideology, as this 
study intends to reveal, do not necessarily control a nation’s policies, or even determine 
its interests.  They are often controlled and determined by subordinates making 
decisions in the immediacy of events, and guided by doctrine and policies that reflect a 
particular agency’s outlook and culture.  They are further guided by extra-governmental 
actors that equally influence strategic outcomes. 
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Chapter 2 - Military Government Planning Prior to 1940 
The Army’s dominance in the planning and execution of post-World War II 
governance has its origins in practices that extended back into the mid-nineteenth 
century.  This included its internal adoption of laws regulating treatment of civilians, and 
its acceptance and application of laws of international conflict, in particular the Geneva 
and Hague Conventions.  The most influential experience was the Rhineland 
occupation following World War I.  That occupation in particular led to the development 
of occupation methods and concepts at the Army War College in the 1920s and 30s.  
Those methods and concepts in turn formed the basis of the Army’s military government 
doctrine.   
It is important to note that those methods, concepts, and ultimate doctrine, was 
almost entirely created within the Army itself, with little to no guidance from other U.S. 
governmental agencies.  Whatever subsequent policy determinations were made by the 
President and other high-level officials regarding military government during and after 
World War II, the template for that government had already been developed, a template 
constructed according to the Army’s own culture and understanding of how to conduct 
postwar occupations.  The consequences were far-reaching and would culminate in the 
Army administering the post-World War II occupations of liberated and conquered 
territories around the globe and greatly influencing American foreign policy during the 
early years of the Cold War.   
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Legalizing Armed Conflict 
The Army’s handling of civilian populations dated back to the Mexican War.1  
During and following the Mexican War (1846-1848), for example, General Winfield Scott 
issued a general order throughout conquered Mexican territory that provided for martial 
law, the establishment of provost courts, and military commissions.  In order to ensure 
good order after victory, and to minimize the need for large-scale occupation, he was 
mindful of the need for good civic relations.  He directed his soldiers to salute priests 
and magistrates, for example, and though a Protestant, regularly attended Mass in Vera 
Cruz and even marched in a religious procession.  Scott’s military government rested on 
two fundamental principles that would be elaborated and fully developed during the 
Second World War.  First, the primary function of military government was to ensure the 
accomplishment of the military mission.  Scott had no directive to rebuild or reorder 
Mexican society; his goal was fundamentally to ensure that that battlefield success was 
not undermined in its wake.  Secondly, military necessity was nonetheless premised on 
providing for basic needs of the civilian society.  Allowing for wholesale pillaging and 
devastation only undermined earlier victory.2   
During the Civil War, the Union Army’s famous Lieber Code of 1863, known as 
General Orders No. 100, was written by German-American jurist Francis Lieber.  Lieber  
had convinced Union General-in-Chief Henry Halleck that, in the American Civil War, a 
conflict fought largely by relatively inexperienced and amateurish militaries, a code of 
rules was necessary to control and guide behavior.3  Its purpose was simultaneously 
idealistic and pragmatic.  Lieber wrote to Halleck on its publication that it was a 
“contribution by the United States to the stock of common civilization.”  At the same 
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time, he saw the Code’s need to control the widespread destruction of property in 
practical terms: “[Such damage] does incalculable injury.  It demoralizes our troops; it 
annihilates wealth irrecoverably, and makes a return to the state of peace more and 
more difficult.”4  It was arguably the first attempt by a fighting force to encode a set of 
rules regarding the treatment of prisoners, the protection of civilians, and  the 
application of “military necessity”—that is, the point at which military requirements could 
overrule otherwise legal restrictions.5     
The Lieber Code did not mention specifically military government.  It did place the 
actions of the Federal troops within the framework of the related legal construct of 
martial law.  The opening paragraph of the Code conflated martial law and military 
government by asserting “A place, district, or country occupied by an enemy stands, in 
consequence of the occupation, under the martial law of the invading or occupying 
army.”6  The power of martial law was seemingly absolute, since it included “the 
suspension by the occupying military authority of the criminal and civil law, and of the 
domestic administration and government in the occupied place or territory….”7  But the 
Lieber Code also mitigated the apparent unlimited nature of martial law.  It stated that 
such authority “disclaimed all cruelty and bad faith.”8  It also had language that stressed 
that the conquered/occupied populace should attempt to carry on life in as normal a 
fashion as possible—civilians could not be forced into the service of the victorious army, 
for the most part private property was to be respected, and civil servants should 
continue to be paid.9  The rationale for this was not exclusively benevolent.  In fact, in 
the words of historian Geoffrey Best, the Lieber Code was an example “close to 
perfection” of the “arch-occupier” model10  The arch-occupier model stressed that the 
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population stay at work and attempt to continue life as normally as possible, in order to 
cause little to no interference with military operations.11   
The American Army accepted the Lieber Code’s basic principles.  The fact that the 
Code was an internally generated document, in the form of a general order no less, and 
not imposed by international requirement was a source of some pride among the officer 
corps.  It was praised by George B. Davis, Judge Advocate General of the Army and a 
delegate plenipotentiary to the Geneva and Hague Conferences, for being a generation 
ahead of its time, and for influencing much of the later Geneva and Hague Conventions 
and Regulations.12  At the same time, its strictures were ambiguous and open-ended to 
suit whatever requirements were on hand.   Its notions of “military necessity” were also 
used as a defense by officers accused of torturing Filipino insurgents during the 1899-
1903 Philippine Insurrection.13   As military historian Brian McAllister Linn points out, the 
Lieber Code was the legalized manifestation of an American military mindset prevalent 
in the nineteenth century that arose as a result from the Civil War and the Army’s  
constabulary duties on the frontier and elsewhere. 14   Specifically, Army leaders formed 
a contractual relationship with conquered populations:  on the one hand, the Army 
would attempt to treat the civilians humanely; for their part, civilians had to abide by 
rules of good behavior in order to allow the Army to achieve its mission.15  
Following the Lieber Code, other rules and requirements codified in international 
treaties, such as the Geneva Conventions of 1864 and 1868, the St. Petersburg 
Conventions of 1868, and the Brussels Convention of 1874, all provided an increasing 
control over what states could and could not do during and after hostilities.16   Most 
significantly, the rules that provided the fullest treatment of military occupation were The 
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Hague Conventions and Declarations of 1899 and 1907, which the Army accepted, and 
made part of its doctrinal practice.17  Prompted by Russian Foreign Minister Count 
Mouravieff in 1898 and then later by President Theodore Roosevelt following the 
Russo-Japanese War, The Hague Conventions not only dealt with rules about weapons 
and treatment of prisoners and noncombatants, they also specifically addressed, in 
section III, military authority over hostile territory, the military’s responsibilities while 
conducting an occupation, and civilian rights in occupied territory.18    
Much of the purpose and language of the Conventions was similar to the Lieber 
Code’s.  Fifteen articles in the Conventions stated the responsibilities of occupying 
armies.  Article 43, for example, required the occupying power to restore public order, 
and Articles 44 and 45 asserted that inhabitants could not be forced to provide 
information about their nation’s military or be required to swear allegiance to the 
occupying power.19  Article 47 prohibited pillaging, and Article 49 only permitted levying 
the population for military purposes if military necessity requires it.20  The Conventions 
also implied a contractual relationship between occupier and occupants: Article 55, for 
example, held the occupying force as a usufruct for the territory it occupied and also 
required the force to safeguard public buildings and agricultural and real property in 
order for them to be in sufficient working condition when the occupation ended.21   
The United States was a signatory to both the 1899 and 1907 Conventions, and the 
Army incorporated The Hague’s requirements into its increasingly legalistic 
understanding of war.22  An example that predated The Hague Conventions, but that 
nonetheless revealed the Army’s willingness to incorporate such legalistic ideas about 
postwar responsibilities, was the 1892 work, Military Government and Martial Law, by 
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William E. Birkhimer, an Army First Lieutenant and adjutant.  Military Government and 
Martial Law was a lengthy treatise on both subjects and it fully recognized the 
application of legal concepts of postwar occupation.23  Birkhimer was a soldier as well 
as a scholar who had been part of much of, and thus reflected, the American military 
experience in the nineteenth century.  Born in 1848, he entered the Civil War as a 
private in the Union Army and rose to the rank of Brigadier General in the Regular Army 
in 1906.  His post- Civil War service began with his graduation from West Point in 1870.  
He later served as judge advocate for the Department of Columbia from 1886 to 1890 
and he won the Congressional Medal of Honor while in the Philippines in 1899 fighting 
insurgent forces.  His service in constabulary-style military actions formed the basis of 
his writing Military Government and Martial Law, which was, in the words of Major 
General George B. Davis, the Army’s Judge Advocate General from 1901 to 1911, “the 
most complete treatise on the subject in the English language.”24 
Distinguishing the occupation of foreign nations (military government) from the 
imposition of military control within one’s own country (martial law), Birkhimer placed the 
notion of military government within a highly legalistic understanding of both the role of 
states and the role of international law in establishing rules for postwar governance of 
conquered states.25  States could lawfully engage in war, and military government’s 
prerogatives and responsibilities came from that lawful right.26  Birkhimer further noted 
that while, throughout most of history, victory gave a conqueror unlimited authority over 
a conquered nation and the property therein, the increasing regulation of the nation- 
state system in the nineteenth century had set limits upon the conqueror’s ability to do 
as he chose.27   
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Into the twentieth century, the Army continued to incorporate both Geneva and 
Hague Conventions into its training.  War Department Bulletins published the texts of 
the conventions at the outbreak of World War I.28  In a 1914 lecture to Army medical 
officers, Lieutenant Colonel John Biddle Porter, a judge advocate, discussed not only 
the efforts throughout the nineteenth century to “codify the customs of war and to obtain 
for them a code of international recognition.”  He also noted the explicit connection 
between these rules and the Army’s own Lieber Code, the “first code of the laws of war 
which were ever published…the code adopted at The Hague Convention in 
1907…departs but little in principle from the code of 1863.”29  He concluded his lecture 
by stating that  
Every officer of the army should be familiar with all those conventions which bear on 
war, and I would strongly advise all officers to procure a copy of the various 
conventions, study them in time of peace and not wait to familiarize themselves with 
the law at the moment when a crisis arises and a thousand other duties call upon 
their time.30 
 
Ultimately, The Hague Conventions would become an official part of Army policy and 
doctrine.  In 1914, the Rules of Land Warfare, which replaced General Orders 100, 
referenced The Hague Conventions (these included the articles on occupation duties).  
The Rules of Land Warfare would subsequently be updated twice, in 1934 and in 1940 
as Field Manual (FM) 27-10, which was even more expansive, including interpretations 
of post-Hague treaties to which the U.S. was a signatory.31       
A Professional Force 
Efforts at providing legal standards for the Army in both war and postwar 
circumstances were consistent with the reforms within the Army during the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth century as well.  In particular, after the colossal failures 
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of planning and logistics mobilizing for the Spanish-American War, Secretary of War 
Elihu Root and similar reformers determined to change the Army from a constabulary 
force  that had largely confined itself to patrolling the frontier and manning coastal 
defenses into an organization capable of asserting American power on a global scale, 
through an increasing professionalization of the officer corps into a more sophisticated, 
knowledgeable, and responsive group.32   
Senior leaders in the Army were also attempting to reach out to American citizens in 
efforts to show the utility and purpose of the military in ways not simply associated with 
combat.  In a 1915 address entitled “The Civil Obligation of the Army,” a prominent 
Army reformer, Major General Leonard Wood, pointed out that the Army was capable of 
carrying out a number of tasks other than winning battles.  These included discovering 
the causes of typhoid and combating yellow fever in the tropics.  Such capabilities also 
included administering civil governments after the conclusion of hostilities: 
[I]t should be remembered also that it, the military army, established and 
maintained a civil government in P[uer]rto Rico, Cuba, and the Philippines, and 
conducted these governments with great success--in Cuba up to the point of the 
transfer to the Cuban people of a completely organized republic, and in P[uer]rto 
Rico until the transfer to the American government; likewise in the Philippines the 
military authorities were in full charge during the most trying period and turned 
over to the civil commission which followed them a well-organized government 
and a well-filled treasury.33  
 
Wood’s comments reflected the Army’s relative confidence in its capability to conduct 
postwar civil governance.  Indeed, despite the highly controversial nature of the Army’s 
handling of the Philippine insurrection from 1899 to 1902, Army leadership was proud of 
its handling of overall civil government functions.  The final report of Major General John 
Brooke, the Military Governor of Cuba, in 1899 set forth the wide-ranging tasks that 
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many in the Army believed had been successfully accomplished from moderately 
reforming the legal system to building and repairing roads and bridges.34 
In reality, the long-lasting achievements of Army occupations were ambiguous at 
best in almost every case. Political scientist David Edelstein has rated both the 1898-
1902 and 1906-1909 occupations of Cuba as failures, since both times the island was 
left in a state of instability.35  The Philippines’ occupation also had mixed results.  The 
Army prevailed, but only after a brutal, controversial counterinsurgent struggle in which 
Army leaders were subject to public criticism for its treatment of civilians.  And the U.S. 
presence there revealed the United States, which prided itself on its anti-colonialist 
position, as an imitator of European imperialism, a posture that contributed to U.S-
Japanese tensions throughout the early twentieth century that ultimately led to war.36 
These failures notwithstanding, the Army continued to make efforts at increasing 
professionalization within its own ranks through the application of scientific and 
managerial concepts and procedures, through study of past successes and failures, and 
through broadening the intellectual horizons of the officer corps into areas that went 
beyond studies of wartime strategies and battlefield tactics.37  Many officers particularly 
thought that the application of business principles would produce a more efficient and 
better run military; they looked with great admiration at the successes of American 
industrialists in creating massive organizations that reaped enormous profits.38  Indeed, 
the advent of the large-scale industrial corporation, which sought to organize large 
numbers of workers into coordinated and regimented labor forces, looked familiar to 
military officers who sought to do the same for armies.39   A “managerial” mindset arose 
in the Army that went far beyond improving close order drill and basic tactics.  Indeed, 
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as Linn points out, many Army officers began to study matters that might not be 
considered the essence of warfare and battle.40    Effective management of war meant 
being able to manage what occurred when fighting had stopped.  And just as doctrinal 
principles were helping to define the nature of conflict, the application of law would help 
to do the same both in combat and when it was over. 
As an example, the Army derived some practical lessons from its experiences in the 
Rhineland Occupation after World War I, including the publication of an official manual 
entitled Military Government, published in 1920 by Fort Leavenworth’s school press.41  
The manual was filled with rule-based prescriptions, defining military government as a 
“branch of international law, and its sanctions are the sanctions of that law.” and 
specifically referring to Section III, Chapter V of The Hague Conventions.42  It cited the 
continuous American practice of military government, from the Mexican War to the 
present, and provided examples of general orders related to military governance, 
especially General Orders 100, which was, in the manual’s words, the United States 
Army’s “Bible” in all matters dealing with occupations since the Civil War.43    
The manual also asserted that military government was, at the same time, a military 
responsibility that could and should be exercised by Army officers and that it should not 
be made complicated or obscure by lawyers or excessive legalisms:  “In searching for a 
good officer to make a military governor or chief of staff for civil affairs do not select a 
man who travels with a large legal library. … Avoid the man who is continually seeking 
for precedents to bolster up his opinions, but select rather one endowed with initiative, 
zeal and vision, one who will more likely create than follow precedents.”44  As the 
manual indicated, more was needed to perform postwar occupation than simply to apply 
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a set of rules: what was needed especially were practical solutions to accomplish what 
were, in essence, military missions, in other words military government led by military 
commanders and conducted by on-ground military forces. 
The Rhineland Occupation and the Hunt Report 
Compared to World War II, the Allies occupied a relatively small part of Germany 
after the prior conflict.   In accordance with the 1919 Rhineland Agreement at Versailles, 
approximately 150,000 troops from Belgium, Great Britain, France, and the United 
States occupied an area covering 12,000 square miles on the west bank of the Rhine 
with three bridgeheads opposite Cologne, Coblenz, and Mainz, an area roughly the size 
of Belgium and including 7 million German inhabitants (11% of the overall population).45 
Despite this comparatively modest effort, this post World War I occupation would be the 
single most influential experience in shaping the American Army’s conceptions of 
military government following World War II.  Especially important was the highly 
rationalized and autocratic German civil service system.  In the Rhineland, the 
government was largely controlled by a Prussian political elite, much to the 
dissatisfaction of many Rhinelanders.  And while American military government officers 
may have seen it as anti-democratic, they also believed that it was especially suited for 
military government rule.  As Major General Henry T. Allen, the commander of the 
occupation troops in Germany noted:  “Regardless of the reasons that may be 
marshaled against such a form of government, it is obvious that its autocratic nature 
peculiarly qualified to adapt itself to the requirements of an occupying military force.”46 
The American Army’s organization and administration of postwar governance was 
the focus of a lengthy and significant analysis of postwar occupation, the so-called 1920 
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Hunt Report, named after Colonel Irvin L. Hunt who had been attached to the 
Commanding General, Third Army as an advisor in civil matters and who was later 
appointed its Officer in Charge of civil affairs.47  The Hunt Report garnered the particular 
admiration of Secretary of War Henry Stimson, who became a major figure in the 
development of World War II occupation planning and policy and also influenced the 
creation of World War II military government doctrine.   Much of the work on the 
document was actually done not by Hunt himself but by Captain Truman Smith, who 
was Colonel Hunt’s primary political assistant.   Smith, an intelligent, capable officer 
from America’s patrician class, viewed the order and seeming efficiency of the German 
civil service with great admiration and respect.  He went so far as to note that the civil 
officials were essentially “army officers without uniforms” and saw the seeming 
advantage in linking the military government with that system as soon as was 
practicable.48     
Hunt submitted the report to the Commanding General of the American Armed 
Forces in Germany, with the request that it be forwarded to the War Department for 
publication to serve as a “basis for technical study of Military Government by the 
General Staff of our Army as well as for future historians.”49   What made the Hunt 
Report especially important was that it actually looked upon the administration of 
occupation responsibilities as a separate and significant task from the wartime efforts, 
with its own set of requirements.50  Additionally, the Hunt Report’s analysis moved 
beyond considerations of abstract legal concepts and definitions and dealt with practical 
administrative concerns, principally (though not exclusively) using the experiences of 
the Rhineland occupation.   
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Hunt made several recommendations, which, while simple and straightforward, had 
considerable influence on prewar and wartime military government planning.  According 
to Hunt, there were two “fundamental principles which profoundly affected the whole 
course of military government [by the American forces]” in the Rhineland after World 
War I.  First, the American occupation separated the overall tactical commander from 
the civil administrator of the occupied territory.  The governor thus directly represented 
(and was directly reportable to) the Commander in Chief of the American Expeditionary 
Force and was “entirely independent of Third Army Headquarters at Coblenz, and 
therefore in a very real sense limited the authority of the Commanding General of the 
latter force.”51   
In Hunt’s view this caused an “awkward division of authority.”  As he termed it, the 
“legislative powers of military government” that were lodged in the Office of Civil Affairs 
at Advanced GHQ were separated from the Army tactical commander’s “executive” 
authority to maintaining public order and with the security of troops.”  He noted that, 
while this divided government scheme may have resembled United States separation of 
powers concepts, it was “wholly unsuited for military occupation.”  Essentially, it violated 
the notion of unity of command, and had it not been mitigated by a “spirit in which the 
several headquarters subordinated personal matters” to the mission as whole, could 
have caused severe difficulties in military government administration.52 
Secondly, the American occupiers used tactical units in the Third Army as units of 
military government.  Hunt considered this a serious mistake that caused administrative 
and bureaucratic difficulties.  Tactical units had other non-military government functions 
to perform (among them, to disarm the German Army and, at least initially, to remain 
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prepared to go to war in case Germany decided to break the Armistice) and they lacked 
the specific training to link its staffs to the sophisticated German governmental system 
at the local levels that remained virtually intact.   
Instead, given the very precise and hierarchical system of Rhineland governments 
at the Province, Regierungsbezirke and Kreise level, American military government 
should have readily conformed and linked to that working system rather than use 
tactical formations to attempt to control and monitor that government.  As Hunt pointed 
out, neither the French nor British “committed our mistake, and modeled their military 
government from the outset along lines paralleling the civil system.”53  This apparently 
more sophisticated approach of the French and British was in keeping with their 
colonialist traditions.  The British in particular had a long tradition of so-called “indirect 
rule” in the colonies, allowing, in the words of Dutch historian of civil affairs Thijs 
Zaalberg “control [of] a vast empire with relatively little administrative and military 
personnel.”54   
Along with these concerns, Hunt noted that while the American occupation force 
had created a civil affairs “G-5” section during the occupation, it dissolved the 
organization at the conclusion of military government, and senior Army leaders did not 
attempt to establish a civil affairs section as a permanent feature of a staff at any unit 
level, nor did they seek to implement any training for future civil administrations.  Hunt 
maintained that no service school devoted to higher level training, such as the Army’s 
Command and General Staff College or the service War Colleges, had devoted any 
course to studying civil affairs and military government.  He stated that it was   
extremely unfortunate that the qualifications necessary for a civil administration are 
not developed among officers in times of peace.  The history of the United States 
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offers an uninterrupted series of wars, which demanded as their aftermath, the 
exercise by its officers in civil governmental functions.  Despite the precedents of 
military governments in Mexico, California, the Southern States, Cuba, P[ue]rto 
Rico, Panama, China, the Philippines and elsewhere, the lesson has seemingly not 
been learned.55   
                                                                                                                                                                  
The Hunt Report was the single most influential document on military 
government produced prior to World War II, and Hunt himself spent the interwar 
period seeking to ensure that the Army was prepared for its next occupation.  
Such was its value that it was referenced in testimony before Congress when 
Army officers were directed to explain the nature of military government training 
and policy.56    Secretary of War Stimson, when planning how to respond to 
President Roosevelt’s apparent discomfort about the military government 
program, relied on its conclusions, and he had planned to mention it in a lengthy 
letter that he intended to send to the president.  He called it “the finest document 
of its kind ever to come out of the Army.”57 Much of it also eventually influenced 
Field Manual (FM) 27-5, the principal doctrinal guide for military government 
during World War II.58   
Hunt’s report also revealed the predisposition of American Army officers to align 
themselves with governmental systems that resembled, to some degrees, the social 
and cultural beliefs and experiences of the Army’s officer class, of which Truman Smith 
was by no means an exception in terms of background.  The Rhineland civil servant 
system that Smith admired was hierarchical, as well as remarkably efficient and 
ordered, and the populations they governed appeared placid and nonconfrontational.  
As Morris Janowitz has shown, the interwar Army’s officer corps was especially infused 
with a value system that would predispose it toward such a system.  The American 
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military elite of the period was largely drawn from an Anglo-Saxon, Protestant, rural, and 
upper middle-class professional background.  Most came from a traditional Protestant 
background, with a heavy concentration from conservative Episcopalianism that 
stressed “authority, ceremony, and mission.”59  Especially in light of what many 
perceived as the anarchy and destructiveness of the bolshevist movements in Germany 
of the post-World War I period, American military officers viewed the order and control 
of the civil service, and the corresponding willingness of the populations they governed, 
as a system that proved the superiority of values that they themselves possessed.   
The Rhineland Occupation, via the Hunt Report, in turn became the 
experience-based template for post-World War II occupations.  The reasons for 
this are unsurprising.  Even though the post-World War I occupation experience 
was atypical for the Army, it was the most recent in time, and even more 
importantly followed in the wake of a total conflict between powerful nation-
states, the sort of conflict that most fit the category of war that the Army would 
prepare for in the future.  Furthermore, the Hunt Report was the most extensive 
document ever created by the American Army regarding a postwar occupation.  
This template was the basis for assumptions and expectations for the post-World 
War II occupiers.  The American experience in the Rhineland, while it had its 
problems, was relatively benign.  The occupied territory had effective civil 
structures still functioning, the population did not resist, and it did not question 
the supreme authority of the military governorship established by the Americans.  
Indeed, for many American occupation troops, the experience was by no means 
unpleasant.60  The post-World War II occupiers, at least during the planning 
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stages, likewise assumed functioning civil structures, unquestioned authority of 
the military government, and a relatively benign environment, free of partisan, 
guerrilla-type activity.  Where assumptions and expectations met a reality that 
most conformed with them, for example in Austria, and to a lesser degree in 
Germany, the occupations were, if not exactly smoothly and problem-free, 
manageable.  In Korea, on the other hand, expectation and reality diverged, and 
the occupation proved extremely difficult. 
Interservice Difference and Interagency Isolation 
The Hunt Report dealt with the problem of military government following a so-called 
conventional war (or what is today referred to as “high intensity conflict”).   Specifically, 
the Army institutionally tended to think in terms of such postconflict responsibilities as 
part of the conventional war paradigm.  As Max Boot has pointed out, the Army did not 
develop anything resembling an anti-guerrilla or counterinsurgency doctrine during the 
nineteenth or early twentieth century.61  There was a clear distinction between war, in 
its standard sense as a lawful armed struggle between nations, and other conflicts, 
defined by Marine Corps doctrine as “small wars.”  Wars, not so-called small wars, were 
the province of the Army, not the latter.   
Small wars were instead suited for the relatively small size and more limited 
capabilities of the Marine Corps.  As a point of comparison, the largest number of 
Marines brought together for battle prior to World War II was as part of the World War I 
American Expeditionary Force—a force that amounted to a brigade of 8500, less than a 
third of one Army division.  During the interwar period when the Army had been reduced 
to 125,000 men, the Marine Corps only had 16,800.  John Lejeune, the Marine Corps’ 
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Commandant throughout most of the 1920s, specifically noted that a Marine Corps 
Expeditionary Force, when “landed in a foreign country, is primarily intended to protect 
the lives and property of American citizens residing there during periods of disorder.”62  
The Marine Corps’ Small War Manual, published in 1940, though reflecting decades 
of doctrinal development by the Marines, underscored Lejeune’s understanding of the 
Marine Corps’ primary interwar mission.  Small wars were low level military actions, and 
technically not considered “true” wars at all.  As the manual stated, they “vary in 
degrees from simple demonstrative operations to military interventions in the fullest 
sense, short of war.”63  Indeed the use of forces in such conflicts did not necessarily 
require a declaration of war or consultation with Congress, since they often involved the 
protection of United States lives and property overseas.64  As such, so called small 
wars were a specifically defined function of the Marines.  As the manual stated, it was 
even considered “routine active foreign duty of the Marine Corps in which this manual is 
primarily interested.”65 
The specific and circumscribed association of small wars with Marine Corps 
operations highlighted another important difference between the strategic cultures of the 
Army and Marines.  Both services, carefully delineating their particular areas of 
expertise, distinguished between the strategic imperatives involved in conducting small 
wars and major military operations.  As the manual pointed out, “military strategy for 
small wars is more directly associated with the political strategy of the campaign than is 
the case in major operations.”66   In other words, there was a much less clearly defined 
division between matters of “policy” and matters purely “military” in small wars.   
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On the other hand, major wars, under the common understanding, were undertaken 
only as a last resort: only when other political options had been exhausted.  Therefore, 
military requirements—what was often called “military necessity”—would be of primary 
importance.67  This distinction proved of great importance in the Army’s postwar 
governance.  Policy was subsumed by military requirements because warfare required 
a totality of effort and a necessary subordination of political goals to military objectives.  
This same logic would apply during at least the initial post-conflict stage of a military 
occupation: because military ends trumped political ones, “military necessity” would hold 
sway. 
If there was interservice distinction between wars and small wars, with the Army 
and Marines going their respective ways, there was also a complete indifference outside 
the military itself to any of the Army’s lessons learned from postwar occupations.  In 
reality, partly as a result of the post-World War I disillusionment, in the 1920s and 
throughout most of the 1930s, the view toward things military in the United States varied 
from lack of interest to outright contempt.68  Indeed, many Americans would have 
considered Hunt’s recommendations as tantamount to establishing a military cadre of 
American Gauleiters.  Despite the Army’s efforts towards professionalization, some 
doubted whether, in fact, the military was a proper profession at all.  Two prominent 
scholars in the 1930s consciously avoided calling the Army a profession, given that the 
service soldiers were called to render—warfare—was one that it was hoped they would 
never have to perform, whereas other scholars determined that the military was wholly 
state-controlled and therefore not autonomous and self-regulating like true professions 
of medicine, law, or education.69 
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This dismissal of the military as a proper profession was consistent with thinking in 
American politics and society during the interwar period.  Up to and through the World 
War, what Samuel Huntington called the “neo-Hamiltonian consensus”—a view that 
advocated strong central government and the ability to project American power 
throughout the world—led to a movement to reform and strengthen the military.70  In the 
wake of the carnage of the World War, this largely vanished, replaced by the anti-
military viewpoint, seemingly across the entire political spectrum.   On the one hand, 
associated with big business Republicans of the period, was thinking that viewed the 
military as essentially an antiquated profession, outdated in the current world of global 
commerce.  Many such Republicans had been instrumental in blocking U.S. entry into 
the League of Nations following World War I.71  This so-called “business pacifism” had 
its counterpart in “reform liberalism” which contained strands of both Wilsonian idealism 
and domestic progressivism. There was also a strong current of “liberal 
internationalism” that saw war as outmoded and barbaric.  In the new order, nations 
would work together amicably and via treaties such as the Kellogg-Briand Pact, control 
or outlaw war altogether. 72 
This disdain for the military in the culture, and particularly for its ability to see 
anything beyond its role in waging war, was reflected in the American government as 
well.  President Woodrow Wilson had stated that a soldier should have “nothing to do 
with the formulation of [American] policy.  He is to support [that] policy whatever it is.”73 
As historian Mark Stoler points out, the State Department shared Wilson’s view.  
Officials in State saw warfare not on a continuum with other forms of policy but as an 
aberration in international relations.  In large part, they effectively shut out the military 
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from policy making throughout the 1920s and 1930s.  It was not until 1935 that the State 
Department agreed to participate in Joint Board deliberations regarding War Plan 
ORANGE, the plan developed by the War Department for possible conflict with Japan, 
by naming a Far Eastern expert as participant, and it was not until 1938 that State 
agreed for the military to be part of a high level State-War-Navy Liaison Committee.74 
Thus the interwar period essentially created a highly insular and even isolated 
military culture.75  Yet there was development within the Army throughout the interwar 
period.  The Root reforms of Army organization continued to take hold.  The power of 
both the Army Chief of Staff and the Army General Staff progressively expanded and 
the independence and authority of the subordinate bureaus declined.76   World War I 
had only reinforced the need for an Army general staff capable of organizing and 
planning the nation’s wars, and movement began towards a more robust staff system, a 
process that would not be complete until the staff reorganization of Marshall in the early 
1940s.77  And the Army’s continuing emphasis on the professional education was most 
prominent at the Army War College, where planning committees developed methods 
and concepts for postwar governance that would prove to be of singular influence. 
The Army War College Planning Committees 
Historians have contended that military prewar planners were shortsighted and did 
not take into account international affairs.  But recent research into the RAINBOW war 
plans that dealt with possible future conflict with U.S. rivals, devised primarily at the 
Army War College, has challenged that view.78   Student officers at the college devised 
numerous plans for future conflict, to include numerous scenarios which foresaw the 
need for postwar occupation and the establishment of military governments.  Brigadier 
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General George S. Simonds, Commandant of the War College from 1932 to 1935, 
ensured a level of realism and sophistication in planning.  He required, for instance, a 
“participation with allies” that brought in ideas about coalition warfare, and he 
encouraged the students to think creatively about a whole range of issues normally not 
dealt with in typical military planning.79   Isolated from the rest of government well into 
the 1930s, the Army was the virtually the only U.S. agency looking at potential 
conflicts.80  As Mark Stoler points out, “military planners during the interwar years were 
forced to compose their own definitions of U.S. policies to serve as guidelines in their 
strategic planning.” 81 
In the interwar period at the War College, various committees examined questions 
that had arisen in the recent past and, based on case studies, proposed 
recommendations.  Furthermore, student committees devised, often in collaboration 
with the Army’s War Plans Division, plans that specifically addressed future potential 
conflict.  These plans, collectively dubbed RAINBOW, posed scenarios in which the 
United States waged future war with various nations.  For example, GREEN addressed 
potential instability in Mexico.  RED addressed war with Great Britain; ORANGE, with 
Japan; and BLACK, with Germany.  Colors could combine to show the possibility of a 
coalition of threats (RED-ORANGE, for example, was a plan for a British-Japanese 
alliance).  Not all plans were developed or used as extensively as others.  For example, 
GREEN and RED plans were used to cover other threat scenarios that might be 
applicable in a variety of contexts, and to provide training for the students.82 
One of those topics was the planning for the occupation and military government of 
defeated nations.  Throughout the interwar period, student planners frequently 
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examined postwar governance, and the answers provided, while never made official for 
use at the Army War Plans Division, would be of seminal importance in the eventual 
training, doctrine creation, and planning for military government in the postwar world.  
Hunt himself was influential in this process in the twenties and thirties.  He served as 
the chairman of the 1924-25 War College committee that studied staff organization for 
occupation responsibilities.  He subsequently lectured the 1933 class on principles of 
military government, stressing among other points, the need for the Army to have 
technical experts in what would become known as civil affairs.83  In that lecture, he 
emphasized the importance of the military commander’s supreme authority during 
occupation.  He also emphasized that even high ranking civilian authorities had to be 
subordinate to the military commander of the occupied territory:  “The military 
commander must, in every case, be the military governor.  That carries all the way 
down.  The assistant military secretaries … are merely the civil staff of the subordinate 
military governors.”84  
Throughout the 1920s and 1930s, Army War College student committees studied 
postwar occupation and military governance issues thirteen times.85  These committees 
formulated solutions to a variety of problems, with subsequent conferences involving 
both faculty and outside officers to review student work.86  In the 1920s, issues of 
primary concern were procedural, focusing especially on whether or not a civil affairs 
organization should be made a permanent Army staff fixture.  Throughout the 1930s, as 
the emphasis moved to planning against potential enemies, student committees 
involved in the RAINBOW planning shifted focus to the actual governance of conquered 
territories.  A result of these various examinations was the creation, as an appendix to 
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the 1933-34 committee study, of a postwar occupation guide entitled “Basic Manual for 
Military Government by U.S. Forces.”87 
Plans for Military Government Organization: The 1920s Committees 
The Army War College class committee of 1924-25 produced a report that studied 
the advantages and disadvantages in creating a section of the Army general staff to 
oversee the administration of civil affairs in occupied territory.  The chairman of the 
committee was Colonel Hunt himself, a student in that class.88  The 1925-26 class 
similarly examined an appropriate command and staff organization for occupation 
administration at theater of operations level and below.89  The 1927-28 report also 
looked at the issue of the required “machinery necessary for the administration of civil 
affairs” at both higher and lower levels.  All the reports set forth a methodological 
approach that would be used repeatedly by different War College committees 
throughout the interwar period:  various American military occupations, from the 
Mexican War to the Rhineland Occupation, were studied, and from them the student 
committees derived lessons learned and possible standard practices and procedures.   
This historical approach can be seen in the committees’ analyses.  The 1924-25 
committee noted that one problem in the occupation of the Philippines at the end of the 
Spanish-American War was the injection of civilians [meaning U.S. civilian 
governmental officials]” into military government.   The power of civilian government 
officials to legislate “crippled the efficient conduct of military operations.”  Furthermore, 
civil affairs was supervised and directed through an operating branch known as the 
Office of Military Secretary for Civil Affairs, greatly diminishing the military governor’s 
power.90  The 1924-25 committee, relying no doubt on Colonel Hunt’s own knowledge 
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and experience, studied the World War I occupation, noting issues raised in the Hunt 
Report.  Specifically, U.S. military and civil authority during World War I divided between 
the Advanced General Headquarters (GHQ) and Third Army commands until the GHQ 
was ultimately abolished.  Military commands were not co-extensive with political 
subdivisions.  Tactical units doubled as military government units.  There was also no 
special general staff section for civil affairs—instead, there was simply appointed an 
officer-in-charge of civil affairs in an ad hoc fashion.91  The 1925-26 committee similarly 
indicated that the establishment of military government along tactical lines and the 
division of military and civil authority in the U.S. Rhineland occupation caused it to differ 
“radically” from the French, Belgians, and English approaches.92  In any case, as the 
1927-28 committee pointed out, there was a consensus that the improvisation that had 
occurred by the AEF during the Rhineland occupation was not good policy and that 
organizing an occupation in a planned systematic manner, as the European allies 
apparently did, required detailed peacetime study of the problem.93 
Based on these Army experiences, the committees provided further analysis and 
recommendations.  The 1924-25 committee provided its analysis as to the question of 
adding a civil affairs division to the Army general staff.  Advantages included a 
centralized decision-making authority at the highest levels, presumably better able to 
integrate strategic decision making into civil affairs policy.  Yet the disadvantages were 
felt to outweigh any potential advantages, primarily because of the staff structure itself.  
A “general” staff was precisely that—it provided general guidance and advice over a 
wide-range of activities that were not specialized: whether personnel (G-1), intelligence 
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(G-2), operations (G-3), or supply (G-4), they covered a gamut of interests, regardless 
of type or phase of operation.94 
According to the 1924-25 committee, a “civil affairs” general staff function, with a 
specific, technical purpose of providing guidance on administration of occupied 
territories was precisely too technical.95  While in retrospect this may seem an arcane 
and even pedantic reason not to recommend the creation of such a staff section, it 
should be remembered that a general staff was still a fledgling notion to the U.S. Army 
in the early twentieth century; this brand new arrangement, after all, had been 
purposefully constructed to have a staff responsible for broad, “general” functions, and 
highly specialized ones.  The committee thus voted against a G-5 section on the 
general staff but offered no solution to the problem.96   
The 1925-26 committee studied the issue though at the level of theater and 
operational command.  It proposed five options: 1) a separate division of the general 
staff for civil affairs matters at GHQ; 2) an additional technical or operating civil affairs 
staff section (akin to the Provost Marshal)—in other words a staff section but 
subordinate in priority to the general staff; 3) a civil affairs staff section under an existing 
staff section (likely G-1); 4) a separate civil affairs section not under the staff scheme at 
all but reporting directly to the Commanding General; or 5) the creation of a civil affairs 
agency or bureau directly under the War Department—in essence controlled by civilian 
and not military authority.97 
That committee unanimously recommended option 3, the creation of an additional 
technical or operating section to administer civil affairs in an occupied territory.  Such a 
staff section “would ensure harmony and preserve the principle of supervision and 
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coordination under which all existing General Staff divisions and sections function.”   In 
so doing, the committee did not recommend the creation of a civil affairs section at the 
Army General Staff or War Department level; rather the Army General Staff would 
enunciate “broad principles” that would be transmitted to the commander, who then, 
through his civil affairs technical staff expert, execute policy.98  The 1927-28 Committee 
came to the same conclusion.99   That committee also enunciated some broad 
conclusions about the possibility of military government: (1) civil affairs agencies and 
methods would have to vary with conditions surrounding particular occupation; (2) it was 
not possible to formulate a complete plan for military government to  be used in all 
cases; (3) the War Plans Division needed to develop preparatory measures prior to the 
departure of an expeditionary force; (4) a commander should have a separate, highly 
specialized staff section, with specifically qualified personnel; and (5) the War Plans 
Division should determine what the initial composition of a civil affairs staff section 
should be.100   
The 1927-28 committee was also especially focused on the legal bases for military 
government, noting that the War Department had codified the laws of war and military 
occupation, to include The Hague Conventions, in Chapter VIII of its manual entitled 
Rules of Land Warfare.101  In two supplements to the Army War College committee 
report, the idea of military government was given an extensive legal analysis.  The first 
supplement analyzed in particular the applicability of The Hague Conventions to the 
United States, as well as the rights and responsibilities of military government under 
United States common law.102  At the conclusion, it provided a summary, which stated 
that military government was supreme and its authority absolute, subject “only to the 
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law of nations, the Rules of Land Warfare, and such Hague Conventions or Geneva 
Regulations as the United States has by treaty adopted” and that, absent express 
legislation otherwise, U.S. Constitutional law and other laws enacted by Congress are 
not binding upon a military government.  It did note that a separate treaty or armistice as 
well as rules, regulations, and orders issued by the President or Secretary of War for 
the organized territory could limit the military governor’s power.103  The second legal 
supplement, written by Major Archibald King, a judge advocate, affirmed that The 
Hague Conventions were binding upon the United States military in conquered 
territories as well as in countries not at war with the United States but nonetheless 
occupied by it.104 
While these points may seem obvious and even self-evident to contemporary 
understanding, the extensive supplements underscored the effort of the committee 
members to ground the planning for postwar occupation in applicable law, while at the 
same time attempting to maximize the authority of military government within the 
boundaries of that law.  This included not only The Hague Conventions but also an 
extensive list of U.S. cases, which laid out the constitutional and common law 
understanding as to when various forms of military authority could be imposed.105 
Subsequent regulatory and policy documents on military government would bear this 
same legalistic tone, with recurring references especially to various provisions of The 
Hague Conventions’ laws about governance in occupied territories. 
Plans for Implementing Occupations: The 1930s Committees 
Whereas in the 1920s, the committees focused on organizational questions and 
remained somewhat theoretical, during the following decade, postwar occupation 
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planning was integrated into the RAINBOW planning scheme.  Specifically, plans were 
prepared to accompany War Plan RED, dealing with the military occupation of Canada 
during and after war with Great Britain, and War Plan GREEN, which called for the 
occupation of Mexico after war with that country.  While it was certainly not a main effort 
of the College, General Simonds, the commandant from 1930-34, thought it significant, 
noting that military government was a subject of “great importance to the higher 
commanders and staff” and further noting that the Army had amassed a wealth of 
material on the subject, particularly the occupations of Cuba in 1899 and 1906-7.106   
In the occupation plans for both RED and GREEN, there was significant 
consistency (if not uniformity) with both the Hunt Report and the more theoretical 
committee work in the 1920s.  The RED occupation proposals grounded themselves in 
historical experience.  In particular, while the problems of the AEF in the Rhineland and 
the German Army in Belgium were examined, positive lessons were drawn from the 
American occupations in the Philippines and especially Cuba.107  Additionally, the 
plenary authority of military government was expressed in legalistic terms.  Citing the 
Supreme Court case U.S. v. Wallace, the 1931-32 RED report stated: “The power 
invested in the President and his military subordinate is large and extra-ordinary.  The 
Supreme Court has ruled that the governing authority ‘may do anything necessary to 
strengthen itself and weaken the enemy.  There is no limit to the powers that may be 
expected in such cases save those which are found in the laws and usages of war.’”108 
The RED occupation plans also were consistent with past analysis of what the 
structure of military government would be.  In particular, for the postwar Canadian 
occupation, there would be a military officer supervising all important branches of 
60 
government; the senior commander in theater would serve as the overall civil 
authority/military governor; a civil affairs staff would be assigned to perform the 
specialized duties of military government; and in a rare instance of interagency 
coordination, the proposed plan called for a State Department representative in an 
advisory capacity to the military commander.109 
Drawing particularly on the perceived positive experiences of the Cuban occupation, 
the RED plans also stressed that local government structures should be left in place as 
much as possible and that the local population would be given as much responsibility to 
govern as the situation permitted.  There would be a maximum use made of the native 
people.  Local laws, officials, and civil courts would continue, and civilian government 
officials would be used whenever possible.110  Finally, both plans provided that the form 
for military government law should be in the form of proclamations with supplementing 
regulations as required.111 
The GREEN plans for the occupation of Mexico in the 1933-34 and 1937-38 
contained proposals similar to those of RED:  GREEN postwar occupation also saw use 
of Mexican government officials and the existing Mexican political structure, and civil 
affairs units would be territorially and not tactically established.112  As in the RED plans, 
use of civilians in the military government was considered objectionable, not only 
because use of them would violate the principle of unity of command but also because 
such civilians were “liable to be political appointees, entirely unsuited for the work.”113 
There were two recommendations that added some further depth to occupation 
concepts.  First, one GREEN proposal called for the Adjutant General to keep a current 
roster of approximately 500 reserve officers who possessed qualifications to administer 
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a military government.114  Second, there was reference to the need for a “constabulary” 
force to be established as soon as possible, to assist the pacification of the country and 
the maintenance of order.115  Neither proposal was a radical departure from previous 
plans but was simply a logical development of the underlying concepts of total military 
control of the occupation and the reestablishment of local government as soon as 
possible. 
As part of the 1933-34 GREEN plan, the student committee also created a manual 
that would serve as a prototype for possible future policy and doctrine regarding military 
government.   Six sections and twelve appendices laid out what essentially reflected the 
thinking done on the subject throughout the interwar period, to include the findings and 
recommendations of the Hunt Report.  The manual, while not formally adopted by the 
War Plans Division, nevertheless looked remarkably similar in substance to the major 
doctrinal statement on military government, Field Manual (FM) 27-5, first published in 
1940.116 
 As with much of the work done by the committees during the twenties and thirties, 
the manual was an essentially legalistic document that continued to reflect the formal 
view of postwar governance as a matter between states.  It began with a formal 
definition of military government as “that form of Government which is established and 
maintained by a belligerent by force of arms over occupied territory of an enemy, and 
over the inhabitants therein.”117  The applicable Hague Conventions formed a constant, 
binding thread throughout the manual’s text on issues such as the duty of the occupant, 
taxation, oaths of allegiance, prohibitions against military service, destruction and 
seizure of enemy property, respect toward private property, and requisition and 
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contribution.118    “War rebels” or what might be today called “insurgents” were 
discussed in legalistic terms as well.  “War rebels” was, in fact, a phrase taken from the 
Lieber Code.119  The manual described these “rebels” as “persons within occupied 
territories, who rise in arms against the occupying forces or against authorities set up 
thereby.”120  The manual briefly stated, “If captured, they may be punished by death.”   
Regardless, none was to be punished “without a fair trial by competent tribunal [almost 
certainly a military commission of some fashion]” even if a swift execution, as in the 
case of those found to be “war rebels,” would almost certainly follow.121 
Also consistent with the work of the committees and the Hunt Report was the stress 
on the importance of exclusive military control of postwar occupation and the need for 
unity of command.   Military government was to be exercised by the “Military 
Commander under the direction of the President” and was not a form of civil 
government that has a system of checks and balances such as was typical in most 
Western democracies.  Personnel involved in its conduct, whether in executive or 
administrative roles, needed to be integrally bound to the military establishment.  The 
manual called for a corps of officers for each expeditionary force that was “especially 
fitted by judgment, experience, and training” to conduct military government.”122   The 
manual explicitly noted that while some civilians could be used in a “purely clerical 
capacity,” all personnel with any significant responsibility “should be commissioned in 
the Army” with “no civilians whatever used on such duty until commissioned.”123  Unity 
of command was likewise stressed as necessary.  There could not be division at the 
highest level between a “civil” governor who maintained the responsibility over the 
administration of the conquered territory and the highest ranking military commander.  
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They should be one and the same person, in order to follow the “essential military 
principle of unity of command.”124 
The manual also provided an organizational scheme for military government and in 
it, as the accompanying figure 1 indicates, the Commanding General of the General 
Headquarters (C.G., G.H.Q.)  served as either the military governor or governor general 
(if there were more than one conquered theater or territory). (See figure 1.) 
While this ensured unity of command at the highest level, as the chart indicates, the 
division of labor then occurred immediately at the staff level.  The standard “tactical” 
work fell within the realm of the normal G-staff, whereas the newly created civil affairs 
staff section, on the same level as the G-staff, oversaw the administration of occupation 
in two corresponding ways: first, along functional, technical lines (such as fiscal, legal, 
sanitation) and secondly through a channel of control over administrators of various 
territories and towns.125  The manual thus reflected the need, if not at the general staff 
level at the War Department, then at least at the highest tactical and operational levels, 
for a separate civil affairs structure to oversee military government operations.   
Relatedly, and also reflecting the consistent thinking done by the committees, was the 
manual’s emphasis on organizing the occupation along territorial lines.  The military 
government organization was to parallel as much as possible the existing civil 
governmental structures, such as villages, townships, provinces, and regions.  Thus 
while tactical units would rotate and continually move to new locations, military 
government organizations would remain constant and attached to existing political 
boundaries as much as possible.126  While this would be difficult during the early stages 
of the occupation, according to the manual, it was an ideal that the occupiers should 
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strive to attain.127  Territorial organization was closely related to another principle of 
military government: wherever possible, local officials should perform the tasks of civil 
governance.128  Changes in existing government were to be as “few as practicable” and 
only after a sufficient study that indicated that such changes were warranted.  Civil 
courts were likewise to be maintained.129 
The manual also provided three types of military occupation.  For a “temporary 
occupation,” the enemy’s sovereignty would not be disturbed (the Allied occupation of 
Germany following the Armistice being an example) and there was a minimum amount 
of interference with local laws and customs.  When it was reasonably certain that an 
annexation would follow the occupation of the enemy territory (such as the Philippine s 
or Puerto Rico), the military governor was given more latitude to set aside laws and 
customs and to align them with those of the United States, though, in general, radical 
changes were restricted only to those absolutely necessary pending further direction 
from higher U.S. government sources.  Finally, where the intention was to “sever the 
occupied territory from its former sovereignty and to set up an independent government” 
(the example provided being the occupation of Cuba), the prime task was to prepare the 
territory to take over its own governance, and the military governor would establish at an 
early date relevant governmental changes to permit this new sovereignty.130  The 
manual listed four standard temporal phases for military government. There would 
typically be armed resistance in the first phase, with tactical units performing military 
government functions as territory was brought under military control, with civil affairs 
sections being linked to tactical units at the corps level and below to perform 
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Proposed Theater-Level Military Govt. Organization, 1934 AWC Basic Manual131 
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governance duties.  The second phase was true military government, when American 
forces had broken armed resistance, military government formally established and 
tactical units generally relieved of governance responsibilities. During this stage, military 
government would attempt to mirror as much as possible existing political structures.  
The third phase saw the predominant responsibilities of the supreme military 
commander being that of military governance and not tactical and operational 
responsibilities.  The fourth and final stage transitioned from military to purely civil 
administration.  Military forces also withdrew.  This final stage could involve turning back 
control to the enemy’s government, to a newly formed state, or to the U.S. civil 
government.132 
Despite the reference to civil administration in the last phase, what was notable 
throughout the manual was a lack of reference to any ongoing coordination with, much 
less subordination to, any civilian agency throughout military government proper.  It was 
envisioned as a near-exclusively military, and, specifically, Army domain (though a 
reference was made to cooperation with the Navy when joint operations were 
conducted).  Reflecting the Army’s experiences in the Rhineland and in nineteenth and 
early twentieth century occupations, it further revealed the influence of a legalistic 
conception of military government: such government was bound by a series of rules and 
regulations, especially relating to the law of armed conflict.  Even more importantly, the 
government would be wholly run by commissioned officers, and the ultimate authority 
unified under a military commander.  And while strategic concerns beyond the on-
ground commanders  would be the province of civilian superiors, the military’s primacy 
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on the ground framed the issues in terms of accomplishment of military objectives, thus 
implicitly at least shaping the larger strategic discussion.   
In the final years of the 1930s as the world drew closer and closer to all-out conflict, 
committees met on the subject of military government, especially in light of many 
problems made apparent by the Spanish Civil War associated with control and 
evacuation of civilian populations.  The committees in years 1938 and 1939 came to 
many of the same conclusions drawn in previous years: that military commanders must 
be in control of the occupation and that military government should coincide with 
political boundaries and be independent of tactical units and that as much as possible 
local laws should be continued.133  The need to stay within legal authorities was also 
reemphasized, this time with a practical concern: a subcommittee of the 1938 review of 
military government noted that military commanders could later be held accountable for 
their actions in civil courts.134  Notably, both the 1938 and 1939 committees saw the 
absolute necessity for a civil affairs staff, at least during operations,  with the same 
authority and importance as other general staff sections, even if, given its nature as an 
“operating” staff section, it would not be considered on the general staff as such.  What 
was most influential in this realization seems to have been the potential magnitude and 
difficulty of attempting to control, coerce, and possibly evacuate huge numbers of 
civilians in the occupied areas.135 
Planning in Isolation 
The committees’ work during the interwar decades clearly reveal that long before 
the United States was involved in World War II, the Army War College, the Army’s 
premier educational institution, had, on numerous times, studied contingencies and set 
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up plans for possible occupation, however hypothetical.  The College had further written 
a manual that laid out many of the basic concepts for military government, the 
fundamental precepts of which remained remarkably consistent with Army thinking 
throughout the period.  None of the plans was formally adopted by the War Plans 
Division.  Nonetheless, the work done by the student committees was influential.136  In 
the words of an official Army historian, that work “was the fountain from which U.S. 
military government principles, organizations, procedures, and publications flowed in the 
period before World War II.”137 
Indeed, as the United States became involved in World War II and began postwar 
planning, many of the committees’ ideas were put into practice, themselves largely 
derived from the Hunt Report but reiterated and clarified many times: the primacy of the 
military in occupation, the unity of command in one military governor, the establishment 
of civil affairs as a separate staff section, the separation of tactical units from military 
government detachments, the linkage of military government to existing political entities, 
and the repeated insistence, whenever possible, to re-empower local governmental 
officials and  reestablish local governmental structures.  Contrary to statements by 
some military government officers during wartime and some scholars afterwards, ideas 
about postwar occupation did not lie in the unread pages of the Hunt Report, in storage 
for nearly two decades.138  They had permeated the Army War College planning 
committees over the years, the organization most linked to the Army’s War Plans 
Division which, under the direction of Army Chief of Staff General George Marshall, 
would largely provide the basis for the Army’s overall wartime direction.139 
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The ideas in the Hunt Report and in the War College committees about military 
government also revealed themselves in the creation of a civil affairs structure within the 
War Department, in civil affairs and military government units throughout the Army, and 
in the development of postwar governance doctrine and policy.  And this was done only 
after much resistance from civilian agencies within the government, many of which 
objected that such planning was excessively militarized in its focus and application. 
But such militarized planning was a logical consequence of the Army’s working 
alone.  After all, the planning had been done in isolation, with no consultation given or 
asked for from any other non-military agency (though there was some with the Navy 
and Marine Corps, whose student officers at the Army War College served on some of 
the committees).140  This was the consequence of what was seen as the hard 
separation between peace and war, accepted not only by the military but especially by 
the State Department.  A comment in a 1937-38 committee presentation by Major 
Francis G. Bonham was instructive: 
There are no other agencies, in time of peace, that are concerned with war planning 
but the War and Navy Departments.  Although we may not be held responsible for 
not having economic, diplomatic, and propaganda plans, nevertheless, morally we 
are responsible for the very reason that nobody else will take the responsibility, or at 
least the initiative and go ahead and do that in time of peace.  Consequently, I feel 
that--and more particularly since we are studying a war and not just battles and 
campaigns--we should take the responsibility to consider and make plans for every 
possible phase of activity that we can foresee that should be planned for, that is not 
being planned for by some other department or agency, that we are the proper 
agency.141 
 
Bonham’s comment pointed out what would become one of the most important 
arguments the Army made in asserting its primary over postwar governance: planning 
for war necessarily meant planning for postwar occupation.  The military requirements 
for maintaining victory required the military to plan for and thereby set the conditions for 
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Chapter 3 - Military Government Doctrine, Training, and 
Organization 
Field Manual 27-5: the Basis of American Military Government in World War II 
The work done by the War College in the decades prior to World War II directly led 
to the creation of Field Manual (FM) 27-5, titled simply Military Government.  It would be 
the source for planning, training, and implementation of all American military 
government following World War II.1  The Army G-1 staff, the proponent of military 
government and postwar occupation, had proposed the document’s creation in 1939 to 
codify the work of the War College committees into doctrine.2  FM 27-5 bore great 
similarities to that previous work, and in fact, Major Archibald King, the judge advocate 
who had participated in military government planning done at the War College in the 
thirties, largely wrote the document. 3     
The Army’s top lawyer, Major General Allen Gullion, The Judge Advocate General, 
objected to the document’s publication, contending that a field manual already did 
exist—the 1934 Rules of Land Warfare (in 1940, published as FM 27-10), and that, 
therefore, a separate doctrinal document was superfluous.4  The Rules of Land Warfare 
had a direct lineage to General Orders 100, the famous Lieber Code of 1863, which was 
essentially revised in 1914, 1934 and 1940, taking into account many though not all of 
the international laws and agreements that had been promulgated since the Civil War.5  
Furthermore, it did include the provisions of The Hague Conventions about military 
occupation.6   Yet there was an important reason justifying FM 27-5’s publication.  The 
1934 document simply dealt with the question of the legality of military government, and 
not the policy, organization, and possible implementation of it.  The G-1 proposal thus 
stated that the Army needed a manual similar to War College’s, which dealt with the 
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administration of military government in occupied territory.7  Army Chief of Staff General 
George C. Marshall thereafter approved FM 27-5, and it was published on July 30, 
1940.   
Some commentators have viewed the document as merely derivative.  The official 
history of military government, published in 1945 by the Provost Marshal, stated that FM 
27-5’s policies and procedures were “premised almost entirely upon the Rhineland 
experience” surveyed in the Hunt Report.8   A more recent assessment concluded that it 
was essentially a modern version of General Orders 100.9  In fact, FM 27-5 was a prime 
example of Army doctrinal creation.  It was, however, more than simply a restatement of 
older principles: it was instead the culminating product of decades of Army cultural 
practice and thinking that took concepts from Lieber, Birkhimer, Hunt, and the War 
College committees and updated, clarified, and refined those concepts  them to create a 
new, coherent idea of military government.   As Samuel Huntington has pointed out, all 
bureaucratic organizations have some form of doctrine, but few if any civilian agencies 
go so far as military organizations do in making such doctrine “formal, self-conscious, 
and explicit.”10  Currently defined by the Army as authoritative guidance that consists of 
“fundamental principles by which the military forces or elements thereof guide their 
action in support of national objectives,” Army doctrine is not meant to be a “set of fixed 
rules” but rather a “guide to action.” 11    While not formally so defined at the time of FM 
27-5, the Army’s understanding of doctrine was essentially the same in the early 1940s 
as it is today.  It could be cited as authoritative guidance that leaders were required to 
be familiar with, and it served as a general guide as to what means to employ and with 
what methods to proceed in the implementation of military force, thus serving, in military 
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historian Barry Posen’s term, as a “subcomponent” of grand strategic design.12It 
bridged the civilian domain of grand strategy and the military domain of operations and 
organization.13   
Indeed, FM 27-5 came about following a period when Army doctrine had 
considerably developed.  Before World War I, military thinkers often used private 
printing houses to publish their work, William Birkhimer’s work being one example.14  
After the conflict, a mix of factors prompted doctrinal development within the Army, to 
include technological change, veterans’ experiences in combat and with other militaries, 
greater control and reach of the Army General Staff to manage overall Army policy and 
procedure, and  the federal government’s own ability to resource and publish 
documents.15   The codification and standardization of this practice focused, as might 
be expected, on common military operations, with officers such as Lieutenant Colonel 
George C. Marshall, while serving as Assistant Commandant of the Infantry School, 
working to make doctrine clearer, more practical and more relevant to the modern 
battlefield.16  It was during this period that the template for “basic” field manuals (of 
which FM 27-5 was so labeled) was determined: such manuals would “concentrate all 
applicable information pertaining to a certain area of instruction, training, or doctrine into 
… a ’package’ format, or treatment.”17 
FM 27-5 followed this model.  At the outset, it stated its practical purpose.  Whereas 
FM 27-10 dealt with the “legality of military government…[which] tells what may legally 
be done,” FM 27-5 provided “what it is advisable to do.”18  FM 27-5 went on to define 
military government in language virtually identical to that found in the 1934 War College 
Basic Manual as well as FM 27-10, and similar to that found in Birkhimer.19  However, 
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FM 27-5’s greater emphasis on the authority of the presiding military commander 
represented a development and departure from its predecessors: 
The exercise of military government is a command responsibility, and full legislative, 
executive, and judicial authority is vested in the commanding general of the theater 
of operations.  By virtue of his position he is the military governor of the occupied 
territory and his supreme authority is limited only by the laws and customs of war.20 
 
This definition wove together concepts from prior seminal documents to link firmly 
postwar occupation with explicit military rule.  The War College Basic Manual 
associated military government with a military commander, as did FM 27-10, in saying 
that both government and commander are under the President’s direction.21  FM 27-5 
strengthened the military commander’s power, stating that the commander’s only 
restraints were the “laws and customs of war.”  It also expressly linked the exercise of 
military government with “command responsibility,” asserting that the commanding 
general in theater would be the “military governor.”  Furthermore, in language similar to 
a provision in the Lieber Code as well as a recommendation from a 1933 War College 
committee on military government, FM 27-5 vested “full legislative, executive, and 
judicial authority” in the commanding general as military governor.22  This plenary 
authority would prove especially important in the postwar occupations precisely 
because it was concomitant to military command, as opposed to standard civilian 
authority.  In contrast, for example, with the highly centralized decision making of the 
State Department, enormous discretionary power devolved to the on-ground military 
commander as a necessary function of wartime responsibilities.  This authority, as 
indicated by FM 27-5’s language that so empowered the military governor, thus carried 
over into the Army’s doctrinal understanding of the postwar environment as well.23   
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Furthermore, according to FM 27-5, the fundamental policy that governed the 
conduct of military government was military necessity, defined in paragraph 9a: 
The first consideration at all times is the prosecution of the war to a successful 
termination.  So long as hostilities continue, the question must be asked, with 
reference to every intended act of the military government, whether it will forward 
that object or hinder its accomplishment.  The administration of military government 
is subordinate to military necessities involving operations security, supply 
transportation or housing of our troops.  If hostilities are suspended by an armistice 
or otherwise, all plans and dispositions must be made so that the troops may 
resume hostilities with the least inconvenience to themselves and to the operations 
of the military government, and above all, under conditions most conducive to a 
successful termination of the war.24 
 
In paragraph 10a, it followed as a corollary from the “basic policy of military necessity” 
that the commanding general of the theater of operations must “have full control of 
military government therein.”25   
FM 27-5’s definition of military necessity came especially freighted with law and 
history, for “military necessity” was a term defined by Lieber, and in its essence had 
been reproduced in the 1914, 1934, and 1940 Rules of Land Warfare.26  Lieber had 
defined military necessity as “the necessity of those measures which are indispensable 
for securing the ends of the war, and which are lawful according to the law and usages 
of war.”  In his view, military necessity “admitted of all direct destruction … of armed 
enemies, and of other persons whose destruction is incidentally unavoidable… .  
[Generally] military necessity does not include any act of hostility which makes the 
return to peace unnecessarily difficult.”27   
Commentators have noted the relative ambiguity of Lieber’s concept in its initial 
form, since there is uncertainty about what the limits of such necessity were in extreme 
cases.28  The 1914 and subsequent versions of the Rules of Land Warfare, relying on 
post-Lieber international law developments, largely reduced that ambiguity by adding  
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two complementary principles of “humanity, prohibiting employment of any kind or 
degree of violence as is not actually necessary” and “chivalry, which denounces and 
forbids resort to dishonorable means, expedients, or conduct.”29  Although those 
principles were absent in FM 27-5, the immediately subsequent paragraph 9b stated 
that military government should be “just, humane, and as mild as practicable….those 
who administer it [should] be guided by the principles of justice, honor, and humanity.”30   
Nonetheless the language of military necessity in FM 27-5 departed from the legally 
grounded terminology in the previous orders and manuals in its orientation.  Specifically, 
FM 27-5’s definition oriented the “absolutist” quality of necessity towards occupation 
during and after hostilities rather than combat during hostilities.31  Instead of the 
“destruction of armed enemies,” military necessity in FM 27-5 focused on the war’s 
“successful termination” if conflict was still underway, which presumably encompassed 
the full sweep of the military governor’s authority to accomplish this. If it was during a 
period of armistice, FM 27-5’s necessity language was slightly less clear.  What 
paragraph 9a stated was that soldiers must have the “least inconvenience” afforded to 
them if fighting had to resume and under conditions “most conducive” to the war’s 
successful ending. 32    What this appeared to mean is that, if required, military 
operations would trump other considerations—a variation, however unclearly presented, 
of standard military necessity.   
In so doing FM 27-5 linked a refined, if not revised, idea of military necessity to 
military occupation.   As earlier pointed out, military necessity had been defined only 
generally in the 1914 and 1934 Rules of Land Warfare, and not defined in terms of 
occupation responsibilities.   At the same time, in spite of the absence of the 1914 and 
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1934 “humanity” and “chivalry” principles, in no way could FM 27-5’s military necessity 
be read as meaning that those principles were not valid, given the subsequent language 
about “just and humane” government.  Indeed, even without such just and humane 
language, FM 27-5 could not be read in isolation—the explicit protections in the Rules of 
Land Warfare remained equally extant in Army doctrine (and law) to guide the 
occupation.  Rather, what the language of FM 27-5 could be reasonably read as doing 
was tightening the linkage between occupation and expressly military responsibility.  If 
the primary concern was military necessity, then logically, a military commander should 
be responsible for governing in order to determine that necessity.     
FM 27-5 further established a temporal framework for occupation.  According to 
paragraph 33, military government “usually pass[es] through [three] successive 
phases... .”33  Though recognizing that not all military governments passed through all 
the phases, FM 27-5 stated that generally an occupation would have a first phase while 
fighting was still occurring—a predominantly tactical phase in which little could be done 
to set up military government.34  During the second phase, organized, conventional 
resistance ceased, military government was formally organized, and the military 
governor issued more comprehensive ordinances.  This phase was indeterminate, 
though peace has not formally been declared between the United States and the 
occupied country.  In the third and last phase, as a result of some formal arrangement 
such as an armistice, peace treaty, or formal surrender, or even the complete 
destruction of the armed forces, “military necessity…operates with greatly diminished 
force, if at all” and “more and more of the operations [will be] taken over by the civil 
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government until the latter assumes full control and the Army becomes merely a 
garrison or is withdrawn.”35 
These phases were in keeping with Colonel Hunt’s ideas.  Hunt had also broken 
down military government into three phases in his 1933 lecture to the Army War College 
on the subject.36  Premised on a nation-state construct that conformed to American 
experiences, FM 27-5’s phasing contemplated a civil government capable of being 
restored as well as a state that could gain reentry into international politics following a 
peace treaty.  It thereby conformed to the American military government model that had 
developed and been practiced in the Rhineland.37   It was premised on a “restoration to 
normality” in a reasonable time to the prior existing government.  In this model, postwar 
occupation was not a long-lasting or comprehensive societal project, but a return, at 
least to some extent, to status quo ante.  Such societal and political transformation 
occurred outside the scope of the objectives of military government.  There is nothing to 
indicate, for example, that the Army paid much heed to what happened in Germany 
following the occupation, which included the eventual transition to the Weimar Republic 
and its ultimate fall in the 1930s. 
The rationale behind the phasing, that of reestablishing the prior political system, 
paralleled that of the treatment of civil order and civilians in general.  In keeping with the 
Hunt Report and the War College Basic Manual, FM 27-5, paragraph 9c stated that  
existing laws, customs, and institutions of the occupied country have been created 
by its people, and are presumably those best suited to them.  They and the officers 
and employees of their government are familiar with them and any changes will 
impose additional burdens upon the military government.  Therefore it follows from 
the basic policies of welfare of the governed...and economy of effort…that the 
national and state laws and local ordinances should be continued in force, the 
habits and customs of the people respected, and their governmental institutions 
90 
continued in operation, except insofar as military necessity or other cogent reasons 
may require a different course.38 
 
Correspondingly, the same paragraph recommended, as much as military necessity 
permitted, to retain existing civil personnel, and to keep in place existing political 
divisions such as states, provinces, counties, departments, cities, or communes, and to 
conform units responsible for military government to those divisions.39   
This understanding of civil government was in keeping with the “contractual” 
premise of the Lieber Code and The Hague Conventions.40  It went beyond both in 
elaborating in detail the principle that civilians should be permitted to keep 
governmental structures as intact as possible.  Yet it was also obviously a product of a 
pre-ideological era.  One could challenge the assertion that the “existing laws, customs, 
and institutions” of Hitler’s Germany or Stalin’s Soviet Union were “created by its 
people,” much less “best suited to them.”  Instead, this portion of FM 27-5 recapitulated 
and expanded upon the Hunt Report’s reflections on post-World War I occupied 
Germany, which still possessed western political norms, and which, in declaring defeat, 
had kept its internal governmental structures relatively intact, and had suffered little 
damage to its infrastructure, though paying little heed to the longer term political turmoil 
that would lead to the rise and fall of the Weimar Republic .41   It also furthered his ideas 
about the wisdom of the British and French military governments in aligning their civil 
affairs units to existing political structures and boundaries.42    
The underlying idea of early return to power—of restoring the civil government as 
soon as possible, to include using existing civil political structures—would be a powerful 
concept in American World War II occupation policy that would be in tension with 
competing policies to ensure occupied territories political systems were purged of 
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offensive ideologies.  Admittedly, as doctrine, the principle was only a guideline—
“military necessity” was broad enough to encompass any number of reasons why laws 
should be overturned and why political structures would need to be altered.  But if 
“military necessity” was the primary, overarching principle for such actions, then the 
purpose had to relate back to primarily military ends, ends that were presumably 
decided by the military commander.  How military and civilian U.S. leaders grappled 
with resolving when and how to return power to conquered (and liberated) territories 
proved to be one of the most important and complex issues from 1945 onward. 
FM 27-5’s 1943 Revision 
Criticism prompted a revision of FM 27-5, which came out in 1943.  Some of the 
criticism came from within military circles, arguing that the manual was actually too 
lenient, despite the rather sweeping authority it gave to commanders.  One lecturer at 
the School of Military Government stated that FM 27-5 gave the impression “that the 
objective of promoting the welfare of the governed in occupied territory is almost as 
important as the objective of military necessity.”43  On the other hand, criticism from the 
civilian community contended that the manual gave the military far too much authority, 
stating with “soldierly bluntness” the Army’s supreme authority over “almost the entire 
range of human activity.”44  There were also practical concerns with its “non-
interference” policy in the light of the occupation of Sicily after the Allies invaded the 
island in July 1943.  Strategic directives had required the abolishment of the Fascist 
Party, and yet at the same time instructions provided to administrators attempted to 
keep military government and purely political matters distinct.  The tension between the 
two led to unease and confusion.45  The Navy’s growing involvement in the occupation 
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of Pacific islands also led to greater joint cooperation between the services on civil 
affairs matters, and this further prompted a review of FM 27-5 in order for it have 
usefulness and relevance to both services.46  
These and other reasons influenced  FM 27-5 subsequent revision,  and a new 
version was published on December 22, 1943, this time as a joint Army and Navy 
manual (the Navy’s designation was OpNav 50E-3), an exceedingly rare occurrence 
during the pre-Defense Department era.47  The process was cumbersome, with 
revisions going back and forth and objections being made from Army reviewers about 
proposed Navy versions that the manual “should state and discuss principles and 
doctrines rather than prescribe rules”— likely a cultural misunderstanding about the 
manual’s purpose due to the relative scarcity of Naval doctrine in comparison to the 
Army’s.48   
Despite criticisms, most of the essentials of the manual remained the same in the 
1943 version, with differences in degree and emphasis.  Largely because of the Sicilian 
occupation, where Fascist laws had to be abrogated, there was a provision that stated 
that laws “which discriminate on the basis of race, color, creed or political opinions 
should be annulled as the situation permits.”49  Nonetheless the clause “as the situation 
permits” meant that military necessity would still be the controlling principle, and the 
remainder of the section also provided military officials some flexibility in determining 
which laws to annul: “However, the practice of such customs or the observance of such 
traditions as do not outrage civilized concepts may be permitted.”50   
The opening definition of military government was slightly less absolute sounding 
(“The term “military government” is used in this manual to describe the supreme 
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authority exercised by an armed force over the lands, property, and the inhabitants of 
enemy territory…”).51 But a later paragraph reaffirmed clearly the supremacy of the 
theater commander (“The exercise of civil affairs control is a command responsibility.  In 
occupied territory the commander, by virtue of his position, has supreme legislative, 
executive, and judicial authority, limited only by the laws and customs of war and by 
directives from higher authority.”)52  Indeed, what the document revealed was a sense 
of both greater ease and confidence in the military’s postwar role, as well as a greater 
understanding of military government’s strategic significance.53    As a drafter pointed 
out, the new manual expanded the objectives of military government.  Now included in 
those objectives were the “further [ance] of national policies” and the promotion of 
“military and political objectives in connection with future operations.54      
The most significant revision was the distinction between the terms “military 
government” and “civil affairs.” 55   The 1940 manual had defined the former term, but 
not the latter and though not defined, “civil affairs” seems to have had an equivalent 
meaning and had been used interchangeably with “military government.” 56  However, in 
the 1943 manual, the term “civil affairs” in fact encompassed “military government.”   It 
became a more expansive term that provided authority beyond that of controlling 
conquered enemy territory.  “Civil affairs control” in the 1943 manual specifically 
described the supervision of the activities of civilians by an armed force, “by military 
government, or otherwise.”57  Under this conception, military authority could presumably 
cover the administration of territory conquered, liberated or claimed by the Allied forces, 
and even other circumstances.  Another paragraph in the 1943 manual confirmed this: 
[A]n armed force may exercise control over civilians to a lesser degree than under 
military government through grant of, or agreement with, the recognized 
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government of the territory in which the force is located… .  In such cases military 
necessity has not required the assumption of supreme authority by the armed 
forces, but limited control over civilians is exercised in accord with these grants or 
agreements and the territory is not considered “occupied.”  While this manual is 
primarily intended as a guide to military government, some of the principles set forth 
may be applied in these other situations as circumstances dictate.58  
 
Reflecting the reality of 1943, when the Allies conducted military occupations in 
territories that were not the homelands of enemies, such as in North Africa, and in 
locations where the governments actually switched from adversary to ally, such as in 
Sicily and Italy, the 1943 manual permitted a wide range of circumstances in which 
military authority could be authorized, thus radically opening up the possible 
circumstances when the use of military authority could be made available.   
FM 27-5’s Practical Influence 
In addition to its influence in shaping the Army’s institutional ideas about postwar 
occupation, FM 27-5 had a more immediate practical influence on the Army.  
Specifically, it provided guidance on how to train, to plan, and eventually to implement 
military government.  More importantly, as Army doctrine, it provided the needed official 
sanction to launch into reality the most extensive postwar occupation program in 
American history.  It did so in four ways: 
First, it provided the official basis for establishing the first-ever School of Military 
Government in Charlottesville, Virginia.  In March 1942, the Army G-1, as the manual’s 
proponent, permitted the Provost Marshal General to establish such a school.  The 
basis of the permission was paragraph 7 of FM 27-5, which stated that “the necessary 
personnel, commissioned, warrant, and enlisted, will be selected and procured” in order 
to staff plans developed for possible postwar occupations.59 Logically, therefore, a 
school to train such personnel was warranted. 
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Second, FM 27-5 became the intellectual cornerstone of the training of all the 
officers who attended the School of Military Government.  As students were told upon 
arrival at the school, the “little pamphlet” would soon be their “bible.”60  Such biblical 
allusions to the document became common.  As Earl Ziemke noted in his official history 
of the occupation of Germany, FM 27-5 would eventually be regarded as the “New 
Testament” of military government (with FM 27-10 being considered the “Old.”).61 In the 
students’ classes, the document served as a primary organizing principle for problem 
analysis.  For example, the procedures students were to take when dealing with military 
government problems in exercises were to classify those facts which could be listed 
under categories found in FM 27-5, paragraph 13—areas ranging from public works and 
utilities to education, public welfare, and economics--and those facts which could not.  
After doing so, the students would then prepare staff estimates and mission 
statements.62    
Third, the document was the basis for the formation of military government units 
that would administer postwar American occupation throughout the world.  In 
determining how and where to assign graduates of the School of Military Government, 
Army officials again used the manual.  In September 1942, the Adjutant General 
determined that civil affairs sections in theater headquarters would “consist of a 
sufficient number of officers for adequate attention to the work of the nine departments 
described in paragraph 13, FM 27-5.”63   
Fourth and finally, it served as a starting point and organizing principle for analyzing 
the internal structures of all the countries in the world where the Army might have a 
postwar responsibility.  Recognizing that there was a limit to what the relatively short 
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manual could cover, early in the military government planning effort, Army planners 
realized that each potentially occupied country needed to have a series of studies 
detailing the areas that FM 27-5, paragraph 13 had listed as relevant.  Using FM 27-5’s 
categories, the end result was an immense, comprehensive project resulting in 
hundreds of so-called “civil affairs handbooks.” 64  By May 1944, there were nineteen 
separate handbooks for Germany alone, on issues ranging from agriculture (170 pages) 
to money and banking (294 pages) to transportation (156 pages). 65  The responsibility 
for the creation of the handbooks was the Army’s Civil Affairs Division, created in 1943 
as an expansion of the burgeoning military government effort, which outsourced the 
responsibilities for researching and writing these handbooks to a plethora of 
governmental agencies, departments, and other organizations.  In so doing, the effort 
helped to make that division the actual center of the U.S. government for postwar 
matters.66   
Doctrinal Promulgation 
By 1945, the Army was communicating a relatively consistent position on postwar 
occupation.  Representing a continuous movement from FM 27-5’s original conception, 
the Army recognized a greater sense of the need to bring about some ideological 
change in occupied territories that had been ruled by authoritarian regimes.  
Nevertheless, the model that was set forth in various plans and publications still bore 
significant resemblance to FM 27-5’s 1940 and updated 1943 versions.  As an example, 
in 1945 Colonel E.H. Vernon, an infantry officer assigned as an instructor to the Army’s 
Command and General Staff College, reiterated the basic template for military 
government in the Army’s professional journal Military Review.67  Pointing out that FM 
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27-5 was a doctrinal statement “which usage has proven to be sound,” he noted that it 
was a “guide, but not a directive.”68   He then elucidated the fundamental concepts of 
U.S. military government, essentially restating FM 27-5’s basic precepts.  It existed by 
reason of military necessity and by right of military power; it acted through indigenous 
officials and the use of local officials were necessary given the limits of military 
manpower; existing laws and customs should be retained whenever possible; and 
military commander should conform to political boundaries and subdivisions.69  Vernon 
discussed the two doctrinal forms of military government organization—operational, by 
which military government remained linked to tactical units; and territorial, by which 
military government units detached themselves from tactical commands and operated 
independently, associating themselves with local political structures and falling directly 
under the supervision of the overall military commander/governor, and bypassing the 
tactical chain of command.  Noting the advantages and disadvantages of each, he 
stated that experience had shown the solution was to start with an operational 
approach, and as security and order prevailed, shift to the territorial method.70 
The 1940 FM 27-5 had been silent on ideologies and political viewpoints that might 
be regarded as morally problematic, though the revised 1943 manual referenced the 
issue.  Vernon made no mention of major societal reorientation in his article, though 
some form of political change within reasonable boundaries was a likely requirement.  It 
would be usually necessary to remove many political officials from office.  At the same 
time, “[s]o far as practicable, subordinate officials should be retained in their office” 
unless it was desirable to remove them because of their associations with such 
organizations as the Nazi Party, Gestapo, or the Japanese Kempai Tai or Black Dragon 
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Society.”71  Thus, the issue was left open somewhat to particular requirements—there 
was recognition that some political reorientation would occur, though how deeply it 
would extend into governments and societies was up to the particular situation and the 
practicalities of implementation.72   
Army planning in both European and Pacific theaters reveal that FM 27-5’s doctrinal 
template, restated in Vernon’s article, was standard practice and policy in the last years 
of the war.  It was Anglo-American policy by the time of the Normandy invasion.73  
Approved as the “basic principles for combined [U.S.-U.K.] Civil Affairs operations” the 
“Standard Policy and Procedure” (SPP) for occupation responsibilities in occupied 
territories had as its primary objective to ensure that “conditions exist among the civilian 
population which will not interfere with operations against the enemy, but will promote 
those operations.”74  Additionally, military government/civil affairs, at least in its wartime 
conception, was entirely focused on the attainment of military objectives, which included 
the restoration of law and order and the stabilization of conditions, the “maximum use of 
local resources” and measures of assistance for the civil population as may be required 
by military necessity and by the policy of the Supreme Commander.”75  The Supreme 
Commander had such powers of government as military necessity might require, though 
it was recognized that this subject to change due to agreements between the Allied 
governments.76  Likewise, in planning for the Korean occupation, the military 
government section involved in planning for it relied on FM 27-5 to construct the 
organization that would perform occupation tasks.77  Reviewing FM 27-5’s various types 
of military government in the doctrine, and looking at its own recent experience in 
Okinawa, it determined that the type employed in Korea would be initially the “combat 
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type” of military government that linked military government units with tactical ones, as a 
precaution against possible Japanese resistance.  Gradually, it would shift to a 
“territorial” model as circumstances permitted.78 
Sometimes criticized as inadequate, FM 27-5 must rather be seen in retrospect as 
forcefully accomplishing its task.  While it was a doctrinal, and not a strategic or political, 
document, it nonetheless structured the postwar occupation model in accordance with 
the Army’s cultural imperatives and with intellectual understanding developed over 
nearly a century.  Additionally, as official Army doctrine, FM 27-5 bore the imprimatur, 
and thus the explicit endorsement of General Marshall, which provided 
interdepartmental justification for expansion of the military government concept into 
tangible reality very early in America’s involvement in the war.  Likewise, as doctrine, it 
provided a coherent consensus view for the Army to present to other departments and 
agencies.  It served, in other words, as the Army’s “expert opinion” not only on military 
government administration itself but also on even more important questions such as 
who would run the occupation, what the course of occupation would be, and what would 
be the relationship of the occupier to civilians.  Debates would later rage about the 
military’s place in the postwar world and about whether the establishment of postwar 
military governments should have been the template.  What is often overlooked is that 
this template was largely derived from, or at least influenced by, FM 27-5.  As a result, 
the document’s influence would rival seemingly far more significant products of high 
diplomacy that were the expressed strategic policy of the United States.  To quote again 
Earl Ziemke, he underscored the document’s influence by comparing it to two more well 
known strategic level plans: “The officers who conducted the post-World War II 
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occupation of Germany were brought up on FM 27-5, not on the Morgenthau Plan or 
even JCS [Joint Chiefs of Staff Directive] 1067.”79   
The Establishment of the School of Military Government and its Curriculum 
FM 27-5 served as the intellectual foundation of the Army’s conception of postwar 
occupation, but the Army, and more specifically the Army’s G-1 section, which had 
doctrinal responsibility for military government, now needed some way to turn the 
principles in that manual into concrete reality.80  Even before the U.S. entered the war, 
Army officials were determining how best to do this, though the ever increasing list of 
administrative tasks across the Army staff was making it exceedingly difficult to do so.  
Nonetheless, Brigadier General Wade Haislip, the G-1 chief wrote a memorandum in 
December to General Marshall proposing the establishment of a Military Government 
School, relying upon a proposal by the Army’s Provost Marshal General, Major General 
Allen Gullion.81  
FM 27-5 had, in fact,  been prepared under Gullion’s supervision while he had 
served as the Army’s top lawyer, its Judge Advocate General, a position he held before 
serving as the Army’s top policeman as its Provost Marshal General.82  Gullion was a 
West Point graduate who had served who had served as III Corps judge advocate in 
World War I.  He was best known as the prosecutor in the Billy Mitchell court-martial in 
1925 and had also served on U.S. delegations to two international conventions on laws 
of war, and had been the Administrator of the National Recovery Act in Hawaii from 
1933 to 1935.83   Made The Judge Advocate General in 1937, Gullion was later 
appointed to be the Army’s top law enforcement official, Provost Marshal General, in 
July, 1941, for a short time actually holding both positions until becoming solely Provost 
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Marshal in December of the same year.84  Gullion was also instrumental in executing a 
highly controversial facet of martial law in the continental United States: he advocated 
and oversaw the exclusion of Japanese-Americans from the Western Defense Zone in 
early 1942 on grounds of military necessity.85  
Gullion’s energetic efforts to push forward a military government school and to bring 
a military government program into being would later bring him criticism from even 
President Roosevelt himself.  Indeed, resistance to the idea came first within the Army’s 
ranks.  While Gullion, Major General Myron Cramer, the Judge Advocate General 
(Gullion’s successor), and the War Plans Division all agreed that  the Provost Marshal 
should run the school, the G-3, in charge of the Army’s overall operations, did not 
concur, stating that the requirements were too vast and also too dissimilar to military 
police matters.86    
In the back-and-forth exchanges between Army staff sections, Gullion eventually 
carried the day.  While the theory about military government contained in FM 27-5 gave 
the G-3 a basis to push back on the Provost Marshal taking on the job, the practical 
realities of the problem as set forth in the Hunt Report provided arguments to let 
Gullion’s organization take on the responsibility.  Cramer, in siding with the Provost 
Marshal against the G-3, extensively cited the Hunt Report, quoting its assertion that 
there had been a “crying need for personnel trained in civil administration and 
possessing knowledge of the German nation.”87  While recognizing, and even to a 
certain extent agreeing, with the G-3’s opinion about the Provost Marshal running 
military government, Cramer further stated:  
…[T]he question is a practical as well as a theoretical one.  As has been shown, 
there are strong objections to the assignment of the task of instruction in military 
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government to any one of the other agencies which have been suggested, but The 
Provost Marshal General is willing to undertake the task.  The present Provost 
Marshal General, MG Allen W. Gullion, who presumably will serve as such                      
for the duration of the existing war, has had a wide and varied experience,                
both civil and military.88 
 
The practicality of the argument prevailed, and on February 9, 1942, General Gullion 
was directed to take “immediate action by order of the Secretary of War” and was 
charged with operating the function of training officers for “future detail in connection 
with military government” which involved establishing a school.89   
After initially trying to establish the school at Fort McNair in order to use the 
resources of the Army War College, Gullion brokered an arrangement to use facilities at 
the University of Virginia, three hours southwest of Washington, in Charlottesville, 
Virginia, and in March 1942, the War Department concurred with his plan.90  Initially, the 
School was not to exceed 100 officers per course and have a small staff with permanent 
overhead not to exceed 12 officers and civilian instructors, 25 civilians, and one enlisted 
soldier.91  The lecturers were a mix of officers, some with practical experience, and 
civilian lecturers, some distinguished professors in their fields. 
While Gullion would have oversight, the School’s commandant, charged with its 
daily administration, was Brigadier General Cornelius Wickersham, in civilian life a 
prominent New York lawyer.  Wickersham also had a military background, having 
served as a major in WWI and an active reserve officer for 20 years.92  Like Gullion, he 
would be the subject of criticism as controversy about the School developed. 
Nonetheless, he served as the School’s commandant until 1944, when he became the 
primary American military advisor for the European Advisory Commission.93       
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Along with Gullion and Wickersham, a third figure served as a primary catalyst for 
military government training.  Colonel Jesse Miller would serve as the Director of the 
Military Government Division within the Office of the Provost Marshal General when it 
was created in August 1942, and even beforehand he was instrumental in establishing 
what became a comprehensive military government training system.94  Miller was a 
Kentucky lawyer who had served in the Army as an aide to the Provost Marshal General 
from 1918 to 1919 and also as a judge advocate.  He had also held a variety of federal 
governmental positions, serving as a special U.S. representative for the Nicaraguan 
presidential elections, as an assistant solicitor for the Bureau of Internal Revenue, and 
as Executive Director of the National Labor Relations Board in the early thirties.95      
It was Miller who, in a detailed memorandum to Gullion in January 1942, set forth a 
plan for the School’s nature, scope and personnel.  Relying on the Army’s 
understanding of military government principles, he stated that the “ideal type” of 
military government school “integrates the local laws, institutions, customs, psychology, 
and economics of the occupied area and superimposed military control with a minimum 
of change in the former and a maximum of control by the latter.”96  The basic materials 
that provided the underlying foundation for such training would come from FM 27-5 and 
the relevant international laws of occupation, as well as records of the American 
occupations of Vera Cruz, the Philippines, and the post-World War I Rhineland.97  On 
that foundation, more specialized and particular studies could follow to include intensive 
study of the culture, language and political systems of the countries to be occupied, and 
then practical application of relevant principles to School-generated problems.98   
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 A review of class lectures and course notes from students confirm that faculty and 
administrators essentially adopted Miller’s approach, however modified and refined over 
the course of the war.  Lecturers referred to both FM 27-5 and FM 27-10.  In his class 
notes, Major Richard van Wagenen, who later worked in the Military Government 
Division, wrote that  “27-10 is binding and mandatory …” and noted FM 27-5, even if it 
was a “guide only …” writing that one could not “use [a] field manual as [a] substitute for 
thinking.”   Students studied the Hunt Report carefully to glean lessons learned.99    
While students studied contemporary occupations, the American military’s historical 
experiences in occupations were the templates and standards by which occupations 
should be judged.100  One lecturer, Professor Ralph H. Gabriel (who was the Learned 
Professor of History at Yale) noted that only Britain had a comparable record of 
occupation experience: the U.S. and U.K. were the “two nations with the longest and 
most varied experiences with military government.”101  
In another lecture, Lieutenant Colonel Paul Andrews also stressed the 
distinctiveness of American military governments, a theme of anti-colonialism that 
comported  with America’s image of itself as a nation devoid of European imperialist 
ambitions: “…American history also affords, to its honor, examples of the occupation of 
territory not for profit, not for restoration of a previous sovereign, not for annexation, not 
to compel the signing of a treaty or the payment of reparations; occupations where the 
motive of benevolence was predominant.”102  Andrews went on to cite Cuba, the 
Philippines and Puerto Rico as examples of American military government seeking to 
ensure those islands gained autonomy and self-reliance and, eventually for the 
Philippines, independence.103 
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This revealed a not-quite resolved tension in American understanding of military 
government.  The actions of American officers in locales such as Cuba or the 
Philippines often promoted reforms that fostered “American” values and virtues.  As 
Gabriel pointed out in a lecture, an American military governor or civil affairs officer 
“carries the culture of the United States and his life is governed by the values of that 
culture.”  But Gabriel said that this was a problem that the principles of military 
government sought to redress:  “The existing laws, customs, and institutions of the 
occupied country have been created by its people and are presumably best suited to 
them.”  Gabriel went on to say, “That is a recognition of the fact of uniqueness in 
cultures.”104   
In another lecture, Thomas Barber stated “four great axioms of civil affairs.”  The 
first and fourth of these axioms were related to the paramount importance of “military 
necessity.”105  To “prevent the population [from] interfering with” and/or “induce them to 
helping” the occupying force was the first axiom, and “[t]he will of the commanding 
general is the law of the land” was the last.106  But the second and third axioms related 
to non-interference:  “Military government supervises the existing government.  It does 
not govern” and, “The best government is the least government. … This is always 
true… . The existence of a military government is an almost intolerable burden on the 
people, and the presence of every member of that government is an insult to their 
pride.”107  Non-interference was thus related not only to American benevolence but to 
military practicality and necessity: injuring a people’s pride by excessive and 
interventionist government would only antagonize the population that the military was 
attempting to control. 
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The question perhaps hardest to answer was: When did a military governor and his 
staff intervene to impose a social, economic, or cultural change?  Regardless of the 
non-ideological premises of some of FM 27-5’s principles, the lecturers and students 
were by no means oblivious to the world around them.  There were detailed lectures at 
the School, for instance, on the growth of Nazism in Germany, and on anti-Semitism in 
Germany and its influence on German culture.108  One way to address it was to 
separate military government “administration” from American “policy.”  Barber went so 
far as to compare military government with “plumbing”—providing basic services and 
keeping things running.109  Higher, far-reaching strategic decisions that could affect the 
course of a nation’s society or culture would have to come from a source that was 
presumably non-military.  As the school’s official history stated, the Army’s role was to 
be “administrative, the precise pattern of which would be determined by high policies 
which the Army itself was incompetent to prescribe, but which properly should be laid 
down by civilian agencies of the government.”110   
At the same time, and in keeping with the doctrinal premise of FM 27-5, it was 
essential that such agencies not interfere with the military government “as long as 
military necessity prevailed.”111  To quote fully from the official history of the School: 
“[R]esearch of the School’s faculty and student body…revealed one fact with great 
clarity i.e., that, in the early stages of any occupation and so long as any military 
necessity continued, complete and exclusive control of the area would have to be 
entrusted to the Army.112  This strong belief by the Army’s military government planners 
that “every effort should be directed by the War Department toward insuring complete 
control by the Army” while military necessity required would cause controversy—and 
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collision—with civilian leaders within the government as the war progressed.113  At what 
point did larger strategic imperatives, to include, for example, the need to impose 
sweeping reform, override military necessity? 
Expansion of the Military Government Program 
The program for military government grew steadily over the course of the war in 
sometimes overlapping and interconnected areas.  The War Department approved the 
School of Military Government at the University of Virginia in Charlottesville in February 
1942 to train 100 officers per class, with each class operating on a four-month cycle to 
meet the curricular requirements.  Deficiencies became quickly apparent after the 
course started in May of that year.  Notably, class sizes were far too small (the first 
class only had 49 students).  If 100 students were trained per class, that meant a 
maximum of 300 officers per year could be trained to perform military government 
duties.  By any estimation of the possible postwar responsibilities the U.S. might have, 
the number was grossly inadequate.  The German occupation force had used 3500 
military government personnel in Belgium alone in World War I, and currently used 7000 
alone in Poland, indicating that, regardless of whether such models of military 
government should be emulated, there did appear to be a significant lack of American 
personnel for potential duties in nations far larger than those German- occupied 
countries.114  Awhile new pool of officers—and possibly, locations for training—would 
be necessary. 
In August 1942, to facilitate this need, Marshall approved the expansion in the 
number of students and faculty for the School, provided they came from personnel of 
the Army Specialist Corps—which meant that once they had completed training, such 
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officers would be returned to an inactive status without pay if there were no active duty 
vacancies.115  Specifically, Gullion received allowance to appoint 2500 in the Specialist 
Reserve Section of the Officer Reserve Corps (which replaced the Army Specialist 
Corps), provided that the rate of intake would not exceed 300 a month and that those 
brought in for such duty had been determined to be skilled in civil government functions 
such as public works and utilities, fiscal affairs and economics, public health, sanitation, 
public relations, law and other fields relevant to military government.116   
The officers served, if activated, for the period of the war and for six months thereafter.  
When the war legally terminated was an open question, however, as a judge advocate 
legal opinion pointed out—conceivably, for instance, the war was not technically over 
until a formal treaty of peace was signed, which could be several years after a surrender 
of armed forces.117  With this greater pool of personnel approved, Gullion began 
actively recruiting for possible candidates.118  As the accompanying letter provided 
reveals (see figure 2), Gullion launched an energetic campaign that readily sought 
assistance and recommendations from other governmental agencies.   The letters were 
not sent randomly, but were only sent to those apparently so recommended.  Indeed, it 
was a successful approach, though one that could ultimately anger other governmental 
officials who felt it represented overreaching by the Army.    
Eventually, the School requested to increase its own capacity to 175 students per 
course and to decrease its length from four to three months, a request approved in 
September 1943.119  But the School in Charlottesville would still prove inadequate to 
meet the demand that Gullion set.  The solution was to partner with civilian universities 
throughout the country to create Civil Affairs Training Schools.  Miller worked to set up 
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the concept at six civilian universities—most of which, out of an apparent desire to 
assist in the war effort, were ready to cooperate.120  Under the Civil Affairs Training 
School systems, students being readied for military government in the European theater 
first received basic military training and general military government principles at the 
Provost Marshal’s School at Fort Custer, Michigan, for one month, then went to one of 
ten civilian institutions for more extensive training.  Students with Asian assignments 
were sent to the Charlottesville first, then to the respective civilian schools.  The roster 
of Schools was impressive, including among the training locations Harvard, Yale, 
Stanford, Chicago, and Northwestern.  It neatly solved the resource dilemma, all the 
while ostensibly providing quality training for the future military government officials.121  
By mid-1943, the training structure for military government was essentially in place 
and underway.  In a July letter to Secretary of State Cordell Hull, Assistant Secretary of 
War Robert Patterson described what was then available for military government 
personnel.  He listed four categories of training: 
1. Officers in the grades of captain to colonel who would have top administrative 
functions were trained at the School of Military Government at Charlottesville where the 
curriculum included “theory and practice of military government, liaison with friendly civil 
governments, special conditions in certain foreign areas, and language study.”  
Generally two-thirds of the class came from various arms and services, and the  
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 --Dear Sir: 
 The Provost Marshal General is creating a pool of highly 
skilled men, in a variety of technical and professional fields, 
for future use in the military government of hostile areas 
ultimately to be occupied by American armed forces.  In 
assembling these groups, the War Department is relying heavily 
upon nominations submitted by other governmental agencies having 
special interests in particular fields.  Those selected will be 
appointed in the Officers Reserve Corps and may be called to 
active duty for a period of four months for training after which 
they will be carried in an inactive status, without pay, 
permitting the continuance of their present civilian activities 
until their services are required. 
        Your name has been submitted as a person qualified for 
appointment on this roster.  If you are interested in having 
further consideration given to it, please accomplish and return 
the inclosed questionnaire (in duplicate), with small 
photograph, at your earliest convenience.  If a further 
examination of your qualification results in your selection, an 
effort will be made to tender you a commission which will be 
commensurate with your ability and experience and at the same 
time fair to officers who have been commissioned for a 
relatively long time.  Self-addressed envelope is inclosed for 
your use. 
 Selective service registrants classified IA or Class II are 
not eligible for appointment.  If you are ineligible or are not 
interested in this opportunity, a reply to that effect will be 
appreciated. 
 
Figure 2 
Major General Gullion's Recruitment Letter122 
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remaining were commissioned directly from civil life.  They received four months of 
training (later reduced to three months, and then reduced even further). 
2.  Those with highly specialized technical or professional knowledge and were 
recruited directly from civilian life were given training at one of the Civil Affairs Training 
Schools.  Instruction included the “theory and practice of military government, 
specialized training, and language training.”  They spent one month at the Provost 
Marshal General’s School at Fort Custer, then three months at a civilian university. 
3.  Less extensive training was provided for junior officers who were expected to be 
assigned to occupational military police duties or as junior civil affairs officers.  They 
were given four weeks of training in military government at the Provost Marshal’s 
School. 
4.  Finally, enlisted personnel identified to be utilized as occupational military police 
were trained for 8 weeks at an enlisted course, also at the Provost Marshal General’s 
School.123 
This system varied over the course of the next three years, before finally being 
completely phased out in 1946.  Nonetheless, the essential division of labor between 
the Charlottesville School and the Civil Affairs Training Schools endured throughout the 
war.  The end result was a total of 5925 officers trained in military government roughly 
by the time occupation duties began in Japan: 3465 for Europe, 2370 for the Far East, 
and 90 foreign officers.124    These personnel would be the core of military government 
officials who would conduct the postwar occupations for the Army.   
To ensure their proper recruitment, training, and structuring within military 
commands required the establishment of a military government division, such a division 
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would also involve other departments and agencies, to include civilian agencies, with 
the Army’s postwar occupation planning efforts.  The same August 1942 memorandum 
that permitted the expansion in the number of personnel to be recruited for postwar 
military government responsibilities also established the Military Government Division 
within the Office of the Provost Marshal General, with Colonel Miller assigned as 
Director.125 The division was a direct sub-organization under Gullion, with a gradually 
expanding number of branches and responsibilities. (See figure 3, which shows the 
Military Government Division within the Provost Marshal’s Office, and figure 4, which 
shows the Military Government Division in relation to other Provost Marshal Office 
functions.) 
In October 1942, Miller wrote to Gullion recommending that the Military Government 
Division “assume responsibility for the preparation, in collaboration with all competent 
agencies of the government, of a series of blueprints for the military occupation of the 
following areas, among others: Germany, Italy, Japan, France, Belgium, Holland, 
Denmark, Norway, Poland, and Czechoslovakia.”126   Miller went on to list various 
agencies to cooperate with in accomplishing the project, to include the State 
Department, the Board of Economic Warfare, and the Office of Strategic Services.   
In collaboration with these organizations, the Military Government Division would 
assemble data for a “detailed plan, including personnel requirements, for the military 
government of each area” which could serve as a recommendation for the theater 
commander for use in the initial stages of the occupation.127   This effort led to these 
civilian agencies assisting in creating the aforementioned civil affairs handbooks on a 
variety of FM 27-5-driven topics.  At the same time, Miller and his division set forth  
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Military Government Division, 1943128 
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Figure 4 
Office of Provost Marshal General, 1943 
(showing all responsibilitie de military government)129 
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recommendations on how to organize military government teams in theater 
commander’s commands.130 
Military Government Staff Sections and Units 
What emerged from these and other recommendations were the organizations that 
would administer civil affairs and military government at operational and tactical levels.   
The establishment of these organizations revealed the Army’s ability to produce 
internally the bureaucratic apparatus to support its doctrinal mission.  At unit 
headquarters, civil affairs/military government staff sections were given either general 
staff or special staff status and authority.  General staff sections were those that dealt 
with traditional, large-scale issues that spanned the breadth of a military operation: 
personnel, intelligence, operations, and logistics and the staff officers on these staffs 
were usually officers with considerably broad experience.   
In the European theater, the civil affairs/military government staff sections attained 
the more authoritative general staff status and were eventually given “G” status and 
known as the G-5 staff section.131  The acknowledgment of the staff office, at least in 
the European theater, as a G-5 general staff section, represented a significant 
recognition of the importance of military government responsibilities.132  In a March 
1944 report to Major General John Hilldring, the Director of the Army’s Civil Affairs 
Division, civil affairs officer Major John Boettiger noted how important civil affairs staff 
sections at the Supreme Allied Headquarters (the Supreme Headquarters, Allied  
Expeditionary Force, known as SHAEF) had become.133  By V-E Day, the G-5 
organization at SHAEF had grown into a large and complex organization, with eight 
subdivisions devoted to military government administration, and covering all the military 
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government duties required in FM 27-5.134  Likewise in the European theater, civil 
affairs/military government staff sections were set up below SHAEF, down to army 
group, army, corps, and division level, and after some initial 
confusion over the table of distribution and allowances (TDA), authorizations for such 
personnel were provided.  On April 15, 1944, for example, the TDA authorizations for  
European theater U.S. armies, corps, and divisions were issued.135  While there was 
initial confusion and uncertainty about the use of such personnel, by V-E Day the Army 
created over 2000 authorizations for G-5 staff personnel in Europe.136      
In the Pacific, the formation of military government staff varied widely, though more 
typically the civil affairs/military government teams existed as special staffs, reflecting 
the lesser importance of occupation governance during the island hopping campaigns.  
Special staffs dealt with technical matters, and the officers usually had special skills, 
such as in law or medicine, but usually lacked the knowledge and breadth of military 
experience to operate at the general staff level.137  The Tenth Army, for example, which 
was originally slated to serve as the force to provide military government for Korea, had 
a G-5 special staff section, and had been involved in the occupation of Okinawa.  But 
below that level, there were serious staff shortages for civil affairs:  one of the Tenth 
Army’s tactical units, the XXIVth Corps, would be given the mission of occupying Korea, 
a role for which it was organizationally and otherwise unprepared.138  
Whereas G-5 staff sections interacted with other staff sections at unit headquarters, 
the civil affairs/military government detachments operated in the field and interacted 
directly with populations of occupied territories.  Detachments were specifically created 
to relieve combat units of civil responsibilities and also to provide on-the-ground 
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expertise in governance and civil administration operate.  At the same time, the 
detachments remained, at least during combat operations, under the authority of local 
tactical commanders.  Detachments could have varying responsibilities: while some 
performed purely administrative functions, many performed operational duties, 
accompanying division in combat and often serving as “spearheads”—moving ahead of 
the division headquarters and serving as its advance party in order to set up operations 
in a town or village.139   Detachments could also vary in composition and number 
depending upon the communities to which they were assigned: the civil affairs/military 
government detachment assigned to an industrial city, for example, would have more 
men assigned to it, with a greater variety of civil skills than one assigned to a small 
coastal fishing port, and such detachments were often kept busier with day-to-day 
problems such as getting local authorities to bury dead civilians after a town was taken, 
or overseeing rubble clearance from the streets, than with implementation of intricate 
governmental policies.140 
Difficulties and Controversies 
This rapid training, organizing, and allocating of personnel to civil affairs/military 
government structures showed clearly the power of the Army to assemble rapidly 
organizational structures.  Yet doing so was not without internal difficulty and 
controversy, much of it inherently related to the Army’s difficulty in linking military 
objectives to longer-term political goals.  Because military operations had their own 
timetable, it was often difficult to predict when areas would fall under Allied control and 
to what units.  Training was therefore not always properly coordinated and linked to the 
location.  Nowhere was this truer than in the Far East, when the sudden surrender of 
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Japan threw of all timetables and forced planners and organizers to scramble to put 
together sufficient assets to get to occupied locations.  While much work had been done 
regarding the probable Japanese occupation, little had been done regarding Korea.  
There had been little to no formal study of Korean language or culture at the School of 
Military Government or one of the Civil Affairs Training Schools.  Many of the units that 
eventually arrived in Korea had either been units that had performed civil affairs 
functions in the Philippines or were originally assigned for duties in Japan.141   
Additionally, not all such personnel in those organizations, particularly in the 
detachments, received sufficient training and education to perform their tasks to the 
fullest, partly because the end state they were supposed to work toward in the occupied 
territories they would administer was not clearly defined.  There had indeed been major 
efforts of Army officials in the military government division to set up extensive training, 
both at the Military Government School in Charlottesville, Virginia and the various Civil 
Affairs Training Schools at prestigious American colleges and universities, and there 
were efforts, at least in the European theater, to ensure the curricula at such schools 
were aligned with current policies and procedures.142  In accordance with FM 27-5, 
further specialized training was given in theater to ensure further understanding of the 
particular problems to be faced in the occupied territory.143  A fundamental training 
problem, at least in the first two years, however, was that there was little to no education 
on policy goals provided: what were the civil affairs/military government personnel 
actually working for ultimately?  This was due in large degree to the deliberately 
apolitical stance of the training, and also due to the lack of clear policy direction 
provided beyond winning the war.144   
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There was also dispute as to whether the detachments should be assigned to 
commanders of combat units or under a separate chain of command under a civil affairs 
officer.  Some senior civil affairs officials, to include SHAEF G-5 Brigadier General 
Frank McSherry, contended that having such units fall under tactical commanders and 
not an overall civil affairs commander in effect made each tactical commander the 
military governor for the area in which he was operating, and creating a hodge-podge of 
policies and procedures lacking uniformity and consistency.145  What eventually 
occurred was a compromise.  The detachments remained under tactical commander 
control, at least during and shortly after combat operations.  After victory was assured, 
and the occupations had clearly moved beyond assuring enemy defeat, detachments 
were put directly under civil affairs command authority.146 
The most fundamental dispute, however, was not within the Army, but between the 
Army and other governmental agencies.  The actions by Gullion and others were seen 
as farsighted and appropriate by senior Army officials, but also as aggrandizing and 
overreaching by civilians in other governmental agencies.  Disputes arose throughout 
the war, though none as prominent and serious as those which took place in late 1942, 
when the most significant challenge to the Army’s authority to administer postwar 
military government was made by high ranking civilian officials in the Roosevelt Cabinet, 
as examined in the next chapter.   
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Chapter 4 - FDR, Interagency Conflict, and Military 
Government 
The War Cabinet and the Pitfalls of Building Consensus 
Others in the federal government contested the Army’s claim that it should handle 
postwar governance, and as a result, clashes occurred at the highest levels of the 
Roosevelt administration, clashes exacerbated by the frictions in FDR’s cabinet that 
predated the United States’ entry into World War II.  In 1940, he was reelected for an 
unprecedented third term of office.  As a way to build consensus, both for his reelection 
and to prepare for the war that he saw on the horizon, he assembled a team within his 
Cabinet and on the various Boards and agencies that had arisen during the New Deal 
era of the 1930s.  It included progressive New Dealers such as Secretary of Interior 
Harold Ickes, the self-styled “curmudgeon” who had championed some of FDR’s more 
controversial social programs, and Vice-President Henry Wallace, who was admired as 
a visionary and common man crusader by some and derided as a naïve dreamer and 
USSR fellow-traveler by others.1  But FDR did not confine his political choices to 
progressives for his third administration.  One choice included the arch-conservative, 
free-market oriented Jesse Jones of Texas as his Secretary of Commerce.  Most 
importantly for the war effort, he also chose two Republicans who had bucked their 
party’s isolationist stance, Henry Stimson and Frank Knox, to serve as his Secretaries 
of War and Navy, in no small part to ensure military preparedness did not become a 
partisan political issue.2   
In so doing, he helped form a national consensus by deliberately creating a team of 
rivals that could unify the parties and the nation on big goals such as winning the war.    
At the same time, within the team itself, the conflicting personalities and viewpoints 
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often caused an actual breakdown of consensus on smaller issues.  Some historians 
have noted that FDR’s desire to dominate events led him purposefully to create 
competing interests.  Historian Robert Dallek contends that FDR became “a court of last 
resort on major issues” who therefore kept control in his own hands.3  Though Dean 
Acheson thought differently, thinking such a claim “nonsense,” Acheson nonetheless 
noted a certain inability of FDR to control subordinates, claiming that FDR was “tone 
deaf to the subtler nuances of civil governmental organization.”4   And Secretary of War 
Henry Stimson was frequently exasperated with FDR’s management and leadership 
style, commenting on having to endure “all the typical difficulties of a discussion in a 
Roosevelt Cabinet,”  and complaining of FDR’s apparently exclusive remedy of “more 
meetings” rather than decisive leadership” and of FDR’s habit of not delegating and 
“want[ing] to do it all himself.”5     
Perhaps knowing the contingencies of politics better than his subordinates, 
Roosevelt often let the logic of events determine policy choices rather than relying on 
close, detailed planning to do so.6  Sometimes there was no decision at all, and events 
would sometimes be decided essentially by default.  Particularly when it came to 
postwar planning, FDR chose not to decide, or chose to defer, for what he perceived as 
sound, practical reasons.  After all, in the first months of the war, whether the United 
States and the Allies would actually prevail against the Axis powers was still an open 
question.  Even then, his administration was flooded with plans, proposals and ideas on 
how to organize, lead, and reconstruct the postwar world.7   
Much of the advice, from both the public and private sphere, was laudable and 
sensible.  But FDR perceived that he had to tread carefully when dealing with postwar 
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matters.  After all, he had assembled a fractious coalition within his own administration 
to create a political consensus to win the war, and he did not want to lose it over efforts 
to win the peace.  According to biographer James MacGregor Burns, Roosevelt was 
haunted by Woodrow Wilson’s political defeat and the League of Nations debacle after 
the First World War.  He moved, especially during the first years of America’s 
involvement with “almost fanatical cautiousness on postwar organization.”8  He might 
allow committees to be formed and experts in one department or another to do some 
quiet, general planning, but any movement to detailed planning, especially when the 
outcome was not certain, could detract from the war effort.   
He also looked at an electorate uncertain about what America’s postwar role 
should be.   Two 1943 reports on America’s postwar roles revealed the ambiguous 
feelings Americans had.  A March 1943 intelligence study concluded that while most 
Americans agreed that the isolationism of the 1930s was an “outmoded formula,” 
nonetheless they were “far from happy about the alternative of international 
cooperation.”9  Most Americans (63%) agreed with the idea of the United States 
participating in a world organization of nations.10  Additionally, 77% believed America 
should “completely disarm its enemies.”  But a far lower percentage (49%) held that 
America should “change people’s way of thinking in the enemy countries” by taking 
charge of education and other significant postwar societal reconstruction efforts.11  
Importantly, the study also noted that even the positive responses did not “suggest the 
timorousness with which they approach the task of building a secure peace, the 
reservations they hold, or the tentativeness of their new opinions.” The study went on to 
say:    
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There seems to be a pronounced tendency to regard the idea of a community of 
nations as an abstraction belonging to the remote future.  The public nervously 
shies away from concrete plans for bringing a more secure world into being.  Only in 
part does this reluctance stem from the reasoned conclusion that such discussion is 
premature.  The size and dangers of the task appear to be far more important 
inhibiting factors. … Many Americans are appalled at the complexity of the 
problems involved in world reconstruction.12   
 
A second survey, done in later 1943, provided similar concerns for FDR.  
Summarizing its findings in a note to presidential advisor Harry Hopkins, economist 
advisor Isador Lubin stressed the greater importance the American public gave to 
domestic, as opposed to international affairs.13   According to the survey, “[p]eople are 
almost twice as much interested in domestic affairs as international affairs. … Two-
thirds of the people think we should not give postwar aid to foreign countries if to do so 
would lower the standard of living in the United States.”14   Furthermore, while 73% 
expressed “considerable” interest in domestic affairs, 46% expressed only an “average” 
interest in foreign affairs.15   
Concerns about the postwar economy troubled many in the government as well.  A 
study written by M. H. Pettit of the War Department’s Ordnance Office and forwarded to 
Undersecretary of War Robert Patterson in April 1943, indicated that current interest in 
dealing with postwar problems “global in scope” could cause the government to “fail to 
see clearly what is under our nose… .  Many domestic problems are casting their 
shadows ahead.”16  The major problem revealed by the study involved the readjustment 
of the national industrial economy from a wartime to peacetime basis.  World War II had 
brought an unprecedented investment by the federal government in the nation’s 
industry.   Defense Plant Corporation, the US Government’s investment agency, owned  
hundreds of plants outright for aircraft, communications, machine tools, iron and steel 
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and other major industries, and the government’s investment in industrial plants and 
equipment was 26 times greater than that of AT&T’s.17  Government officials feared 
greatly a retriggering of depression, if not worse.  As Pettit noted, “With the 
disappearance of the common interest in winning the war, the basic conflict among 
[business and industry]  for maximum participation in the profit (but not in the loss) 
resulting from the operating of industry, will re-assert itself.”18  If there were not careful, 
wise and closely monitored policies established for the termination of war contracts, the 
orderly liquidation of factories and equipment inventories, and the transfer of functions 
to peace-based industries, chaos and economic disaster could result. 
A presidentially approved report in early 1943 from the National Resources 
Planning Board, another FDR-created executive agency, highlighted the tension 
between FDR’s lofty goals of individual freedom and international harmony and concern 
about home front prosperity.19 The Board prepared the report, in the President’s words, 
to assist Congress in “development and consideration of appropriate legislation to 
achieve normal employment, to give assurance for all our people against common 
economic hazards, and to provide for the development of our National resources.”20 
The report stated that  “We look to and plan for … [t]he fullest possible development 
of the human personality, in relation to the common good, in a framework of freedoms 
and rights, of justice, liberty, equality, and the consent of the governed.”  It went on to 
use language highly similar to that of the Atlantic Charter’s, asserting that the war 
America was waging was “not a war for revenge and conquest, for more lands, and 
more people; but for a peaceful and fraternal world in which the vast machinery of 
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technology, of organization, of production may be made to serve as the effective 
instruments of human ideals of liberty and justice.”21  
The most vital problem identified would be the “maintenance of full employment and 
avoidance of a prolonged depression following a short-lived post-war boom.”  It pointed 
out that for there to be international order, there had to be national prosperity.  Thus the 
reports discussed plans for the development of the economy, for actions by state and 
local governments, and the demobilization of the huge American armed services as well 
as the demobilization of war plants.  At the same time, the problems abroad still had to 
be addressed:  
To make victory secure, the United States as part of the United Nations must aid in 
the disarmament of the Axis powers, the demobilization of armies, the repatriation 
of war prisoners and dislocated populations, the feeding of the starving peoples, 
and the rehabilitation of devastated areas.  The United States must gear its 
agriculture and industry to the tasks involved, and perhaps apply some form of 
lease-lend, use its shipping facilities, and supply technicians and organizers on a 
scale unknown heretofore.22 
 
This remained a daunting challenge and requirement, even if who was going to be  
responsible for addressing them was not yet clear.     
Thus Roosevelt approached postwar schemes with some caution.  What should be 
done, and what agency should lead the effort in postwar matters, to include postwar 
governance of territories following the war, was an open question.  Yet certainty and 
clarity did lay in one issue: winning the war.  And as might be expected, during the war, 
all things military were of primary and even paramount importance.  FDR’s wartime ties 
to the military were strong, and he was comfortable in his role as commander-in-chief.23   
Army Chief of Staff George Marshall and Navy Chief of Naval Operations Ernest King 
reported directly to him, and he made Admiral William Leahy his White House Chief of 
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Staff.  At the same time, his relationship with his military chiefs regarding strategic 
issues was complex.  While there was little doubt that civilian authority was 
unquestioned throughout the war, the military, especially the Joint Chiefs of Staff,  
emerged as the most influential and powerful arm of the executive branch, and indeed 
of the government, apart from the President himself.24   
On major issues of grand strategy Roosevelt sometimes decided against his military 
subordinates, such as when he overruled Marshall’s call for a cross-channel attack in 
1942 or 1943.  Yet on many other matters that were predominantly military in nature, 
FDR was deferential.  John J. McCloy, who had served as Assistant Secretary of War 
during World War II, later observed:  “The President’s consultations with his uniformed 
officers—unlike those of his distinguished colleague in victory, Mr. Churchill—rarely 
resulted in the imposition of his views on the military but rather in his acceptance, 
almost without question, of the views of the military.”25  Military necessity could trump all 
other matters.  For example, when Marshall demanded in January 1942 that the 
Munitions Assignment Board remain answerable to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, and 
not FDR or Churchill, Roosevelt acquiesced.26   
Often overshadowed historically by Army Chief of Staff George Marshall, Secretary 
of War Henry Stimson was as influential as Marshall in the Army’s development of 
postwar occupation planning.27  He was, in historian Michael Beschloss’s words, a 
figure with whom Roosevelt did not dare play too many games: his knowledge, 
experience, and key standing in the coalition Cabinet made him a powerful ally and 
adversary.28  A paragon of the American WASP establishment and spiritual father of the 
Cold War “Wise Men,” Stimson, Yale and Harvard Law graduate, was a distinguished 
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Wall Street attorney, and had been Secretary of War under Taft and Secretary of State 
under Hoover.  He had also been a colonel of artillery during the First World War (and 
would thereafter always be called “the Colonel”).  He had even had considerable 
firsthand experience in a form of American colonialism that strongly resembled military 
government, having served as Governor-General of the Philippines in the 1920s.29  
Stimson had combined an American paternalism that seemed like a variation of 
European colonialism with a willingness to let local Filipino authorities conduct the day-
to-day administration largely by themselves.  Thus, as Governor-General, he left the 
day-to-day administration almost entirely to the people, essentially leaving laws and 
customs intact. Yet he was an opponent of granting Filipino independence in the near 
future, determining the country was not suitably advanced at that time.30    
Many of Stimson’s most important experiences were shaped by his military service.  
He wrote in his diaries that his “best lesson in democracy had been in the 77th 
Division”—the American unit that he had served in during the First World War.31  
Stimson was also an internationalist who had broken from the isolationist wing of his 
party.32  As a lawyer, he was appreciative of the rules of international law and the legal 
prerogatives that came with sovereignty.  He noted in a 1939 article, for example, that 
international law had required that the United States to treat the elected Republican 
government of Spain as both the lawful government and as the only government of 
Spain entitled to receive assistance from the United States:  “Until the insurrection has 
progressed so far and successfully that a state of belligerency is recognized by the 
outside nations, no rules of neutrality apply.”33  Whatever the political status of the 
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Spanish Republic, a nation whose socialist government likely did not appeal to Stimson, 
the norms of international law were clear and had to be followed. 
Stimson was a strong proponent of military government’s necessity in conquered or 
liberated territories.  To him, it was a “great and proper function,” and the American 
tradition of military government was a long and honorable one.34  In the postwar memoir 
that he coauthored with McGeorge Bundy, they wrote: “World War II demonstrated with 
unprecedented clarity the close interconnection between military and civilian affairs; 
nowhere was this connection more evident than in military government. … [I]t was a 
natural and inevitable result of military operations in any area where there was not 
already a fully effective friendly government.”35   
Stimson, however, did not believe FDR shared his views of military government in 
any way.  Indeed he commented that he believed that FDR thought the idea of military 
government was “strange” and even “abhorrent.”36  Yet what Roosevelt really thought of 
military government—as a vestige of Old World imperialism, as a required and 
appropriate postwar process, or as an obstruction to needed societal transformations—  
would actually never be totally clear to the War Department, or, for that matter, to other 
members of FDR’s wartime team.  Indeed that lack of understanding about Roosevelt’s 
intentions fostered disputes and tensions with those on the opposite side of the political 
spectrum in FDR’s administration, the New Dealers.      
While most of the New Deal’s impetus had been spent by the late 1930s, the New 
Deal still had powerful voices in FDR’s wartime administration.37   Two in particular 
would be at the center of early postwar planning controversies.  One was Henry 
Wallace.  As a champion of civil rights, he was years ahead of his contemporaries, and 
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as a true believer in a building a better world, he was a strong proponent of some 
international body to govern the conduct of states.  Wallace represented such an 
important part of the FDR coalition that Roosevelt made him the 1940 vice-presidential 
pick.  Many also viewed Wallace with deep suspicion.  He had only recently become a 
Democrat in 1936 and was distrusted by members of his new party as a Republican 
apostate.   When Roosevelt elevated him from Agriculture Secretary to Vice Presidential 
nominee, booing broke out in the convention hall.38   Many Democrats and Republicans 
also thought of him as a “doe-eyed mystic,” the living manifestation of the “hopelessly 
utopian, market-manipulating, bureaucracy-breeding New Deal.”39  He could make 
statements both sincere and generous, yet also naïve and misinformed.40   
Such distrust and disdain were evidently shared by Stimson, who thought little of 
Wallace’s managerial abilities.  As one example, the War Secretary recorded in his 
diaries the first meeting of the then-Economic Defense Board (the future Board of 
Economic Warfare), which Wallace chaired.  Stimson scornfully noted that Wallace kept 
everyone waiting by being initially absent, having “forgotten his own date which he had 
fixed himself.”41   And it was in his role as Chairman of the Board of Economic Warfare, 
an organization presumably with major responsibility for postwar planning, that many of 
the cracks and fissures of the FDR coalition would reveal themselves when he clashed 
with others in the Roosevelt administration. 
A second New Deal figure of importance was Harold L. Ickes, Secretary of Interior. 
Another New Deal progressive, he was a champion of civil rights and Roosevelt’s Four 
Freedoms, and he was not afraid to confront the War Department over matters he 
regarded as morally significant.  He once brought to Stimson’s attention allegations of 
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discrimination in the Army against 500 members of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade, the 
famous outfit of American volunteers that had fought for the Spanish Republicans.  If 
true, Ickes contended, “they are so shocking, particularly in an Army that is fighting for 
the Four Freedoms, that the Army itself ought to be the first, on its own initiative, to clear 
the record.”42  Ickes was especially suspicious of military plans and designs, and 
echoed Henry Wallace’s view that what was needed was a “people’s peace…founded 
upon certain elementary principles,” with a list of rights—to think, speak, print freely, 
equal education, etc.43  What Europe and the world did not need was a return to 
realpolitik after the war, so “power-statesmen [can]…return to their pleasant little game 
of international penny-ante.”44  His immediate experience with American military 
government in Hawaii only confirmed his suspicions that military men would grab power 
and then refuse to give it up.  Feeling his own authority as Secretary of Interior had 
been circumvented there, he fulminated that “[w]ithout protest” the territorial governor of 
Hawaii, Joseph Poindexter, had “abdicated’ his responsibilities to the military there after 
Pearl Harbor and had allowed the military to set up a military governor of Hawaii, “an 
office not recognized by our Constitution, and an office that was thus brought into being 
for the first time since we became a nation.”45 
As the controversy over government in Hawaii revealed, Ickes also had a very real 
interest in postwar occupation responsibilities.  The Interior Department did have 
authority and responsibility over the governance of American territories such as Guam 
and the Philippines, and he argued that because of the Interior’s “unique experience 
with primitive people” it should “participate actively in the administration of any islands in 
the Pacific which may be occupied and governed by the United States.”46 He actively 
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campaigned for a prominent role in postwar planning, and wanted to lead a group to 
discuss postwar planning for the Far East.47 
Wallace and Ickes, then, were both representatives of the New Deal and 
“Progressive” side of FDR’s war Cabinet.  They, along with others would also play key 
roles in controversies that had civil-military implications, such as the fate of the Board of 
Economic Warfare, the imposition of martial law in Hawaii, and the exclusion of 
Japanese-Americans from the Western Defense Zone.  These controversies, in turn, 
helped to inform and shape theirs and other FDR cabinet members opinions regarding 
the Army’s role in postwar governance, and in particular the Army’s establishment of the 
School of Military Government.  Understanding these controversies is critical in 
understanding the Army’s ultimate ability to preside over postwar governance planning 
and implementation.  For what was especially evident in the aforementioned civil-
military controversies was that the civilian New Dealers lost in every case.  Wallace in 
his role as Chairman of the Board of Economic Warfare would not succeed in promoting 
or implementing his postwar visions, and the spectacular failure of that Board would 
indicate the limitations of FDR’s managerial style.  Ickes, as an unafraid and unabashed 
skeptic of notions of military necessity in wartime, would be generally unsuccessful in 
disputes with the Army over martial law in Hawaii.  So would other civilian members of 
FDR’s Cabinet over the Western Defense Zone Japanese-American exclusion policy.   
Finally, the interagency dispute over the School of Military Government would show how 
deeply and inextricably developed, by late 1942 and early 1943, were the Army’s 
conceptions about postwar occupation and how much it had already done to achieve its 
own goals regarding it.  As the controversies revealed, the Army’s internal culture, to 
148 
include its patterns of organizational control as well as its years of prior thinking and 
planning postwar occupations, gave it major organizational advantages.   These 
advantages, given FDR’s predisposition to favor military choices, resulted in the Army’s 
success in becoming predominant in postwar governance planning. 
 The Board of Economic Warfare and Interagency Dispute 
The growth of the federal government, especially in the executive branch, was 
unprecedented during FDR’s presidency.  Most noteworthy was Roosevelt’s creation of 
a plethora of new federal agencies as ways to deal with the unprecedented economic 
and later military challenged faced by the United States.  As sociologist Carl Grafton 
has pointed out, the creation of new agencies is indeed predicated upon sudden, 
discontinuous socioeconomic and/or technological shifts, though the very process of 
attempting to understand the major change—what Grafton calls “conceptualization” can 
in fact cause agencies to reorganize or even self-destruct as they attempt to grapple 
with the problem.48  In the thirties, FDR established eight executive agencies to 
implement New Deal programs.  In the early phase of World War II, he created an 
unprecedented 18 new agencies.49  Many of these focused on wartime economic 
activity, to include the lending or leasing of defense items to nations resisting the Axis; 
the control of commercial exports to protect American materiel, the procurement abroad 
of strategic materials, economic warfare against enemies, and in the field of postwar 
activity, the relief and reconstruction of liberated areas and the planning for economic 
reorganization in defeated Axis countries.50  By executive order, he directed the setting 
up of offices, committees, and boards to as a way to manage and control America’s 
involvement in the global conflict.  The Office of Lend-Lease Administration was the 
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most famous example, having been established in 1940 to get critical defense materiel 
to countries fighting the Axis while America was still officially neutral, under the personal 
direction of one of FDR’s closest counselors, Harry Hopkins.51 
When it came to postwar economic reconstruction and rehabilitation of countries 
either liberated or conquered, FDR’s goals were more enigmatic.  Roosevelt was 
concerned about moving too fast with postwar schemes, about alienating the electorate 
or his own coalition-style government.   At the same time, there was another large 
section of the FDR constituency, whom New Dealers such as Wallace and Ickes 
represented, that positively did see the need to plan and pursue an activist postwar 
agenda.  As early as 1941, there were disputes as to who should ultimately run overall 
economic planning within his administration.  The Secretaries of Interior, Treasury and 
State Departments all thought that their organizations should play large roles, though 
the Interior Department could only credibly claim occupation authority over United 
States territory (primarily The Philippines), and Treasury could only assert primacy over 
financial matters.  Shortly before and during the North African campaign, State in 
particular appeared as a candidate for the postwar leadership role.  Yet FDR had 
significantly reduced the Department’s influence, especially in the early war years, and 
essentially served as his own foreign minister.52  As Secretary of State Cordell Hull 
noted, after Pearl Harbor, Hull did not sit in on meetings that involved military matters, 
nor did FDR did not take him to the Casablanca, Cairo, or Tehran Conferences and he 
had to learn what actually happened at those meetings from sources other than the 
President.53   
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Whether Roosevelt deliberately glossed over long-range details, or whether his 
managerial style simply allowed agency power struggles to occur, the result was serious 
and intense interagency rivalry.54  The creation of a plethora of new agencies 
exponentially increased the rivalries’ intensities.  As sociologist James Stever has 
pointed out, such newly created agencies created intense feuds over jurisdictions and 
domains.  Indeed, far from creating an all-encompassing federal bureaucracy, the 
opposite resulted: supposed centripetal movement toward such total control was 
nowhere near as powerful as centrifugal tendencies caused by the environment and the 
politically charged atmosphere of the time.55      
On July 30th, 1941, FDR established the Economic Defense Board under the 
chairmanship of Vice-President Wallace (renamed the Board of Economic Warfare after 
Pearl Harbor).  While its wartime functions were somewhat limited—the Office of Lend-
Lease, for example, carved out much of economic activity in Europe-- as defined in the 
Board’s founding executive order, its functions and duties included “mak[ing] 
investigation and advis[ing] the President on the relationship of economic defense … 
measures to post-war economic reconstruction and on the steps to be taken to protect 
the trade position of the United States and to expedite the establishment of sound, 
peace-time international economic relationships.”56 
Chairman Wallace sought to make the Board an agency that advanced postwar 
ideas about global industrialization and higher living standards.  Wallace intended to 
use the Board as a platform to export his own vision of the New Deal abroad, 
developing systems to create international economic cooperation, joined with efforts to 
combat illiteracy and poverty to eradicate imperialism altogether.57  But there were 
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significant problems from the outset.  The President’s views of the postwar world were 
not clear to Wallace, and while the Board had major authority, to include dealing directly 
with foreign governments, FDR kept a hold over the Board’s fiscal spending.58  Then 
there were the bureaucratic difficulties of establishing a complex organization made up 
of other governmental agencies, many of them long standing, each with their own 
agendas, staffs and budgets, and not necessarily united in a common purpose.  
Wallace especially fought State over prerogatives.  Wallace noted that the Department’s 
difficulties with the Board were “mostly jurisdictional ones without any reference to 
principles.”59  He was determined to have unilateral authority to act with foreign 
governments, informing but not necessarily obtaining State’s permission to do so.60  But 
when he attempted to get exports under the Board, he had to get FDR to sign an 
executive order to transfer State’s export authority to him, and only after great 
resistance.61  While Wallace was successful in getting this much greater responsibility, 
it brought a need for reorganization and expansion of powers that took months to 
complete.  The Board did become a functioning bureaucracy with 2500 people and 
three divisions, but this took considerable start-up time. It did not meet at all for the first 
four months of 1942.62   
If his relationship with State was uneasy, with Secretary Jones of Commerce it 
bordered on mutual contempt 63   Not only was conservative, big-business  Jones 
worlds apart ideologically from Wallace, he also was chairman of the Reconstruction 
Finance Corporation, a Hoover-era government organization that FDR had kept for his 
New Deal agenda.  The Corporation represented another side of the New Deal, one that 
promoted competition, expansion, and economic development.  It provided government 
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loans to businesses, and Jones’ parsimonious view of loaning government dollars soon 
clashed with Wallace’s expansive ideas of using government monies as ways to 
increase industrial production and thereby enact socially transformative designs.64   
Matters came to a head when Wallace got the President to sign an executive order 
in April 1942 granting Wallace’s Board broad authority, to include providing to the Board 
the ability to represent American interests in dealing with economic warfare agencies in 
foreign countries, an encroachment on State Department authority.  It also transferred 
from Jones’s Corporation to Wallace’s Board the power to buy abroad materials for 
production.  Wallace did it without consulting the State or Commerce Departments, 
though apparently leading Roosevelt to believe that he had.65  Hull was infuriated, and 
for his part, FDR felt that Wallace had duped him, and his relationship with the Vice-
President was permanently soured.66   Shortly afterwards, another showdown with 
Jones brought the end of Wallace’s grandiose postwar plans by sealing his Board’s 
doom.  The conflict erupted when Wallace made public allegations about Jones’s 
supposedly derelict handling of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, a huge political 
mistake, since Jones was actually close to the President.  Enough fighting and bickering 
had gone on, with Wallace generally getting the worse of it, until finally Roosevelt 
intervened.  In July 1943, he abolished the entire organization, placing its functions 
within a new executive agency, the Office of Economic Warfare, later the Foreign 
Economic Administration under Leo Crowley, a businessman and a fiscal conservative 
close to Jones.67  Crowley was not one to attempt to impose a New Deal vision on the 
postwar world: he lacked both the desire and interagency influence to accomplish 
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Wallace’s goal.68   New Deal visions for postwar reconstruction, at least under 
Wallace’s direction, were dashed.   
The end of the Board of Economic Warfare did not end postwar planning efforts by 
civilians in FDR’s administration.  There were other civilian organizations that were 
involved in postwar matters, though none had the opportunity as the Board did to 
leverage civilian influence.  The Office of Foreign Relief and Reconstruction Operations 
under the direction of Governor Herbert Lehman of New York was intended to 
coordinate and direct relief efforts in liberated countries, but since its authority was not 
established by formal executive order, disputes broke out between it and other 
agencies, and it ended up being folded, like the Board, into the Foreign Economic 
Administration.69   
Indeed, Roosevelt established the State Department’s Office of Foreign Economic 
Cooperation in July 1943 as the primary agency to have the power to coordinate 
American policy in liberated areas, and as part of its charter it was supposed to pay 
“major attention to the relations of civilian agencies with the Army.”70  The Office was an 
attempt to gain some responsibilities back to State, but in the end its existence only 
increased the interagency warfare: the Office of Foreign Economic Cooperation tended 
to side with Lend-Lease against the Board of Economic Warfare (before it folded) and 
the Office of Foreign Relief and Reconstruction Operations.  Soon the Office of Foreign 
Economic Cooperation too was folded into Crowley’s organization.71  Finally there was 
the Foreign Economic Administration itself, under Crowley’s restrained vision.  It ended 
up partnering with and subordinating itself to the Army and was not capable of 
conceiving or planning a postwar world beyond matters of providing economic aid and 
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logistics—essential tasks to be sure, but a far cry from the conceptions of Wallace, 
whose lack of managerial and political skills helped to destroy his own organization.   
The story of the Board of Economic Warfare illustrates the centrifugal tendencies of 
the ad hoc civilian organizations.  The infighting, the dueling over prerogatives, and the 
lack of internal coherence were not lost on commentators of the period.  In an article 
written in September 1942, economist and journalist Eliot Janeway wrote about the  
consequence of Washington’s aimless and overadvertised whirl … .  [T]he present 
crisis has arisen out of the failure of the inhibited civilian agencies to check or 
balance anything.  The truth is that the Army and Navy have been the only groups 
in Washington pressing for more power.  Instead of being checked by the 
counterpull of the civilians, they have run headlong into a vacuum.72   
 
Janeway was writing about the virtual takeover of key economic positions by military 
men, but his comments could be applied with only slight modification to postwar 
planning efforts as well.  What Janeway noted was the failure of anyone taking over as 
a “chief of staff” of all the civilian agencies, which properly managed, would direct the 
wartime economic effort.  The Army and Navy, while “far from free of incompetence, 
bureaucracy, and a fantastic amount of self-defeating paperwork,” had bureaucratic 
advantages: “they are disciplined, unified military organizations with a concentration of 
power at the top … [and] able to dominate…civilian committee colleagues.”73   
Martial Law in Hawaii and Japanese- American Exclusion in the Western Defense Zone 
Secretary Ickes was likewise concerned about the power vacuum that the military 
was filling, if by default.  He and others in the FDR Cabinet would dispute the Army’s 
first exercise of martial law and military government not abroad, but in United States 
territory, in the Hawaiian Territory, where the Army imposed martial law, and in the 
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United States itself, where military commanders had extensive powers given to them in 
the so-called defense zones.    
Martial law was imposed in Hawaii on December 7, 1941, with Lieutenant General 
Walter Short becoming the military governor.  A steady succession of events expanded 
the military’s civil authority in the territory:  on December 8, all civilian courts were 
closed, and on the 9th Roosevelt approved both martial law in the territory and the 
suspension of habeas corpus.  Even after the battle of Midway, and after the imminent 
threat of invasion had passed, the military retained power in the islands.  On October 
16, 1942, FDR designated Hawaii a military area pursuant to Executive Order (EO) 
9066, thus granting to military authorities great power to exclude residents under 
penalty of law from areas on the islands it deemed necessary.74 
While not provided the power to impose absolute martial law, the authority given to 
military commanders of respective defense zones in the continental United States was 
nearly as great.  Lieutenant General John DeWitt, the Commanding General of the 
Western Defense Zone, activated in June 1941, in particular, provided the most visible 
display of military power.75  Relying on both EO 9066 and a common law understanding 
of military authority, DeWitt published a series of proclamations throughout 1942 that 
included putting restrictions on public gatherings, prescribing conditions for outdoor 
lighting, and, most controversially, establishing an exclusion policy that resulted in the 
removal of over 100,000 Japanese-Americans from zone to the U.S. interior.76  
In both the Hawaii and the Western Defense Zone examples, Army officials on the 
ground and in Washington relied on both their understanding of the law and the 
requirements imposed by military necessity.  For example, a December 15, 1941 
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opinion from the Western Defense Zone staff judge advocate quoted extensively from 
U.S. common law cases in setting forth the case for military authority in emergency 
situations.  As the opinion concluded, military authority could require actions even if 
outright martial law was not imposed:  “When the exigencies of the situation require, the 
commanding general may, in time of war, use every means necessary to accomplish his 
military mission, including the summary taking of privately owned property.  This 
authority exists irrespective of any declaration of martial law.”77   
Similar arguments were used in Hawaii to justify continued military authority over 
government.   In December 1942, Lieutenant General Emmons, the military governor 
wrote to Assistant Secretary John McCloy regarding a dispute with Attorney General 
Francis Biddle over the relinquishment of civil authority in Hawaii.  Finding Biddle’s 
proposals inadequate, Emmons asserted: “My responsibility as Commanding General 
and Military Governor requires me to defend the Hawaiian Islands at all costs, and as 
the prelude to such an eventuality, to organize the military and civil population to co-
operate in that defense.”78  
Assistant Secretary of War John McCloy deferred to the judgment of the 
commander on the ground regarding the Japanese-American exclusion.  In the words of 
his biographer Kai Bird, “[I]t was simply a question of whether the removal of the 
Japanese Americans was a military necessity.  He was fully prepared to allow the 
military authorities to make this judgment.”79  Other FDR Cabinet members argued 
heatedly with the War Department over Hawaii and the Western Defense Zone.  
Secretary of Interior Ickes privately fumed that civilians had abdicated authority in 
Hawaii and that the term “military governor” was “not recognized by our Constitution.”80  
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Attorney General Biddle and members of the Justice Department (to include FBI 
Director J. Edgar Hoover) argued against the Japanese-American exclusion policy as 
unwarranted.81  Yet in both cases, the Army’s arguments were generally successful.  
Biddle eventually acquiesced to the Army’s arguments, and Federal courts throughout 
the war generally (though not always) deferred to the Army’s exclusionary policies.82  In 
Hawaii, martial law remained an issue of tremendous controversy.  The Army’s authority 
gradually diminished over the course of the war.  But it was only totally ended in 
October 1944, the same month that FDR restored the writ of habeas corpus by 
proclamation.83  
The Hawaii martial law and the Western Defense Zone exclusion controversies 
reveal the FDR administration’s deference to the military on such matters.  But the 
controversies reveal more.  They also show how the Army used arguments for military 
necessity in ways that maximized the U.S. Army’s influence and interests by referring to 
terms and conditions that were set by the Army itself.  In wartime, the Army, as the 
subject matter expert, was the best judge of what would constitute possible invasion or 
sabotage in Hawaii and the Western Defense Zone.  It was thus able to thwart other 
actors and agencies, such as Biddle at Justice and Ickes at Interior, and thus prevailed 
in the interagency disputes.   
The School of Military Government Controversy84 
Another controversy involving the School of Military Government would immediately 
threaten the Army’s role in postwar governance.  By the summer of 1942, high-ranking 
officials and FDR himself became suspicious of the Army’s military government training.  
Noting that his wife Eleanor had apparently expressed some concerns about the 
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Charlottesville school and perhaps fearing it was a conservative training ground, the 
President sent a memorandum to Undersecretary of War Robert Patterson, asking to 
speak to him about it.85  As an indication of how little high ranking officials knew, 
Patterson reported back on July 20th, stating that while some work had been done in 
War Department, “very little attention” had been paid to the training of personnel, even 
though the School of Military Government was in operation and midway through its first 
class.86     
By August, suspicions among the FDR administration about the School had 
heightened.  Rumors that it was either a reactionary hotbed or filled with incompetents 
(or both) had gotten to the point where FDR wanted further discussion.  FDR called for 
another meeting with Patterson, and he also sent a memorandum to General Marshall 
stating that he wanted specifically “a breakdown, and possibly the names of those who 
are taking the Charlottesville course, and why they were selected.”87  As the 
memorandum indicated, what raised Roosevelt’s suspicions had to do as much with 
who was in the School as what was taught.   Was it a magnet for anti-New Deal 
politicos who wanted to influence America’s postwar policy?   Just as concerned as 
FDR was with braking the perceived utopianism of Wallace, he still needed to placate 
his still powerful New Deal/progressive front.  The last thing he wanted was the 
perception that Old World imperialism was to be the postwar American model.   
Marshall sent back a detailed study that August, as well as a by-name student 
roster.  Clearly intended to assuage FDR’s concerns, he pointed out that the Navy had 
a similar though much smaller school underway at Columbia (perhaps a subtle way to 
get the naval-oriented Roosevelt’s favor).  He also anchored the School’s justification 
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for existence in the Army’s doctrine on the subject, FM 27-5, providing FDR a copy for 
him to read, and quoting its text as a justification for the training in several places.  He 
cited in particular paragraph 7 which prescribed qualifications and backgrounds of those 
required for key positions in military government.88  
Marshall also included a report from the Army’s Inspector General (IG), which 
validated the School.  The report stated that the School was developing officers to be 
efficient managers, but it sought to dispel notions that it was training them to be 
statesmen: the personnel being trained were to handle purely military matters of 
administration, leaving policy questions to those beyond the War Department.  The 
report also stressed repeatedly the practicality of the School—its emphasis on training 
engineers, sanitation officials and the like, and noted that while the first class had spent 
excessive time on “international law and political philosophy, which are not essential to 
subordinate officials,” that overemphasis had been remedied.  Perhaps most importantly 
for FDR, the report indicated that only 8 of the 51 personnel in the current class had any 
political background.  Finally, it made three recommendations: that the school be 
retained under Army control, that it be expanded to take in 150 rather than 100 students 
now authorized, and that the additional 50 come from the Army Specialist Corps and 
that they be returned to their civilian jobs upon completion of course and called up when 
needed.89 
Meanwhile, John McCloy, the Assistant Secretary of War who had worked on both 
the Hawaii martial law and Western Defense Zone exclusion policy, also examined the 
issue.90  Hopkins had asked McCloy informally to look into the School as well, and 
McCloy wrote back to him that “Somebody has been seeing things.  The [s]chool is 
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simply a necessary component of military education.”91    McCloy also tried to normalize 
the school by saying among other things that in World War I there was similar training 
(this was erroneous —one of the Hunt Report’s points was that such a school had been 
badly needed).  He referred twosome of the faculty, to include Paul Andrews, Dean of 
the Syracuse Law School, and Hardy Dillard of the University of Virginia Law School 
faculty, and he mentioned that Colonel Miller was a friend of Isador Lubin, an economist 
advisor to FDR.  He further pointed out that almost all the students had been selected 
by commanding officers, and none had been selected based on political affiliation.92  
In his response to Hopkins, McCloy also structured the notion of postwar occupation 
in a way that reflected the Army’s classic understanding:  “In the present war we will be 
apt to have all types of jurisdiction—martial law, as we now have in Hawaii; military 
government, such as you would have in an occupied zone, and liaison work in 
communities in which we merely support the civilian administration.”93  His comment 
revealed how extensive was the Army’s involvement in areas outside of the battlefield.  
The idea of “communities” where the military would “support the civilian administration” 
were inchoate, undefined, and without any sort of real context or historical meaning, 
though presumably appropriate if military necessity required the Army to have 
jurisdiction.  On the other hand, both “martial law” and “military government” were 
doctrinally defined and practices with legal standing.   Military government, indeed, was 
to be considered reasonable and de rigueur in the present context.  It was a logical, 
codified, and appropriate practice for the Army to prepare for—the Army had done 
exactly that by codifying it in doctrine and establishing training for it.  Indeed, McCloy 
contended that the attacks were by “chronic under-the-bed lookers who had visions of 
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grand rehabilitation schemes after the war, in which they themselves might play no 
mean part….[such persons] suddenly became alarmed when they heard of this [s]chool 
without realizing that it was not only the normal but the necessary function of military 
government.”94   
McCloy convinced Hopkins, who wrote back to him: “I have heard all about the 
[S]chool that I want to hear for the present.  I am sure it is all right.”95  Yet such was not 
the case.  FDR did not respond back to Marshall in September or October, and it was in 
October that Gullion’s energy and ambition triggered an eruption in the Cabinet.  As 
Guillion had gotten the military government program underway, he had begun sending 
notifications to various agencies within and outside the government, requesting liaisons 
with agencies, and seeking assistance and recruiting personnel as possible students for 
the school.96   Initially, Ickes seemed to go along with this, and had designated 
Undersecretary Abe Fortas to maintain liaison with Gullion in connection with the 
program.  In a September 30, 1942 note, Ickes wrote to Stimson that the administration 
of territories and insular U.S. possessions were under his department’s jurisdiction, 
which provided Interior with much experience in the matter, hinting at his own 
department’s prerogatives in such matters.97   
What apparently set Ickes off occurred in October when Miller asked Fortas for the 
names of engineers, economists, lawyers, and other civilians who might be qualified to 
serve as advisors to military governors.98 Ickes recorded in his diaries that he had met 
with FDR in early October, and that he had told the President that the Army was training 
“pro-consuls” at the School in Charlottesville.99  He also noted that a reason he wanted 
to establish his department in occupation planning going was to start a civilian training 
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program of its own “and thus crowd the Army out.”100  Most interesting in Ickes’ account 
was FDR’s response.  Roosevelt knew all about the school, and indicated that he was 
going to do something about it: “[Roosevelt] does not think that Army men are the 
people who should have civil administration entrusted to them.”101  But Ickes was also 
concerned that FDR would put off deciding the issue until it was too late to do anything 
to change course.102 
The matter climaxed in two Cabinet meetings in late October and early November 
1942.  While FDR did not allow minutes taken at his Cabinet meetings, the recollections 
in the diaries of Stimson and Ickes, and the post-Cabinet notes of Attorney General 
Francis Biddle, provide valuable insights.  At the meeting, according to Ickes, FDR 
somewhat chastised Stimson for the School, with Ickes remarking that it looked like 
“militaristic imperialism” and that it should be stopped.103  Ickes thought that Stimson 
seemed surprised, though the Interior Secretary thought that Stimson surely knew the 
School was in operation.  Ickes further remarked that the School was in his mind “one of 
the most dangerous indications that has come to my notice… .  We ought to be getting 
ready to administer for the interval necessary to reestablish governments after the war.  
But the administration ought to be by civilians, although it would be necessary to have 
troops at hand to keep the peace.”104  Biddle’s notes of the meeting mirrored Ickes’, 
though with an interesting addition.  Afterwards, he met with Vice-President Wallace 
suggesting to him that a study be made of turning the training over entirely to civilian 
colleges such as Harvard and Columbia, and thus apparently avoiding any charge that 
the Army was training a pool of modern-day pro-consuls, with Wallace responding 
favorably.105   
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Apparently the notion of the Army being the “lead” in postwar occupation duties, at 
the very least the training for such duties, would seem to have been in jeopardy.  The 
President was skeptical, and the Vice-President and two prominent Cabinet members, 
Ickes and Biddle, looked to oppose the concept.  Even Secretary of Navy Frank Knox 
had apparently thought that civil governors should run postwar occupations.106  In 
reality, the case against military government was not quite as clear.  Stimson viewed the 
affair as a “foolish rumpus” and saw it less as a civil-military crisis and more of a power 
play by other departments that were “greatly piqued” at the Army for “setting up 
something that would encroach on their prerogatives.”107 He blamed the matter on what 
he called the New Deal “cherubs” and noted that Assistant Secretary of State Dean 
Acheson accepted the school.108  Perhaps most importantly, FDR’s own view was more 
nuanced.  Regardless of what FDR told Ickes in a private meeting, what he had 
objected to publically was not the idea of the School, but that those some of the faculty 
and students there were perhaps not adequate to the task.109 The distinction was 
important.  FDR was siding seemingly with his New Dealers by attacking the School, but 
he left an out, presumably, to Stimson: fix the School, and all might be well.   
Ickes in particular (and others, such as Wallace, though not so vocally) was, 
however, determined to stop the School and gain some control over what they expected 
to be extensive postwar governance planning in conquered and/or liberated territory.  
Yet, the arguments provided were far from convincing.  Much of what they did have 
were either ad hominem attacks about the quality of personnel at the School, which 
could either be rebutted or were irrelevant to the central issue, or were vaguely sinister-
sounding attacks on “militarist imperialism.”   Two of the more comprehensive civilian 
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arguments against the School and military primacy in postwar occupation--one a report 
by key Roosevelt aide Jonathan Daniels and the other a counterproposal on a civilian-
run training system by S.K. Padover, an Ickes assistant-- were revealing in their 
arguments’ weaknesses. 110  Daniels’ report was essentially aimed at FDR’s concern 
that the school might be a breeding ground for imperialists or at least opponents to 
FDR, and Daniels framed the issue in a way to appear that FDR did have something to 
worry about.  He reported that 53% from the first class at least had some previous 
government experience and that the School was somewhat hostile to the Roosevelt 
Administration.111   
Daniels’ evidence of this hostility, however, was scarce, and that which did exist 
sometimes amounted to little more than character slurs.  He admitted that it was not 
“strictly true” that “no friends of the Roosevelt Administration need apply.”  But he 
speculated all same and said that the truth was “not far off,” basing his finding on 
speculation and cherry-picked anecdotal evidence   “My impression is that while many 
of the officers are not on record as to their political and social views, more of them 
would probably be politically sympathetic with Major George Norwood, wealthy anti-New 
Dealer … from South Carolina, than with … New Dealer … Major Lewis Hyman 
Weinstein, from Boston.”  He wrote that Gullion seemed defensive, calling himself a 
“Kentucky Democrat” and a “New Dealer enough to run the NRA [National Recovery 
Administration] in Hawaii.”  Daniels characterized Wickersham as a “sincere, ineffectual-
appearing man, whose eyes blink in a nervous tic” and noted that Miller, “while 
intelligent and highly regarded by many, is vigorously disliked by some important 
elements in Labor because of his opposition to the creation of the NLRB [National Labor 
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Relations Board].”112  Yet that was as far as his survey of the School’s administration 
went: he conceded that apart from Wickersham and Miller, he had not interacted with 
other members of the faculty.113   
The central issue for Daniels was “the place and meaning of the School and the 
Provost Marshal General’s Division of Military Government in America’s plans for 
successful war and sensible peace.”  Daniels conceded that the military was needed to 
run the “truly military phase.”  But he noted that, in the Army’s view, this might be 
lengthy and would even include things such as supervising education.  Daniels also 
pointed out that if the same personnel were used when the transition to civilian control 
occurred, “a military attitude toward people and problems might be carried over into 
civilian control.”  His solution was twofold: turn the process over to the State Department 
and appoint a New Dealer to run it, “someone aware of the democratic process and 
devoted to the welfare of people under it.  In this connection, while he may not have 
foreign experience, I think of such a man as David Lilienthal of TVA [Tennessee Valley 
Authority].”114 
Whether Daniels’ recommendations had traction is debatable.  It is true that in June 
1943, FDR directed Cordell Hull to establish the Office of Foreign Economic 
Coordination under the State Department’s direction, an agency whose responsibility it 
was to serve as “one central point in Washington for the coordination of interrelated 
activities of the several US agencies operating abroad.”115  But the organization’s 
charter, especially vis-à-vis the military, was unclear.  Even after its set-up, it was not 
certain whether War or State had ultimate responsibility for postwar planning.  And after 
the Office’s establishment, the Army continued to plan for its postwar occupation duties, 
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continue to train military government officials, and indeed, to set up an even more 
powerful and influential section, the Civil Affairs Division.116   
 This suggests that Roosevelt likely was playing both sides in directing the Office of 
Foreign Economic Cooperation to be stood up (though it would soon fall by the wayside 
and, as previously mentioned, be absorbed into another federal agency) and in letting 
the Army continue to conduct training and planning.   Probably the very thing FDR 
wanted to avoid the most to preserve his win-the-war coalition was to analogize postwar 
occupation to a gigantic worldwide effort to impose the New Deal, and taking Daniels’ 
suggestion of putting the TVA director in charge of it would almost certainly have had 
that effect.  Additionally, Daniels likely did not understand the military government model 
as the Army understood it, which sought precisely to “maximize” the independence of 
the occupied territories as much as possible in order to ensure the least interference 
with military efforts.  In other words, the real concern to the military government model 
should not have been the imposition of a “military attitude,” of a kind of jackbooted 
militarism similar to Hitler’s Gauleiters, but the acquiescence to local control by the 
American military authorities.   
Padover’s memorandum to Ickes, sent to him in January 1943, was a more aware 
and penetrating document than Daniels’ report, and Ickes, who adopted Padover’s 
arguments, forwarded the document to FDR as well for consideration.  In his 
memorandum, Padover admitted that the Army has a “plan and a purpose.  The Army’s 
plan is to train administrators for the post-war world and thereby to control it.”  In so 
doing, the Army will “monopolize all of the training and research facilities of the country 
by a process of total absorption.  In other words, the present plan is to put the men 
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skilled in social science, public law, administration, scientific management, etc., into 
uniform.”  While this is exaggerated (Stimson and his War Department would certainly 
contend that a notion that the Army sought to “control” the postwar world was ludicrous), 
Padover got the essentials correct.  The Army did have a plan, was moving forward on 
it, and was actively recruiting to put in uniform a large manpower pool in all the areas he 
mentioned.117 
Padover’s solution to civilianize the postwar planning and training process involved 
the creation of a “Center of Administrative Studies” that would be “interdepartmental—
most important of the agencies are the Department of the Interior, the State 
Department, and the Board of Economic Warfare.”  Thus proposed, the agencies would 
set up a planning Board for “training and research, to draw up administrative plans and 
work out policy.”  The establishment of the Center was phase one.  Phase two involved 
setting up a research agency “for the study of what the British call “colonial problems, 
but which we prefer to call problems of non-industrial groups and areas.” Phase three 
involved organizing contact with major scholars, universities, and learned bodies in the 
U.S.118 
In retrospect, given the increasing call for interagency cooperation in post-conflict 
reconstruction, some of Padover’s ideas seem remarkably ahead of their time.119  But 
Padover’s proposal had serious flaws.  His justification for a civilian agency was that by 
“tradition, training, background, and outlook, the Army is not equipped for long-term 
administration of foreign areas… .”   This was institutionally myopic.  One could argue 
that if any agency had studied and had experience in administration of foreign areas, it 
was the Army, which had done it over twenty times in its history around the world.   
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Furthermore, the Army was already far ahead of any governmental agency in 
developing doctrine and setting up training.  In contrast, for Padover’s scheme to work, 
an entire postwar administration apparatus would have to be interdepartmentally 
established to even begin to get to some level of institutionally expertise—a “Center for 
Administrative Studies” followed by a “research agency.”  What civilian agencies lacked 
was precisely what the Army did have, in strategist Michele Flournoy’s words, a “training 
culture.”120  With the advent of professional military schooling in the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth century, additional training and education were virtually mandatory for 
military officers to rise to higher levels.  Nothing like this was developed for civilian 
governmental agencies.   What Padover thus was attempting to do was create such 
training in the absence of such a culture, without the requisite doctrine, organizational 
knowledge, and experience to effectuate such training. 
Additionally, what made his proposal perhaps most problematic was a neo-
colonialist approach: Padover even made mention of it in his proposal.  The “research 
agency” would study “what the British call ‘colonial problems,’ but which we prefer to call 
problems of non-industrial groups and areas.”  In fact, there were many experts in the 
Interior Department in what they called “primitive cultures” who thereby had greater 
expertise in cultural and sociological issues than anyone in the military, who focused on 
the so-called “plumbing” of civil administration, an expertise that would presumably exist 
to be implemented by greater control and management over resident civil 
populations.121   
In contrast to the above arguments, Stimson had major advantages in the 
interagency controversy.  The Army had a historical and intellectual foundation 
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regarding postwar occupation.  It had a formulated doctrine, historical examples, and a 
staff working hard on military government issues.   Stimson did not have to propose new 
structures, or make unsettling proposals about New Deal-like postwar orders.  He could 
forcefully lay out the case for both the School and the Army’s overall management of 
postwar occupation duties rooted in the Army’s institutional conceptions of military 
government and postwar occupation responsibilities.    After the October Cabinet 
meeting, Stimson prepared a lengthy written rebuttal to Ickes’ charges, which, while he 
did not send, reflected the essence of the arguments that he would make in favor of the 
School and the Army’s conception of postwar occupation.122  In it, he discussed the 
October Cabinet meeting in which he understood FDR to “feel that the idea of the 
Army’s School of Military Government…was a good one, if confined to a proper scope, 
but to have misgivings about the caliber of its faculty.”  He separated Roosevelt’s 
concerns for other Cabinet members, who sensed in it the “germ of imperialism.” 
In the letter, Stimson framed the issue with the argument most likely to appeal to 
Roosevelt as a war president.  The object was to win the war, and because civilians 
might commit acts of sabotage and other perfidy, “[m]ilitary necessity, therefore, 
demands that the army be in complete control” at least in the immediacy after conflict.  
To Stimson, the issue is so rational as to be beyond doubt: “No one, I believe, would 
quarrel with the view that, so long as military necessity exists, it is the army and no 
other agency which must hold the reins of government.”123  He then asked rhetorically, 
“When does military necessity come to an end?”  Here he relied on the American 
Army’s tradition and experience.  “No rule of thumb” he asserted, could answer this.  He 
cited two examples:  during the Civil War and in the Philippines after the Spanish-
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American War, “we paid a heavy price for concluding prematurely that [the need for 
military government] had disappeared.  The treacherous nature of our present enemies 
will make a correct determination of this question more important than it has ever been 
in the past.”  He then went on to point out that was eminently reasonable that 
occupation duties would last at least as long as the Rhineland occupation of fourteen 
months, in places throughout the world.124   
Stimson quoted from the Hunt Report (“the finest document of its kind ever to come 
out of the Army”) and noted that it became the basis for “a Field Manual on Military 
Government (FM 27-5).”  Finally, he addressed concerns about so-called “militarist” 
occupations by recapitulation of the Army’s doctrine: 
The ideal type of military government is one that preserves to the fullest extent 
consistent with military necessity, the local institutions and customs of an occupied 
area.  Military government, with this objective in view, is thus one that is 
superimposed upon the preexisting local organization and seeks to shape the latter 
to the military and political exigencies of the occupation.  Hence if the job is to be 
well done, those charged with its execution must have a knowledge, not only of the 
local institutions, customs, economy, and psychology of an occupied area but must 
be prepared to supervise or to function in every sphere of activity that may be 
encountered in the field of public administration.125 
 
Those who would execute those polices were the officers being trained at the School.  
They would not be military governors but rather “the administrative assistants to Military 
Governors.  Nor [will they be] civilians.  They [will be] all officers of the Army of the 
United States.”  Likewise these officers would be administrators, executing policy from 
agencies presumably outside the War Department.126 
The arguments carried all the weight of experience and of a codified doctrine.  It 
also forcefully, and in sharp contrast to the civilian agency arguments, linked postwar 
occupation with the actual winning of the war.  Wartime and postwar strategy conflated.  
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It was not, so to speak, “In winning the war we must not lose the peace,” a formulation 
sometimes heard regarding nation-building strategies, but rather “in winning the peace 
we must not lose the war.”127  As an argument, it therefore both addressed FDR’s 
concerns and it preserved the Army’s prerogatives.128 
The arguments were powerful, but whether they were fully persuasive remains 
unclear, because, as noted, Stimson did not send the letter, though the ideas in it 
framed his thinking and his arguments at a follow-up Cabinet meeting.129  There 
Stimson, in his own words, attempted to show “how ridiculous was the proposition that 
we were trying to train Army officers for proconsular duties.”  According to his account, 
Roosevelt himself looked to derail his efforts, “constantly interrupting” Stimson with 
“discursive stories,” but Stimson said he kept going and he concluded, “[I] think I finally 
got it across.”130  According to Ickes, FDR stated “in clear language” that, “while the 
Army might have to take over temporarily, it should be the purpose to turn the civilian 
government back to civilians, even native ones, as soon as possible.”131   
While Ickes’ account seems to indicate Roosevelt favored his own understanding, 
again what FDR said was ambivalent.  After all, FDR’s assertion that the military turn 
over to civilians the occupation responsibilities was not a point of contention for 
Stimson.  The real and unanswered question was who was going to control the overall 
process for postwar planning.  There would be significant dueling between agencies 
and departments for the next several months.  FDR would personally criticize Gullion for 
“lacking elasticity of mind”—an enigmatic reference to a document by Gullion regarding 
the need of military government, and Ickes would continue to attack the School.132  The 
School would get bad publicity, ironically, as being an agent of Wallace-driven 
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utopianism (“globaloney” as one opinion writer termed it), and would actually go to 
ground for a short period in the spring and summer of 1943.133  FDR also said 
throughout much of 1943 that the State Department should have significant postwar 
responsibility by putting the Office of Foreign Economic Cooperation under it, though 
that organization’s charter was itself ambiguous.134   But it was also during 1943 that 
the Army stood up the Army’s Civil Affairs Division, without any apparent objection, and 
it was during this year that the School of Military Government both increased its student 
body and also branched out to prestigious colleges to establish its Civil Affairs Training 
Schools.135   And on November 10, 1943, in a letter to Stimson, Roosevelt directed that 
the Army undertake the planning necessary to ship and distribute relief supplies in 
occupied areas, subsequently clarified to doing so for the first six months after liberation 
from the Axis forces.136  Stimson clearly felt vindicated, as he stated in his memoirs: “So 
clearly did the Army prove itself to be the proper agency for such work that more than 
two years after the end of the war, long after the military importance of the overseas 
theaters had been superseded by the dominance of economic and political problems, 
the War Department was still carrying on the administration of the American occupation 
in defeated countries.”137 
If this is not what many of the New Dealers wanted, they had not made their 
arguments well, and they may have missed a chance at a more collaborative 
interagency relationship by overstating claims about “militarism” and “imperialism”—
notions that the historical record could disabuse.  Such claims only alienated someone 
such as Stimson, who considered them affronts.  Furthermore, any hint of utopian 
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schemes was not what FDR wanted in his role as “Dr. Win-the-War”: he was instead 
comfortable with goals that could be explicitly linked to wartime success.   
Additionally, the internecine feuding that saw organizations such as the Board of 
Economic Warfare self-destruct revealed the limitations of such bodies.  Lacking 
internal coherence, hierarchies of control, and historical precedents, the ad hoc FDR 
war committees lacked the ability to provide a coherent and meaningful counterweight 
to the War Department.  As inefficient and wasteful as that department could be, it was 
already working, training personnel, producing plans, and refining doctrine.   And with 
the landings of the Allies in North Africa in November 1942 and the subsequent 
experiences there in 1943, soon those personnel, plans and doctrines were put to the 
test of reality.   
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Chapter 5 - The Civil Affairs Division: Representing the 
Army’s Interests in the Interagency and Intergovernmental 
Arena 
FDR’s Ambiguities and Continued Interagency Conflict 
It was not until late 1943 that the Army created a bureaucratic structure, the Army’s 
Civil Affairs Division, which ensured that it would have a predominant role in postwar 
governance planning and implementation.   The Army had established a School of 
Military Government and a Military Government Division, with both organizations 
remaining under the control of the Provost Marshal Division.  That Division continued to 
do a variety of planning, much of it theoretical, and the School continued to produce 
military government officers throughout 1943.  The School indeed expanded its training 
program that year by creating the Civil Affairs Training Schools at numerous universities 
across the United States.  Yet neither School nor division was at a high enough level in 
War Department organization to have major impact on the course of strategic thinking.  
As figure 5 below shows, following the 1942 reorganization of the Army Staff, the 
Provost Marshal General itself was a sub-agency of the Army’s Services of Supply (later 
renamed the Army Service Forces).  Any action from either the Military Government 
Division or the School thus had to work its way through at least three layers of higher 
authority to have access to the Chief of Staff.  
If the problem was excessive layers of command and control on the military side, 
the problem on the civilian side was a seeming hodge-podge of agencies, committees, 
bureaus, Boards and Cabinet departments.  While many had a variety of functions 
ostensibly connected to post-conflict civil administration, relatively little coordinated 
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planning had been done specifically for the North Africa campaign, Operation TORCH.2  
No doubt some of this was due to poor planning assumptions that included a hope, if 
not an expectation, that the French in the occupied areas would warmly welcome the 
Allies as liberators, thus making the question of military occupation irrelevant.3  But the 
situation was further confused by Roosevelt’s ambiguity in determining who should take 
the lead in occupation responsibilities.  French North Africa, with its Vichy government, 
only added to the complexity.  Robert Murphy, Eisenhower’s political advisor in North 
Africa, noted in his memoirs that Roosevelt could never firmly decide whether French 
North Africa was to be occupied or liberated.4   
The confusion in Washington over direction mirrored that in North Africa.  Marshall 
apparently noted Eisenhower’s “disgust with … seventeen civilian agencies roaming 
around areas in Africa, causing him more trouble than the Germans… .”5  Eisenhower 
apparently felt consumed by civil affairs matters, claiming it took a majority of his time—
more than even the conduct of combat operations.6    Very early in the campaign, 
Eisenhower’s frustration was evident.  In a secret cable to Marshall on November 30, 
1942, he wrote, frustrated that “Sometimes I think I live ten years each week, of which 
at least nine are absorbed in political and economic matters.”7  He went on to say that 
the sooner he was rid of such matters “outside the military in scope,” the happier he 
would be.8   At the same time, he did not want to cede control or authority to anyone 
outside the military.  In a cable sent to Marshall just a few days earlier, he wrote: 
 No one could be more anxious than General Clark and myself to rid ourselves 
 completely of all problems other than purely military, but the fact remains 
 that, at this moment and until North Africa is made thoroughly secure, in  
 which process the capture of Tunisia will be an important incident, every- 
 thing done here directly affects the military situation.9   
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Because of this direct impact on military operations, Eisenhower therefore argued that 
the State Department representative on his staff, Robert Murphy, not be independently 
accountable to State.  Instead, “single headed responsibility” for all aspects of the 
operation, to include those dealing with civil and political matters, had to remain with the 
theater commander.10 
To Stimson, interagency wrangling for power in what he thought was clearly a 
military domain was also a source of continuous frustration, as his diary entries 
indicated.  Despite his best efforts in the School of Military Government dispute, 
Stimson had not yet convinced the President that the Army should have primacy.  
Stimson noted that Roosevelt “distrusted the Army as an agency for the temporary 
handling of civilian matters.”11  Instead, Roosevelt continually seemed to prefer civilians, 
whom Stimson wrote dismissively of as the “whole crew of agencies which have been 
squabbling with each other in their haste to get into North Africa.”12 .  The seemingly 
haphazard arrangement of government agencies, often without clear charters or 
mandates, seemed to verify Stimson’s point about the need for unified control under the 
overall authority of the military.    
At least in the initial stages of the operation, Roosevelt had granted authority over 
all the liberated territories of North Africa to a number of boards and agencies ostensibly 
under the Department of State.  The Office of Foreign Territories, among its other 
duties, was responsible for implementation of U.S. economic and social programs in 
North Africa. The Interdepartmental Advisory Committee was established to assist 
Office of Foreign Territories, and was made up of representatives of the Departments of 
State, Treasury, Agriculture, Lend-Lease, the Board of Economic Warfare, and others 
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(the War Department being initially omitted).  Its mission was to serve as a clearing 
house for civil affairs.  There was also the Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation 
Operations, which was intended to provide for the essential necessities for the peoples 
of the occupied territories. Lastly, there was the Committee on Combined Boards, a 
Board that had both U.S. and U.K. representatives and which served as an inter-allied 
clearing house for civil affairs questions.13     
These agencies had overlapping functions and responsibilities.  The 
Interdepartmental Advisory Committee was intended to be a collaborative coordinating 
agency that would receive civil affairs-related questions in the theater and either send 
them to the appropriate U.S. agency for resolution, if the question was U.S.-specific, or 
to the Committee on Combined Boards, which would then attempt to best resolve the 
issue.  Yet the Interdepartmental Advisory Committee was not successful as a 
coordinating agency.  Not only was War Department membership lacking, but the 
committee lacked specific terms of reference and had a vaguely defined authority.14  
Instead, Eisenhower decided to go directly to Committee on Combined Boards as his 
conduit for all civil affairs questions, thus leaving the other agency out.  The Committee, 
which had been set up based upon a recommendation from the U.S.-U.K. Combined 
Chiefs of Staff, was decidedly military in its orientation, and the secretariat for both 
organizations was the same.  Thus Eisenhower could send a civil affairs question to that 
unified secretariat, an organization presumably more oriented toward the military 
requirements of the problem, and also presumably less likely to get entangled in the 
more problematic political questions--and less likely to get caught in the competition of 
various agencies on the Interdepartmental Advisory Committee.15  
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Brigadier General Lucius Clay, the Assistant Chief of Staff for Materiel in the 
Services of Supply Command recommended that all government agencies funnel 
through the Combined Chiefs of Staff/Committee on Combined Boards conduit.16   By 
December 1942, that conduit was the Army’s preferred communications route.  Later 
that month, having Assistant Secretary of War John McCloy assigned to the Committee 
on Combined Boards for the duration as the War Department representative further 
improved the Army’s ability to maintain some semblance of military control over the 
burgeoning North Africa occupation questions.17  Yet while there may have been some 
success in the Committee on Combined Boards as a coordinating body, its utility was 
limited.  Marshall subsequently noted its ad hoc nature: “[It] exists with the 
acquiescence of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. ...  It has no charter.  It has no staff.  The 
secretariat is furnished by the [Combined Chiefs of Staff].”18  Indeed, in large part 
because of these organizational limitations, the Committee on Combined Board’s 
success would not extend beyond North Africa.19    
Regardless of the Army’s moderate success in using the Committee on Combined 
Boards as a way to control civil affairs questions, any notion of complete military 
primacy in civil affairs looked premature throughout much of 1943, and the picture 
remained unclear, as FDR sent mixed signals over authorities.  On March 19, 1943, for 
example, he wrote a letter to the Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation Operations 
Director Herbert Lehman authorizing him to “plan, coordinate, and arrange for the 
administration of the Government’s activities for the relief of war in areas liberated from 
Axis control through the provision of food, fuel, clothing, and other basic necessities… 
.”20  Yet the President also gave at least an ostensible primacy to the military by stating 
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that Lehman’s organization would be “subject to the approval of the U.S. military 
commander as long as military occupation continues.”21 Relying on FDR’s March letter 
that gave him authority to plan and organize civilian relief efforts, Lehman himself 
issued a statement on May 8th that indicated that he had broad postwar authority.   In 
the letter, Lehman asserted that after the first ninety days following cessation of 
hostilities, all plans, information, and requirements for supplies would be entirely 
accomplished by his organization.  The letter also stated that Office field officers in 
North Africa would be directly under Lehman’s—and therefore not the Army’s-- 
authority.22  
Stimson responded directly to Lehman in June, reiterating the standard military 
position: the theater commander, as military governor, had complete responsibility for all 
matters regarding supply, distribution and transportation for relief until a civilian 
government was established or until relieved of duties by the President.23 Lehman, 
who was actually quite amenable to military interests and willing to work with the Army, 
somewhat relented, but offered a further proposal.  In it, he proposed that his 
organization would be responsible for relief requirements for both the purely military and 
subsequent civilian periods of civil administration, thus separating out these 
requirements from purely military ones.  The Army responded and again resisted: no 
separation of relief requirements from military supplies.  The War Department wanted to 
have one overall supply effort that was an integral part of all the procurement and 
distribution plans.  Separating civilian relief out from the overall military supply scheme 
would delink the two efforts and potentially lead to confusion.24   
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Lehman did not prevail in the argument.  By mid-1943, alternative civilian agencies 
such as his organization were at a significant disadvantage.  His field teams were small, 
and the administrative and logistic mechanisms to distribute relief would largely have to 
be provided by the Army even under Lehman’s proposal.  The organization’s charter 
lacked the authority to do much more without direction from the President himself.25  
And while it may seem, in retrospect, that given Lehman’s close relationship with the 
Army, a compromise more amenable to him may have been brokered, by this time, 
senior officials in the War Department were in no mood for any compromise of authority. 
Another Presidential plan for coordination of post-conflict governance efforts took 
place in June 1943, in what appears to have been a last-ditch effort to bring together 
into a meaningful and coherent relationship all the civilian agencies that Eisenhower 
had complained were swarming over North Africa.  The plan, developed at Roosevelt’s 
behest by his Bureau of the Budget, sought to create “one central point for the 
coordination of interrelated activities of the several U.S. agencies operating abroad.”26  
The effort would be under the leadership of the State Department, and a committee 
would be established consisting of State, War, Treasury, Navy, the Board of Economic 
Warfare, the Office of Lend-Lease Administration, and the Office of Foreign Relief and 
Rehabilitation Operations.  In each liberated area there would be appointed an “Area 
Director” who would “provide overall direction and coordination to the economic 
activities of civilian agencies in their respective areas,” though that Area Director would 
be subject to the military commander’s orders.27  
In a cover letter to Secretary of State Cordell Hull, FDR went into additional detail:  
“[C]ivilian agencies must be adequately prepared to assist our military forces in 
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performing those services and activities which they are expert.  We must harness 
together military and civilian efforts.”28  The President then listed respective agencies—
Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation Operations, Office of Lend Lease 
Administration, Board of Economic Warfare, and Treasury—and explained their 
particular roles.29  It was the most comprehensive attempt to unify civilian and military 
efforts in post-conflict operations so far, and at least on its face, the plan had merit.  It 
did not seek to override the military’s primacy, expressly indicating that the role of the 
civilian agencies was to assist the commander, and that the Area Director be subject to 
him.  It gave the overall coordinating responsibility for the many agencies to the State 
Department, recognizing that longer-ranging foreign policy would be the overarching 
concern.  It further attempted to delineate the specific requirements for each agency.  
The Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation Operations for instance was to be 
“responsible for the relief and rehabilitation of victims of war in certain liberated areas.”  
The Board of Economic Warfare was to be responsible for “foreign procurement, the 
development of strategic and critical materials…and other prescribed economic warfare 
measures.”  Treasury’s role was to fix exchange rates, “and … assist on monetary, 
currency control, and general fiscal matters.”  FDR told Hull: “I shall rely on you to unify 
our foreign economic activities to the end that coherent and consistent policies and 
programs result.  The Department of State should provide the necessary coordination, 
here and in the field, of our economic operations with respect to liberated areas.”30  
What resulted was the Office of Foreign Economic Coordination under the direction 
of Assistant Secretary of State Dean Acheson.31  The organization was intended to 
settle jurisdictional disputes between the agencies, both among the civilians and 
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between the civilian and military.  Yet once again, the effort ended in failure.  As FDR 
biographer Kenneth Davis notes, “[A]s was generally true of Roosevelt’s administrative 
arrangements, …responsibilities were not accompanied by a commensurate 
assignment of authority or power.”32  Lehman argued this very point, that the plan left 
civilian agencies with responsibilities, but took away the authorities to ensure the 
responsibilities were carried out.  The Army, while acceding to the overall concept, 
would not alter its military planning to fit plans for other civilian agencies, reiterating that 
at least initially, the first occupation phase must be completely run by the military.33  In 
particular, the Area Director idea was problematic:  such a representative needed to 
work through the theater commander and not have direct access to Washington.  
Treasury, on the other hand objected, countering that such a link was required.34   This 
took place concurrently with other interagency disputes, to include the long-running (and 
previously discussed) dispute within the Board of Economic Warfare.  Once again, FDR 
decided to overhaul the process.  Acheson’s organization was absorbed (along with the 
Board of Economic Warfare, Lend-Lease, and Lehman’s organization) into the Foreign 
Economic Administration under the direction of conservative, big businessman Leo 
Crowley in September 1943, and it never regained the authority or stature that had been 
envisioned for it.  Yet another civilian interagency attempt resulted in falling far short of 
what was intended.   
Establishing the Civil Affairs Division 
Stimson believed that he needed a primary military government planning and 
policymaking organization that could assert military viewpoints, provide clear control 
and direction, and shape and fashion policy in way to ensure military interests were 
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protected.   The scope of occupation matters in North Africa showed that the Army’s 
current organizational methods were inadequate.  Prior experience and planning had 
not contemplated the scale and complexity of occupation requirements.  The War 
College committees of the twenties and thirties, for example, only briefly discussed 
centralized War Department planning—virtually all of the committees’ attention had 
been on actions taken by theater commanders.35   
Furthermore, though Army doctrine, expressed in FM 27-5, stated that the G-1 
remained responsible for military government matters, after the 1942 War Department 
reorganization, the G-1 staff was reduced dramatically, from 73 officers to 13 and from 
100 civilians to 20.36  It was clear that the G1 could not take on such a responsibility.  
As for the Military Government Division (itself within the Provost Marshal General’s 
Office), its primary mission was the training of military government officers for future 
occupations, and though it had a limited role in long-range planning, it did not and could 
not handle day-to-day planning for North African civil administration.37  Additionally, it 
was too far down the War Department hierarchy to have meaningful influence at the 
strategic policymaking level.38 
However unable Stimson may have been in persuading FDR of the need for military 
control over postconflict governance responsibilities, he did have the ability to establish 
an organization within the War Department.  In so doing, he could create an 
organization that could have much greater influence than in the past, especially 
because the President himself had greatly strengthened the War Department’s status 
and authority.  In March 1942, the President, pursuant to Executive Order 9062, had 
already permitted the most sweeping reorganization of the War Department since Elihu 
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Root had established the General Staff in 1903.  Not only did the order allow for 
Stimson and Marshall to unify command and control in a much more powerful way, it 
also allowed an unprecedented direct line between the War Department and the 
President.  On matters of “strategy, tactics, and operations” the President in his 
commander-in-chief role made explicit his ability and authority to consult directly with 
the Chief of Staff himself.  Accordingly, staff sections directly under the Chief of Staff 
could have a far greater ability to shape national policy than in any previous time in 
American history.39  
Indeed, as the war progressed, the Army continued to assert its interests more 
forcefully, especially whenever military operations intersected with longer-range foreign 
affairs.   The Joint War Plans Committee, for example, was established in early 1943 to 
advise the joint chiefs on political considerations when doing strategic planning.40  
During that same time, the Joint Strategic Survey Committee was set up to formulate 
grand strategy—the first time that a military planning group had moved deeply into a 
realm considered primarily related to foreign policy and political decision-making.  Its 
charter stated that military authorities should “share with diplomatic and economic 
authorities the responsibility for shaping the national policy in peace as well as war.”41  
Additionally, as part of the burgeoning departmental bureaucracy that came with the 
responsibility of managing a worldwide conflict, the War Department began to create 
high-level staff sections broken out from the General Staff that had functions that did not 
fit neatly within traditional domains.42  Doing so allowed for more direct control from 
senior War Department leaders, which became especially important since so many of 
these new staff sections required interaction with civilian counterparts.43      
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The unprecedented development of these organizations within the massive 
governmental bureaucracy pointed out the obvious: it was not enough for high-ranking 
officials such as Stimson simply to make arguments to the President about the military’s 
need to have primacy in post-conflict governance.  Bureaucratic methods and 
organizational controls were central in gaining success in this environment.   In the 
Roosevelt administration, a competent and cohesive Army agency had to represent the 
Army’s view of the military’s primacy in occupation matters at the point of planning and 
implementation.  Throughout late 1942 and early 1943, officials in the War Department 
urged the creation of just that, one argument being made was that if this was not done, 
the State Department would dominate post-conflict occupation matters.   
A key meeting in early February 1943 attended by Major General Lucius Clay, then 
Assistant Chief of Staff for Materiel, revealed the scope of the Army’s current 
problems.44 Clay attended it to discuss civil affairs policy with key civilian leaders in civil 
affairs matters and key administration officials such as Herbert Lehman and Milo 
Perkins, Chief of FDR’s Bureau of the Budget.  For Clay, the meeting illustrated the 
problem of what he called “idealistic” civilian agencies who sought to “improv[e] 
conditions throughout the world.”  Moreover, Clay was concerned that apparently little 
thought had been given to the Army’s role in an occupied zone, especially in the initial 
phases of the operation.45 
What was more telling were the disagreement and friction in the meeting.  Lehman, 
frustrated with the lack of direction from the administration, wanted one overall agency 
in Washington to set a clear direction.  According to Clay, however, many, including 
Assistant Secretary of State Dean Acheson, did not agree.  Rather, Acheson defended 
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the current arrangement that gave the State Department a kind of putative overall 
authority.46   For Clay, “the War Department [needed] to formulate a definite War 
Department policy as to its own relationship to civil affairs in occupied countries at the 
earliest possible date so that its views may be presented before a policy which may be 
contrary thereto has been established.”47 
A series of conferences between Stimson, Marshall, and Lieutenant General John 
Hull, a senior official in the Operations Division resulted in the creation of the Civil 
Affairs Division.48  Officially, Stimson directed its creation by order, and the organization 
officially went into existence on March 1, 1943. 49  Both Marshall and Stimson each 
believed that he was responsible for the organization, and indeed both played key roles 
in its establishment.  Marshall asserted that he established the Division “to take charge 
of civil matters,” and as a way to relieve him and others of the various diplomatic and 
political burdens of civil affairs.50  Stimson also stated that he established the Division, 
noting in his diaries that he created “[the Civil Affairs Division] to carry on the absolutely 
essential work which is necessary to be done on behalf of Eisenhower, the military 
commander, in regards to civil affairs.”51  The Secretary went on to say that he had 
“quietly” set up the Division in spite of the President’s preference for civilian control of 
postwar governance of occupied territories.52   
Stimson thus had not simply acquiesced to FDR’s predisposition to put a non-
military agency in charge, but had worked within his own department as a way to create 
a strategic-level organization that would favorably represent the Army in the interagency 
domain.  Stimson’s diary comments further revealed his linking of occupation with the 
necessities of military operations:  “These civil affairs stem directly from the military 
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occupation.  They affect its safety and its interest… .”53  Noting that the President 
“obstinately refuses to see it yet,” Stimson pointed out that the requirements and 
responsibilities of occupation would give rise to “far-reaching problems.”  Interestingly 
and consistently, he emphasized those problems were not primarily long-term political 
problems, but military ones that required military solutions: “[matters of civil affairs] will 
inevitably give rise to far-reaching problems which in part at least must be handled by 
the military commander and his department the War Department.”54       
In early February, Stimson directed John McCloy to establish the organization.55  It 
was a logical and astute choice.  Both Stimson and Marshall appreciated the Assistant 
Secretary’s adroitness in problem-solving and Washington politics.  McCloy had already 
worked skillfully in representing the Army’s interests in the interagency disputes over the 
School of Military Government, the Japanese-American exclusion policy and the 
question of martial law in Hawaii.  On the School issue, McCloy had successfully moved 
key FDR aide Harry Hopkins onto the Army’s side.56  On the Japanese-American 
exclusion policy, he had successfully, if controversially, carried the Army’s position in 
contentions with the Justice Department.57   And on the Hawaii martial law matter, he 
gradually gave back authority to civilians, but at a pace amenable to military 
leadership.58  Even Harold Ickes, while going so far as to wonder whether McCloy had 
fascist leanings, liked him personally and got along with him.59   
He also had on-the-ground knowledge of current civil affairs problems.  In early 
January 1943, Marshall had personally requested that McCloy go on a mission to 
assess the North African situation (though Stimson demurred, saying that he was much 
too valuable and was needed at home, with FDR intervening and allowing McCloy to go 
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for a short trip).60  While there, McCloy soon noted the rampant confusion in civil 
administration.  Whereas the British had “competent people,” the U.S. had confused 
monetary and fiscal policies, scrambled communication set-ups, and too many 
departments without clear direction.  After talking to Major General Mark Clark, 
Eisenhower’s deputy, McCloy reflected that he had never realized “how closely we 
sailed to a military occupation that we were not prepared to deal with.”61 
Along with such a prominent War Department civilian, the Civil Affairs Division 
needed a military director who could administer the division and have a significant, if not 
equal, level of influence as McCloy’s.  Marshall had discussed with Hull who should run 
the division, initially favoring a civilian, Boykin Wright, a high-powered official that 
according to Lieutenant General Brehon Somervell, the head of Army Services of 
Supply, was of Cabinet stature.”62  Perhaps because McCloy was to serve in that 
Cabinet-level role, Marshall instead chose a professional military officer whom he knew 
personally and who had a reputation as a solid administrator, Major General John H. 
Hilldring.  
Hilldring proved to be a wise choice.  An infantry officer who had been awarded the 
Distinguished Service Cross for heroism in the 1918 Meuse-Argonne offensive, Hilldring 
later served under Marshall at the Infantry School at Fort Benning when Marshall had 
been Assistant Commandant there.  He had experience in wide-ranging areas: he had 
served in the Philippines in the late 1920s and had also commanded Civilian 
Conservation Corps Districts in the late 1930s.  Hilldring was also currently the Army G-
1, and thus already had apparent if not actual responsibility over military government 
matters.  Additionally, he had gained Marshall’s respect in a direct way.  General 
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MacArthur had slated him to take command of a division in New Guinea, but before he 
left the U.S. in mid-1942, Hilldring suffered a heart attack and instead was about to be 
involuntarily retired for medical reasons.  Awaiting the decision, he wrote to Marshall, 
pointing out that risk of death due to work-related stress and demands should not be an 
impediment to his continued service when so many men were risking their lives in 
combat.63  This impressed Marshall, and he kept him on active service.  Instead of 
combat command, Hilldring got the job as the Civil Affairs Division’s Director and he 
remained in the position for the duration of the war.64 
Organization and Purpose of the Civil Affairs Division 
The position of the Civil Affairs Division within the War Department’s organizational 
hierarchy was essential to its success in representing its interests within the Army, and 
also in intergovernmental and inter-Allied fora.  Hilldring stated that in his opinion the 
most important step in the Division’s establishment was where it stood in the War 
Department vis-à-vis other staff organizations.  He doubted whether he could have 
coordinated the various civil affairs activities without the direct authority to speak for 
either the Chief of Staff or the Secretary, something only possible if the Division were 
high enough in the War Department.65  This point was reaffirmed by the Division’s 
executive officer, who stated that its most vital feature as a staff section was its direct 
access to either Marshall or Stimson.66 
Figure 6 below, displaying the overall War Department structure in early 1944, 
shows both the Division’s position in the department hierarchy—essentially one remove 
from the Chief of Staff (the Deputy Chief generally concerned with department 
administration and not policymaking) and two from the Secretary, and with an informal 
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supervisory line to the Assistant Secretary.  Not only was the Division as near to the 
Chief and Secretary as the Army General Staff (Operations and G-1 thru G-4), the 
nerve center of the War Department organization, it was comparatively much closer 
than the Military Government Division, not displayed on the chart.  That division was a 
subsection of the Provost Marshal General, which (as Figure 5 illustrated) was itself a 
subordinate of the Services of Supply (renamed Army Service Forces) staff function.67 
Furthermore, the Division had a charter drafted by the Operations and Plans 
Division and signed by Stimson.  The Division was to “inform and advise the Secretary 
of War in regard to all matters … other than those of a strictly military nature, in areas 
occupied as a result of military operations.”68  The charter also linked the Division to the 
Operations and Plans Division, the most important Division in the War Department, by 
requiring communications to theater commanders to be coordinated first with the 
Operations and Plans Division in order to ensure integration of civil affairs planning with 
purely military requirements.  Equally important, the Civil Affairs Division was the 
primary coordinating agency for the Army in dealing with civilian agencies “exercising 
functions in any theater in which [the Division] may be engaged.”69  It thus became the 
War Department organization that represented War Department interests in post-conflict 
occupation matters at all interagency meetings. 
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By March 12, 1943, the Civil Affairs Division’s structure was essentially in place 
and most of its personnel provided.  It was organized by functions and not geographic 
areas, remaining so for most of the war.  The Division’s director reported to the Chief of 
Staff and advised the Secretary.  Its deputy handled special projects and its executive 
officer transmitted the director’s decisions and coordinated the various branch activities.  
The branches were military government (changed later simply to “government” in part to 
sound less forbiddingly martial), civilian relief, economics (later merged into the 
economics and relief branch) and personnel and training.  Whereas actual training of 
future military government personnel continued to remain with the military government 
division under the Provost Marshal, the Division’s personnel and training branch 
assumed long range requirements for training and procurement.  Since it was 
responsible for long-range planning as well, in August 1943, a planner position was 
created exclusively devoted to charting the Division’s course for six months and more in 
advance.71   (Figure 7 below.) 
Within the U.S. military structure, the Civil Affairs Division quickly gained 
preeminence as the primary organization that planned for civil affairs and represented 
the Army’s interests in postwar occupation matters outside the War Department.  Inside 
the Army, as its charter stated, it formed a close link with the Operations and Plans 
Division which always had a working member on the Civil Affairs Division to ensure that 
there was integration.  It also formed a relationship with Army Service Forces, both 
because of the presence of the Military Government Division within the latter’s 
organization, and because the Army Service Forces had overall War Department 
responsibility for handling fiscal and related economic problems.  Thus when 
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Eisenhower queried as to which organization, the Army Service Forces or the Civil 
Affairs Division, that he should look to for fiscal advice on non-military matters, Hilldring 
successfully argued that since so many such issues were interwoven with civil 
administration concerns such as foreign exchange rates, currency control, and taxation, 
that the Civil Affairs Division had to be given direct responsibility to formulate solutions 
to those problems.72        
As a special staff section in The Pentagon, it had no command authority over any 
civil affairs/military government staff officers assigned to various units, nor did it possess 
such authority over military government detachments.  Nonetheless, the Division was in 
the so-called “technical chain” of both.  It could use its relationship, which was based on 
the particular expertise required for civil affairs issues, to provide policy guidance and 
direction to civil affairs/military government staffs (dubbed G-5s) at unit headquarters 
and civil affairs/military government detachments in the field.73   Hilldring frequently 
corresponded with military government officials directly on a number of issues, providing 
information and policy guidance.  Regarding the planning military government in 
Germany, for example, Hilldring’s advice and counsel was sought by the G-5 of the 
Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF), Brigadier General Frank 
McSherry on a number of key issues, from the details regarding the activation and 
administration of the U.S. component of the Allied Control Council, the organization that 
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would jointly preside over Germany’s occupation, to ensuring that SHAEF public 
announcements on military government to the German populace were aligned with 
larger policy interests.75 
The correspondence Hilldring conducted with Brigadier General Lester Flory further 
revealed the depth and breadth of his involvement as the Army’s technical supervisor in 
civil affairs matters.  In a March 1945 letter, for example, Flory, whom Hilldring had 
selected to head the U.S. Group Control Council in Vienna, thanked Hilldring for 
sending to him the latest working drafts on Austrian occupation matters.  Doing so 
enabled him and his staff to keep abreast of the latest thinking at the highest levels of 
policymaking. 76  In an earlier February 1945 letter, Hilldring had provided his views 
about the possibility of the future Allied Control Council administering joint government 
throughout all of Austria.  Apparently disagreeing with Flory, Hilldring stressed that 
zonal commanders should at least initially retain their full authority, noting further that it 
would be inappropriate for the European Advisory Commission, an international Allied 
body, to attempt to alter “the conventional channels of command by an 
intergovernmental agreement.”  This meant, in other words, altering the fundamental 
command structure of military government at the outset of the occupation.77  In that 
same letter, Hilldring also responded to an administrative question, and his response 
revealed the boundaries of control that the Army’s military government bureaucratic 
structure placed on occupation matters.  When asked by Flory to whom a military 
government financial specialist should look for guidance, Hilldring was clear: the 
specialist was not to look either to the “U.S. Treasury or to any other civilian agency of 
our government for approval of a directive on financial policy.”  Instead, the information 
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channel was the military command channel: during the period of wartime operations in 
Austria, it would flow up to the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean to the 
Combined Chiefs of Staff; and during the occupation period, it would go from the 
Commanding General, European Theater of Operations of the United States Army, to 
the Joint Chiefs.78   
In joint Army-Navy relations, the Division was likewise successful in establishing 
itself as the military’s executive agency for handling civil affairs concerns.  While FDR 
continued to favor civilian primacy in postwar occupation responsibilities, in April 1943, 
the Joint Chiefs concurred on three fundamental points: 1) civil affairs were the 
“responsibility for the Theater Commander in his role as Military Governor until he was 
relieved of his responsibilities by the Commander-in-Chief”; 2) just as that commander 
was the Commander-in-Chief’s representative in the field, the War Department was the 
Commander-in Chief’s executive representative in Washington; and 3) the Civil Affairs 
Division was the appropriate War Department agency to “plan and coordinate the 
handling of civil affairs in nearly all of the occupied territories.”79  Wherever the Navy 
had interest in civil administration (such as the occupation of certain islands in the 
Pacific), the Navy was represented on the Civil Affairs Division as well.80   
The Civil Affairs Division and the Interagency and Inter-Allied Process 
With McCloy providing the Cabinet-level stature the Army needed, the Civil Affairs 
Division soon established itself in the interagency process.  By April 1943, the Division 
members were regularly meeting with the Department of State, Treasury, and the 
numerous other FDR-created agencies.  The Division prepared plans and policy 
statements, often at a theater commander’s request, and then coordinated these plans 
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with the appropriate agencies.  After getting general agreement, the Division then 
forwarded these plans to the appropriate commander, who used them to formulate his 
own detailed military government plans.81   The Civil Affairs Division also began to 
assert a steadily growing control over the military-civilian process regarding civil 
administration for North Africa.  McCloy stressed to Division officials to provide guidance 
to civilians in the Board of Economic Warfare, the Office of Foreign Relief and 
Rehabilitation Operations, and the other agencies.  What was needed in places like 
North Africa were not executive-types:  “If you have to send an executive,” McCloy 
urged Civil Affairs Division officials to tell civilians, “be sure he can type.”82  Later in 
May, McCloy told Hilldring to start working on Italian armistice conditions, suggesting 
that he obtain information from the School of Military Government and noting that the 
school had previously worked on the armistice as a school practical problem.83 
The Division also directed the Military Government Division to serve as the War 
Department’s gatekeeper for information requests related to non-military concerns in 
countries that might possibly be occupied.84  The Office of Strategic Services, after 
being requested for information in June, attempted to take over the researching of such 
information entirely, and thus supplant the other civilian agencies.  Instead, at the 
behest of Civil Affairs Division senior leadership, an editorial committee was created 
that contained the various organizations, to include the Military Government Division, 
the Office of Strategic Services, and civilian agencies.  The chairman of the committee 
was a Civil Affairs Division official, and, under the Division’s direction, the committee 
became responsible for the preparation of civil affairs handbooks, as well as other 
studies.  By the end of 1943, the State Department itself had membership in this 
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committee, essentially confirming the Division’s oversight role for the production of 
information for potentially occupied areas.85    
The Civil Affairs Division also played an important intergovernmental role on the 
State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee.  This committee was largely the result of 
Secretary of War Stimson and Assistant Secretary McCloy, and as it name indicated, it 
consisted of representatives of the State, War, and Navy Departments, with War 
Department Civil Affairs Division personnel serving in important subcommittees.  Its 
chairmanship, at least in its early phase, has historically been identified with McCloy, 
with Hilldring serving as his military advisor—a designation that, while inaccurate, 
nevertheless correctly reveals McCloy’s dominating role. 86  The Committee became 
deeply involved in the most important aspects of postwar governance policy, and was 
especially influential in establishing occupation policy for Japan and Korea.  Considered 
a forerunner to the National Security Council, its purpose was to “coordinat[e] the views 
of the three departments in matters of inter-departmental interest.”87   
By its limited membership, it excluded all other Cabinet departments, as well as all 
other agencies and committees set up during the Roosevelt presidency that War 
Department officials such as Stimson had found so problematic (and annoying) in the 
past.88  This exclusion created intense interagency conflict between those in the 
Committee and those left out. In early 1945, pressure, particularly from the Treasury 
Department, forced the creation in April 1945 of the Informal Policy Committee on 
Germany, which for a brief period worked with the State-War-Navy Committee on 
postwar German matters, though not with any measure of success: the Informal Policy 
Committee folded by the end of August of the same year.89  Agency conflict resurfaced 
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in June 1946 when the Department of Commerce asserted that any notion of equality 
between State and War and other agencies on the Committee was a sham, and that the 
State Department did not guide postwar policy regarding Germany, apparently having 
ceded all its authority to the military.  What therefore was needed, according to 
Commerce officials, was an independent agency in which Commerce, as well as 
Justice, Agriculture and other departments and agencies would be represented. The 
idea however was rejected.90      
There was much truth in Commerce official’s allegations that, at least in the first 
year of the postwar occupations, the Committee was militarily-dominated, and hence, 
militarily focused.  Called a “ratification of the War Department’s de facto supremacy in 
foreign affairs,” the Committee’s recommendations on matters connected to military 
operations, essentially all significant matters discussed, were required to go the Joint 
Chiefs for approval.91  As an example, the Subcommittee for the Far East was 
established in January 1945 to be the primary policy-making coordinating agency for 
Far Eastern matters, and in particular, for the expected occupations in Far East nations.  
The framework for determining policy matters in committees oriented around military 
interests.  When a question was “primarily military in character” and policies were 
prepared by “non-military persons of the Government” (e.g., the State Department), 
military policies would govern.  If there was a question that was political, it would 
govern, unless the policy itself would “serve to defeat a military objective.”92  
The Civil Affairs Division further represented War Department interests in the 
combined U.S.-U.K. domain.  The Combined Chiefs of Staff had already been set up in 
January 1942, consisting of the British and American Joint Chiefs.  Strategic 
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imperatives had compelled the two nations to form multiple combined Boards under the 
military chiefs of the two nations.  For civil affairs matters, the initial proposal in late 
1943 was to continue to use Committee on Combined Boards as the organization, but 
the American Joint Chiefs completely rejected the idea: that committee, as Marshall had 
pointed out, was a derivative organization without formal standing.  Furthermore, while 
its secretariat was linked with the Combined Chiefs, its membership was predominantly 
civilian:  the organization needed to be a military one.93    
This seemed unnecessary to the British, far more used to combined military and 
civilian efforts that conducted integrated strategic thinking that came with worldwide 
empire.  But the Americans counter-proposed with the Combined Civil Affairs 
Committee.  Its function was to recommend to the Combined Chiefs general policies for 
occupied areas and areas to be occupied and be responsible for civil affairs planning.  
Most importantly, its charter asserted ultimate military control over the entirety of the 
process: 
The decision as to when and to what extent civilian departments and agencies will 
assist the military in the administration of civil affairs will be determined by the 
[Combined Chiefs of Staff], upon the recommendation of the military commander in 
the area.  Generally, responsibility for the handling of civil affairs should be 
relinquished by the military as quickly as this can be accomplished without 
interference with the military purposes of the operation.94    
 
This clearly reflected the American view, and specifically, the American Army’s view, of 
postwar occupation responsibilities.   
The set up of the Combined Civil Affairs Committee was not met without British 
resistance.  The U.K. Chiefs recognized that there was a need for better coordination, 
given the problems in North Africa for the past several months, but they were resistant 
to the Combined Committee, no doubt fearing that this meant further loss of control and 
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proximity to London.  Other U.K.- based organizations, in particular, the Administration 
of Territories (Europe) that ostensibly had responsibility for advanced occupation 
planning in Europe, would undoubtedly lose influence in determining postwar 
occupation policy.95 
The American response, however, had an irresistible logic, even over British 
objections.  Since the Combined Chiefs existed, it needed a similar combined 
committee on a matter as important (and as so far mishandled) as civil affairs for 
occupied areas.  Furthermore, as McCloy effectively argued, it needed to be co-located 
with the Combined Chiefs of Staff in Washington.96  It was also, as McCloy noted, 
politically necessary.  McCloy asserted that Anglophobia was prevalent in the United 
States; Americans needed to be shown that it was not simply a “European” war among 
the nations of empire with perhaps postwar empire ambitions.97 
The Combined Civil Affairs Committee was thus established in Washington, with 
McCloy serving as its chairman.  The Americans on the Combined Committee wanted 
the military and civilian domains separated as much as possible, openly asserting the 
apparent difference between American and British viewpoints.  Marshall at a Joint 
Chiefs of Staff meeting in the spring of 1943 commented that in the Middle East, the 
British had a committee “dominated by civilians which, to a large extent, exercise control 
over the military concerning their relations with the civil population.”98  Stimson at the 
same meeting noted that British believed that “almost immediately after an occupation 
takes place, the foreign office will be called upon to take action.”  Stimson was actually 
incorrect:  the British government had decided that the War Office would have primary 
responsibility for at least the initial post-combat phase of the occupation period.  
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Furthermore, the Colonial Office, the long-established civilian agency that typically dealt 
with governance of overseas territories, and not the Foreign Office, which had much 
more in common with the U.S. Department of State, would act in an advisory capacity 
during the first phase.99  Despite this error, Stimson’s point did highlight a fundamental 
difference between the American and British strategic culture: the British had agencies, 
systems and processes in the civilian sphere long-accustomed to overseas governance, 
which the War Office could rely on and build upon.  No comparable organizations 
existed in the U.S. government: postwar governance had been developed, and trained 
and organized for almost entirely within the U.S. Army.    
As the Combined Civil Affairs Committee proceeded, the American position--to 
large degree a manifestation of doctrine contained in FM 27-5--became evident.  The 
Americans sought a unified military government largely free of civilian interference and 
control.  Their overarching concerns were to ensure military requirements were met in 
order to ensure overwhelming victory.  Regarding the future occupations of Sicily and 
Italy, Stimson remarked that “[W]e want to have purely military and non-political 
government so long as we have any connection with it.”100  He also noted a difference 
between the U.S. and U.K. over Italian surrender terms: whereas the U.S. position was 
“unconditional surrender,” Stimson was concerned that the U.K. might go “on a different 
line and…recognize some Italian government as the authorized one, instead of 
imposing a military government of the conqueror on it.”101     
Throughout the remainder of the war, the Civil Affairs Division’s interagency and 
inter-allied influence, in the Combined Civil Affairs Committee and elsewhere, continued 
to grow.  As serious planning for the invasion of Northwest Europe commenced in 1944, 
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the Division drew up the basic policy guidance for all postwar operations in Belgium, the 
Netherlands, Luxembourg and Norway.102  It then drafted the guidance, and submitted it 
via the Combined Civil Affairs Committee to the Combined Chiefs for review and 
ultimate approval.  The Division played a crucial role in the extremely complex and 
difficult determinations of policy for liberated France, with a prominent result being FDR 
maintaining Eisenhower’s ultimate authority as the theater commander.103  As further 
proof of the Army’s dominance in civil affairs matters, in the interim period between final 
approval of the negotiated agreement with what would be called the de facto French 
authority, Eisenhower relied upon the field civil affairs handbook that had been issued 
shortly after D-Day, which made him, absent further guidance, the interim supreme 
authority in France.104  
The Civil Affairs Division also deeply influenced the formation of and the 
subsequent actions taken by the European Advisory Commission, an Allied effort, 
established in January 1944, with representatives from the U.K., U.S., U.S.S.R., and 
eventually the French Provisional Government.  Its headquarters was in London, and its 
American representative was John Winant, the U.S. Ambassador to Great Britain.  
According to Winant, the British Government insisted that the Commission deal with 
larger political questions, and as Lucius Clay recounted, the British already had zonal 
boundaries for Germany created before the Commission actually met.105  For the 
Americans however, its purpose was decidedly limited, and the U.S. position (shared by 
the Soviets) was that the Commission should have a much narrower focus, dealing 
near-exclusively with the surrender and related issues of Germany and Austria.106   As 
Winant asserted, the U.S. Government’s support of the Commission was less than 
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robust, due in part because of the inability of the US to formulate a unified policy 
towards Germany.107  George Kennan, who served as Winant’s political advisor, 
provided a subtler reason: he recounted that the Commission in particular conflicted 
with President Roosevelt’s desire for political maneuver room with respect to postwar 
Europe, a matter which FDR recognized as having both international and domestic 
implications.108  Kennan went so far as to indicate that FDR would have preferred not to 
have the Commission at all.  Forced to do so, he kept it on a “short leash” and thus 
limited its authority to zonal boundaries and surrender terms.109   
If this was FDR’s goal, it was apparently shared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.  They 
agreed to the Commission’s establishment, and they agreed to send military 
representatives, but only on the condition that the body “keep strictly within the letter 
and spirit of its directive and in so doing be particular to avoid problems relating to the 
conduct of military operations, and concerning civil affairs of liberated or enemy 
territories incident to such operations prior to the end of hostilities.”110  The 
representatives sent from the War Department included, as Winant’s military advisor, 
Brigadier General Cornelius Wickersham, who had served as Commandant of the 
Military Government School and Director of the Military Government Division, and 
members of the Civil Affairs Division, who would serve as the U.S. military’s 
representatives on the Working Security Committee of the European Advisory 
Commission. 
Indeed, in the very establishment of the European Advisory Commission in London 
in 1944, the American position, expressed primarily via the Civil Affairs Division, 
prevailed.  In an attempt to get out from under US dominance, the British wanted the 
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Commission to have wide-ranging jurisdiction over postwar occupation matters.  The 
U.S. view, as represented by McCloy and Civil Affairs Division officials, was to restrict it 
to the absolute terms as set forth in its commission—which amounted to surrender 
terms and a limited number of occupation control functions.  The American Joint Chiefs 
in particular did not want the Commission to leverage in civilian control over civil 
administration during the immediate post-conflict period.111  Instead, Civil Affairs 
Division officials insisted that the Combined Civil Affairs Committee be the means to 
resolve occupation questions, going so far as to refuse to provide to the Commission a 
military advisor until the British relented.  The British did, and the Combined Civil Affairs 
Committee retained the authority.112 
The European Advisory Commission’s work on zonal boundaries and surrender 
terms was by no means insignificant.  But the Commission was nearly powerless as an 
autonomous entity.113  Winant, after first going through the Working Security 
Committee, which included the Civil Affairs Division representatives, then had to send 
any Commission recommendations to Washington for approval.114  The War 
Department’s approval, along with the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s, was of even greater 
importance than State’s in Washington, and Winant had to personally confer with 
McCloy, who was essential in getting final clearance on proposed Commission 
directives.115  The Commission’s limitations were likewise revealed in February 1945, 
when Wickersham corresponded with the SHAEF G-5 McSherry on the subject of 
SHAEF’s need for detailed directives regarding the occupation of Germany in order to 
being planning.  Wickersham commented that although the Commission had prepared 
36 directives, only 16 had actually been approved by the Joint Chiefs, and even these 
218 
approved directives were being carefully scrutinized to ensure their conformity with 
another Joint Chiefs document, the so-called Joint Chiefs of Staff Directive 1067 (JOINT 
CHIEFS 1067) that would serve as the Army’s primary directive for the first years of 
Germany’s occupation.  Only after such directives were approved by the Joint Chiefs 
could Wickersham forward them to SHAEF.116   
The European Advisory Commission’s autonomy was often frustrated by the 
Working Security Committee’s own authority and composition.  That subcommittee 
lacked a formal charter, and it also lacked any form of unifying the disparate viewpoints 
of the agencies involved.  As a result, any member of the subcommittee had essentially 
a veto power, a power that Civil Affairs Division representatives used to its fullest.117   
As Kennan noted, even the “modest measure of activity on the commission’s part” met 
quite often with great resistance—a resistance Kennan saw coming from Civil Affairs 
Division representatives.118  Many of the Division representatives were actually lawyers 
in uniform who were used to adversarial roles in negotiation; as  Philip Mosely, 
Kennan’s successor as Winant’s political advisor, noted, they “seemed to regard the 
jurisdiction and prestige of the military service as they might regard the interests of a 
client,” and who thus aggressively defended perceived War Department prerogatives.119   
The Civil Affairs Division representatives essentially dominated the U.S. position at 
the Committee by establishing that virtually all the questions on the table, especially 
regarding the postwar occupation of Germany, were military matters, and therefore 
largely beyond the province of the Committee to decide.120  Indeed, much of the 
thinking about zonal boundaries and authorities had already been developed at military 
operational levels among the Combined Chiefs of Staff and Chief of Staff, Supreme 
219 
Allied Command, the combined US-UK staff planning the invasion of northwest Europe.   
To the Civil Affairs Division on the European Advisory Commission, therefore, further 
discussions usurped military primacy.121  On nearly all major issues, the U.S. military’s 
position either prevailed, or was only modified after intense labor and very often, after 
much contention.122   
The Civil Affairs Division and the Army Predominant 
As the above reveals, the formation of the Civil Affairs Division was central to the 
continuously expanding authority and ultimate predominance of the Army, not only in 
interagency but in inter-Allied post-conflict occupation planning.  Near the end of 1943, 
FDR himself finally relented and granted the Army greater authority.  In his memoirs, 
Stimson noted two actions by FDR in November 1943:  
[These actions] showed…how far the President had moved.  First, on November 10, 
he wrote a letter…declaring that the War Department must assume the 
responsibility for civilian relief in all liberated areas during the first six months after 
their liberation.  Second, from Cairo, he cabled…his views that all arrangements for 
civil administration and dealings with the French people must initially be purely 
military… .123 
 
In his diary, Stimson recollected that in a meeting with McCloy, Hilldring, Clay, and 
others he said that “this directive of the President was a final recognition of the proper 
function of the Army in those matters and that it was up to us to go ahead and carry it 
out.”124   
In light of Roosevelt’s November decision, how does one explain the President’s 
apparent vacillation throughout 1943?  Given his predilection in other areas to give the 
military broad authority, why did he only defer to military advice after repeated failures?  
Part of the answer probably lay in his apparent distrust of military government, as well 
as his concern that imposition of military rule, especially on “liberated” territories would 
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look decidedly suspicious, if not hypocritical from a nation that espoused the Four 
Freedoms, democracy, and anti-colonialism.  Yet it appeared that FDR was finally 
willing to grant the Army such authority only if it could be demonstrated that military 
necessity truly was paramount.  Throughout 1943, it seemed that more than once 
Roosevelt sought a way to reconcile a postwar occupation policy that would incorporate 
military requirements with civilian prerogatives, as if in doing so, he could carefully 
balance both.  He was hampered, however in two ways.  First, because of an 
organizational system, perhaps due to his management style, that sent forth one civilian 
agency after another into North Africa without clear lines of jurisdiction between them.  
Second, because the Army had developed an effective organizational system that 
represented its interests and that ultimately successfully promoted its interests in 
interagency and inter-Allied fora, and to the President.   
The Civil Affairs Division became both the Army’s and the Joint Chief’s executive 
agency for civil affairs.  McCloy, who oversaw the Division’s direction, in turn became 
the chairman of the Combined Committee on Civil Affairs, and played a crucial role in 
the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee.  The Division was a major factor in 
limiting the power of the European Advisory Commission. In the Civil Affairs Division, 
the Army found a powerful internal body to represent its views on postwar occupation 
matters, views that, expressed through the Division, became relatively clear, consistent 
and unified.   
But this unity of vision came at a strategic price, as would be seen in the 
subsequent occupations.  The Army had planned and organized for military government 
around doctrinal views, expressed in FM 27-5, regarding how military government 
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should be organized and practice.  It had established a powerful organization in the Civil 
Affairs Division to represent its interests.  The Army’s efforts to manage and control, and 
even dominate, the postwar governance debate had largely succeeded, but the 
relentless focus on military objectives at the expense of longer political goals, and the 
militarized form of government that doctrine made a template, meant that for many of 
the occupations planning was by its very nature limited, backwards focused, and 
unhelpful to the military governors who would be responsible for executing postwar 
governance.  Over and over, whether in Germany, Austria, or Korea, the military leaders 
in charge would complain that much of what they had to do had to be improvised, since 
they had little guidance beyond what were the basic strictures of a military-style 
governance, a governance, that, in the end, was meant to be temporary and focused on 
ensuring military victory.  The stage was therefore set for a complex series of events to 
unfold in the occupied territories, where the Army’s policies would be influential 
precisely because they lacked a longer, more “political” focus.  The storyline becomes 
complicated, especially since in Germany, Austria, and Korea, the political imperatives 
of the Cold War began to emerge soon after the occupations began.   The results of the 
American occupations would be decidedly ambiguous, as the following examinations of 
the American occupations of Germany, Austria, and Korea reveal. 
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Chapter 6 - Planning and Implementing Military Government 
in Germany, 1943-46 
 
Cold War historian Melvyn Leffler points out that no country was more critical to the 
superpowers than Germany during the Cold War and that Germany’s integration in 
some form into a postwar international system favorable to the either the U.S. or 
U.S.S.R. was an overriding issue.1  But how that integration would occur only became 
evident as the Cold War both intensified and clarified.  During World War II and during 
the occupation’s first year, what Germany meant to the United States was not 
completely clear.  Correspondingly, the United States’ efforts, particularly during the first 
critical year of the American occupation, were both largely formulated by military 
planners and were driven by military, and not long range policy, objectives.  Underlying 
those objectives were a series of assumptions about how postwar governance in 
Germany should be implemented.  Although these plans and their implementation were 
by military leaders, particularly by then Lieutenant General Lucius D. Clay, during the 
first year of the occupation, they would dramatically shape the longer-range policy goals 
of the United States in Germany.  This could be seen in fundamental policy and 
planning documents and in actions taken on the ground by the Army’s military 
government.  Particularly revealing are the examples of Clay’s associations with the 
Soviet Union and the communist party in Germany and the American military 
government’s reempowering of German officials quickly through his efforts in 
establishing local governments in the U.S. zones.  Both these examples show how 
military imperatives shaped larger policy outcomes, sometimes in conflict with U.S. 
strategic thinking among high-ranking civilian officials.   
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FDR’s postwar goals for Europe were initially not entirely clear, and civilian 
leadership throughout the war had little to offer as far as what should be done with 
Germany.  Writing to the Acting Secretary of State in early 1944, Roosevelt stated that 
he did not want the United States to have the “post-war burden” of reconstituting many 
of the liberated nations, saying that was a British task.  What FDR stated was the 
“principal object” was to “take part in eliminating Germany as a possible and even 
probably cause of a third World War.”2  Officials in the State Department shared 
Roosevelt’s aversion to the British approach and also indicated a reluctance to take, in 
the words of the Central European Division’s James W. Riddleberger, a “long-range 
view.”  According to Riddleberger, there was too much uncertainty as to what the future 
would hold.  , Longer range planning was virtually impossible until the Allies had 
“entered a considerable portion of Germany and kn[e]w the conditions … existent 
there”.3   
Planning for Germany’s eventual occupation thus began with little more than a 
vague notion of Germany somehow reentering the international order in a way not 
especially burdensome to the United States, though obviously looking different than the 
Nazi dictatorship it had become.  Such planning was also based upon a series of 
wartime assumptions that turned out to be mistaken, assumptions formed from past and 
current experience.  The first assumption was that Allied forces would enter Germany in 
a fashion similar to World War I, with Germany’s administrative structure intact.  If this 
assumption held, then an occupation akin to the Rhineland occupation described in the 
Hunt Report could ensue, and the occupiers could facilitate a return to power by 
appropriate German civil authorities with relative ease.  Another was that there would be 
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a sudden, overwhelming internal collapse of Germany, again similar to what occurred in 
1918, which would allow for a shift of resources and personnel to the Pacific theater in 
order to invade Japan in 1946.  This turned out also to be mistaken.  Germany resisted 
bitterly even till the final days of the war, combating the Allies with a ferocity that was 
stunning as it was pointless.4  A final assumption was that the wartime coalition 
between the Western allies and especially the Soviets, would maintain itself at least for 
the foreseeable future.5  The preparatory documentation for the Allied occupations 
reveals that the last assumption was constant, even if the basis for such an assumption 
was unclear. 6  This mistaken assumption confused an exigent wartime coalition with a 
genuine long lasting alliance.  As the months following V-E Day passed, the coalition 
between the Western Allies and the Soviets broke apart, and the Cold War began.  
The above assumptions were practically oriented, and they focused on the 
immediate goals of successful administration of a defeated nation.  They underpinned 
initial American strategic thinking about postwar Germany.  As the war ended, however, 
it became clear that Germany would resist, and that the surrender would not be 
prefaced by internal collapse.  These unpalatable truths, along with the strong beliefs by 
many high ranking civilian officials that Germany should be socially transformed, would 
clash with military government assumptions about an early return of German authorities 
to power.  And as the war ended, there would be a decided clash of perceptions 
between high ranking American civilian officials about the Soviet Union, and on-ground 
perceptions by American military leaders in Germany.  But what is especially notable is 
that during the first, critical phase of the German occupation, particularly from the 
German surrender in May 1945 to the establishment of provisional local German 
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governments in the U.S. zone in 1946, the Army’s institutional understanding and 
practice, executed in the form of military government, had the greater influence in 
Germany.  Despite the view of key U.S. civilian officials that the Soviet Union was a 
threat that had to be contained, U.S.-U.S.S.R. relations in the occupied zone were 
relatively amicable during the occupation’s first year; and despite the reticence and 
even resistance by American civilian leaders, German officials were returned to power 
relatively quickly in the American zone.    
Military Planning 
Detailed planning for the initial stages of the occupation was almost entirely done 
within the Army itself, beginning as early as 1943.  Army planners at the Civil Affairs 
Division and at what would become the Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary 
Force (SHAEF) began to formulate a series of plans for the eventual occupation of 
Germany.  Ostensibly, the State Department still had general supervision over postwar 
policy, allowing the Army only to administer postwar occupations throughout the world.  
But the Army had, in establishing the Civil Affairs Division and then asserting authority 
in various agencies, committees, and commissions, ensured its viewpoints were 
expressed and more often than not, complied with by civilian organizations.  The Army 
also had access to, and had an ability to gather, huge troves of information on 
potentially occupied territories.  It also an ability to integrate with ongoing military 
operations, and thus to transition seamlessly to postconflict occupation responsibilities 
in a coherent and presumably ordered way.   
Accordingly, the first occupation plan so devised, named Operation RANKIN, was 
conceived almost entirely as a military operation.  Premised on a World War I-type 
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collapse of the Third Reich, it called for the speedy occupation of a barrier zone along 
Germany’s western frontier and the quick stationing of forces in key strategic locations 
in order to secure control over Germany.  Even though the planners were undoubtedly 
aware of the enormous political ramifications of the plans they were formulating, the 
planners were reminded to avoid delving into policy questions in order not to commit the 
American government to a particular political agenda that had yet to be formulated.  In 
the words of an official history of the occupation planning, General Eisenhower’s 
influence was “exerted constantly in the direction of avoiding the political implications.”  
He gave strict instructions throughout the planning process that the occupation should 
focus on military and not political issues.7   
The SHAEF planners in turn fashioned mock directives from higher as a way to 
frame their own planning assumptions.  One, drafted as if sent from the Combined 
Chiefs of Staff, stated that the occupation would be firmly under military control:  
“Except by the express direction of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, there will be no 
Political Agency or Political Representative of either the United States or British 
government taking part in the Administration.” 8  The occupation would have an initial 
military phase, during which Eisenhower, as presumed military governor, would have 
full authority to take all administrative or other measures necessary for the conduct of 
operations.  But the end point of that phase was not clearly stated.  Only when the 
military situation allowed would civilian authority come in to assume control over such 
areas as Eisenhower himself would decide when civil relief agencies such as the United 
Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration and the Red Cross would be permitted 
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to function, and in all instances, all actions would conform to the requirements of military 
necessity.9 
The planners also worked to ensure a close linkage between tactical forces and 
military government and civil affairs units.  They determined that it would be necessary 
from the outset to integrate closely the civil affairs units with the tactical chains of 
command during operations and movements towards and into Germany, and that at 
least in the initial phases of the occupation, there would be a tactically oriented form of 
military government.  SHAEF planners would also prepare at their levels policy 
directives that lower level echelon G-5s would provide to the military government and 
civil affairs units.  Furthermore, the SHAEF planners established a school in Great 
Britain at Shrivenham, in large part to ensure a better integration of civil affairs 
personnel with combat units.10  
According to RANKIN, the location of occupation troops in Germany would be 
premised on the tactical location of the Allied troops as they entered the physical 
territory of the Reich.  British troops, beginning with the Normandy landings themselves, 
were positioned north of the American troops.  By military logic, the British and 
American axes of advances into Germany followed this initial scheme of maneuver.  
President Roosevelt would seek to reverse the occupation zones as the war ended, with 
the Americans in the northwest and the British in the south.  But RANKIN’s premise 
held:  the zonal occupation in the west was ultimately determined upon the disposition 
of forces, not political considerations, as the Western Allies entered into the conquered 
territory.11   
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RANKIN would be obsolete by D-Day on June 6, 1944, and military planners 
developed two other plans in succession, TALISMAN and ECLIPSE.  They revealed a 
more political awareness than RANKIN.  In the words of one senior military planner, 
“We cannot wait for policy to be laid down by the United Nations.  It is essential that we 
should prepare now, as a matter of urgency, papers on all these problems.”12  Planners 
therefore drew up special studies on a range of issues from imposition of sanctions to 
disarmament and the establishment of martial law.13  Yet even these plans 
fundamentally oriented on the Army’s military government doctrinal model as the 
approach to execute postwar governance.  Accordingly, the postwar governance 
objectives in TALISMAN and ECLIPSE were military ones. 
For example, the planners developed what they termed Standard Policy and 
Procedure (SPP)—underlying policy and procedural principles that would inform their 
planning for civil affairs.  As draft notes reveal, the planners explicitly drew upon FM 27-
5 in order to ensure that any principles that they adopted were in general alignment with 
the doctrinal principles in the Army manual.  Among other matters, it noted that FM 27-
5, provided for two basic types of military government organization—tactical and 
territorial.  The SPP indicated that initially the tactical model would be adopted, though 
also that it would be necessary to provide a territorial type of organization for an orderly 
transition to Control Commission authority at some future point.  The SPP also 
discussed handling a variety of issues, such as the handling of displaced persons, 
occupational military police, the disposal of government records and archives, referring 
throughout to FM 27-5’s broad guidance in dealing with such matters.14 
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In further drafts and comments, it was clear that the planners understood the need 
to comply with international law requirements.  At the same time the absolute primacy of 
military authority was continually stressed, and the occupation mission would be 
focused on military objectives.  Brigadier General Frank McSherry, who was the SHAEF 
G-5, commenting upon the proposed SPPs, wrote that under international law a 
supreme commander was responsible for the maintenance of law and order, the well 
being of the civilian population and the restoration of conditions to normal, insofar as the 
military situation permits.  He also noted that “[m]ilitary necessity is the first question to 
be considered; it is still the duty of the Commander under International Law, to govern 
the country which he has occupied as well as possible subject to military exigencies.”15   
Such comments were in keeping with the American Army’s understanding of military 
government.  It had both a set of rules under international law that were required to be 
obeyed, though at the same time, the paramount matter at all times was military 
necessity and the primary military requirement of maintaining wartime victory.  Draft 
comments about the SPP did note the requirement for aligning military objectives with 
longer range political goals.  A January 31 draft entitled “Allied Military Government in 
Occupied Territory” noted that an objective of military government was “[t]o promote 
political objectives of the Allied Government “as well as “military objectives of their 
combat forces.”  But even within that particular draft, ultimately the “objectives of a 
military government [were] primarily to aid in the successful prosecution of the war.”16   
Yet this determination that military requirements were ultimate arbiters during 
occupation was not simply a conceptual matter.  It also revealed the practical reality that 
there were not sufficient civilian agencies in size, ability, or authority to assume the 
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Army’s mission and thus direct the course of the occupation toward non-military goals.  
Commenting upon a proposed policy of the U.S. and U.K. governments to replace 
civilian agencies with military personnel during the Germany’s occupation, SHAEF civil 
affairs planners noted in early 1944 that “No such agency is available at present, or 
likely to be so for some time after operations being.”17 
The last plan developed at SHAEF for action in case of German surrender was 
labeled ECLIPSE, published in November 1944, and expressly termed the “military 
continuation of Operation OVERLORD.”18  The plan was intended to provide interim 
guidance to the Allied forces prior to a turnover to what would presumably be an Allied 
Control Council.  Accordingly, it said virtually nothing about long range plans for 
Germany, other than that German forces would be disarmed and demobilized, law and 
order would be established, and Allied forces would be properly distributed throughout 
the country.19  As figure 8 below illustrates, Germany’s land mass contained operational 
objectives for Allied forces to capture, in order to then ensure the accomplishment of 
ECLIPSE’s military objectives.  As figure 8 also illustrates, ECLIPSE provided an initial 
tripartite zonal demarcation and clearly depicted a trizonal partition of Berlin. 
Regarding the territory of Germany however, it was not clear which Western Ally 
would occupy which zone, even in the fall of 1944, as the ECLIPSE map also 
illustrates.20    There was a boundary decided upon between the Western Allies and the 
Soviets, but while that line had been agreed upon by the summer of 1944, it was simply 
an educated guess at where the respective fighting forces would be when the fighting 
stopped.21  Indeed, this partitioning of Germany into Western and Soviet zones of 
occupation was not considered a political matter.  When the U.S.-U.K. Combined Chiefs 
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of Staff discussed the zonal distribution, they did so in a way that reflected military 
objectives entirely.  In the so-called Octagon Conference held by the Combined Chiefs 
in the fall of 1944, the Combined Chiefs stated:  “[T]he following subdivision of that part 
of Germany not allocated to the Soviet Government…is acceptable from a military point 
of view… .”22  The discussion set forth the acceptable American zone “for disarmament, 
policing and preservation of order”: 
The forces of the United States under a United States Commander will occupy 
Germany east of the Rhine, south of the line Koblenz-northern border of Hessen-
Nassau and west of the area allocated to the Soviet Government.  Control of the 
ports of Bremen and Bremerhaven, and the necessary staging areas in that 
immediate vicinity will be vested in the Commander of the American zone.23 
 
The only relevant points of discussion regarding occupation zones were their utility as  
 
staging areas, implicitly referencing future combat operations against Japan. 
 
The Handbook Controversy, the Morgenthau Plan and JCS 1067 
 
Throughout 1944, SHAEF civil affairs planners in its German country unit had 
worked on a guide for military government in Germany that would provide concrete 
guidance for the occupiers.  Relying on documents such as the Hunt Report and FM 27-
5, the SHAEF planners created the Handbook for Military Government in Germany, 
which quite explicitly reflected the standard doctrine and practice of American military 
government.24  President Roosevelt read the Handbook himself after Secretary of 
Treasury Henry Morgenthau, a strong proponent of severe terms for German surrender, 
returned from Europe with a copy of it.  Apparently, even given FDR’s deference to  
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 Figure 8 
Troop Concentrations within Germany per ECLIPSE Plan25 
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military matters, it was not punitive enough.  Writing to Secretary Stimson in August 
1944, Roosevelt noted that  
 
This so-called “Handbook” is pretty bad.  I should like to know how it came to be 
written and who approved it down the line. … It gives me the impression that  
Germany is to be restored just as much as the Netherlands or Belgium, and the 
people of Germany brought back as quickly as possible to their pre-war state.26 
 
The Handbook not only referred to Germany’s economic rehabilitation, it also fully 
reflected the military government doctrine of early return to civilian authority as soon as 
possible.  Roosevelt in particular noted comments in it such as “Your main and 
immediate task, to accomplish your mission, is to get things running, to pick up the 
pieces, to restore as quickly as possible the official functioning of the German civil 
government in the area for which are [sic] are responsible… .  The first concern of 
military government will be to see that the machine works and works efficiently.”27  
Elsewhere the Handbook stated that “All existing German regulations and ordinances 
relating to…production, supply or distribution will remain in force until specifically 
amended or abrogated.” 28 
FDR commented angrily to Stimson that he saw the Handbook as too gentle and 
friendly, with too much of a “helping hand” approach: “I see no reason for starting a 
WPA [Works Progress Administration], PWA [Public Works Administration], or a CCC 
[Civilian Conservation Corps] for Germany when we go in with our Army of Occupation,” 
a reference to the various New Deal agencies Roosevelt himself had created during the 
Depression. 29  In reality, such a massive social welfare effort was not what the U.S. 
Army contemplated.  What the Handbook pointed to was restoring Germans to power 
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quickly, in accordance with military government doctrine and organizational practice, 
with as little interference and oversight from the Army as could be allowed.   
Nevertheless, this caused great protest within FDR’s Cabinet.  Even prior to the 
Handbook’s publication, a Cabinet Committee consisting of the Secretaries of State, 
Cabinet, and War had proposed a plan for the President that was far more severe than 
the mild occupation envisioned by the SHAEF civil affairs planners.  The Cabinet 
Committee’s proposal included Germany’s demilitarization and the political destruction 
of Nazism and other extremist viewpoints.  It also, most controversially, called for 
keeping the standard of living of the German population at subsistence levels, and for 
reconverting the “German economic capacity in such manner that it will be so 
dependent on imports and exports that Germany cannot by its own devices reconvert to 
war production.”30  Secretary of Treasury Henry Morgenthau went even further, seeking 
to implement his plan, the so-called Morgenthau Plan, in large driven by perceived 
softness he saw in the Army’s postwar proposal.  Morgenthau’s plan likewise called for 
keeping Germany at subsistence levels, as well as its near-permanent 
deindustrialization and pastoralization.31       
Stimson himself did not object to the destruction of Nazism and even the restructure 
of German political life to some degree, as both the Morgenthau Plan and the Cabinet 
Committee recommended.  But he particularly fulminated against the plan to keep 
Germany deindustrialized and kept at subsistence levels.  Stimson was utterly opposed 
to the idea in either plan, saying that to hold Germany to subsistence levels would not in 
his opinion prevent but breed war.” He added that he could not conceive of such a plan 
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being possible and effective, but instead saw “enormous evils” as a result of it being 
implemented. 32  
What resulted from this clash between civilian views of sweeping societal reform 
and the military’s more modest proposals was a document that has caused confusion 
among historians as to its purpose and significance.   The document, Joint Chiefs of 
Staff (JCS) Directive 1067, could be seen as either an extension of the harsh aspects of 
the Morgenthau Plan, or at best as a compromise between civilian and military planners 
regarding Germany’s future.   On close inspection, however, it is apparent that JCS 
1067 was fundamentally a military document.  An examination of the correspondence 
from SHAEF planners indicated that they interpreted JCS 1067 as an interim military 
directive meant to be replaced with a longer-term and more political product.33   And as 
a military document, it was subsequently executed by military personnel, who did so in 
such a way as essentially to diminish the document’s rigors and instead to enact it in 
accordance with imperatives consistent with U.S. military government, as expressed in 
its doctrine, and as practiced in its organization and leadership. 
It was a War Department creation.  No other body, not even the European Advisory 
Commission, whose capabilities had been delimited largely because of War Department 
efforts, had the authority to produce such a directive.34  According to occupation 
historian Earl Ziemke, it was largely the work of the Army’s own Civil Affairs Division. 35  
John McCloy when interviewed was even more specific, going on the historical record to 
say that he was given the job of drafting the document, noting that JCS 1067 was 
written in response to the Morgenthau Plan’s extremism.36  According to McCloy, JCS 
1067 deliberately deflected the Morgenthau Plan’s more punitive measures.  Rather it 
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contained a series of clauses and phrases which permitted the on-ground military 
governor freedom to maneuver: 
If you read 1067…there’s a clause in every paragraph, “except in case of 
emergency” or “except in case of” something or other, so you did have some 
leeway there. …  And we were responsible, or I was responsible, for putting in 
the “unless you have to.” … But when you consider what move that was from 
the Vidictus of the original Treasury plan, and the original State Department 
plan, you can see how far away it was from that.37 
 
McCloy exaggerated the ameliorative language to some degree, but prominently there 
was a provision in Annex D, the “Relief Directive,” that allowed the military governor to 
take action to “prevent disease and such disorder as might endanger or impede military 
occupation.”38  General Lucius Clay, de facto military governor of the U.S. zone in 
Germany from 1945 to 1947, would later fully exploit this loophole as he saw fit.39  
Indeed, the overall language of JCS 1067 was sufficiently broad that Clay himself did 
not find JCS 1067 particularly restrictive.40 
Roosevelt approved an initial version of the directive in September 1944.  There 
were in fact no less than eight versions of JCS 1067 between September 1944 and May 
1945, though the content of the major sections largely remained the same in all.41  It 
stated that Germany’s rehabilitation was the “preparation for an eventual reconstruction 
of German political life on a democratic basis.”  However, any such goal was 
subordinate to the primary one, which related back to the original and underlying 
purpose of the occupation—to prevent Germany from reemerging as a military threat:  
“The principal Allied objective is to prevent Germany from ever again becoming a threat 
to the peace of the world.”42  Another consistent provision throughout all versions, from 
the fall of 1944 to the published version in April 1945, was the supreme authority of the 
military governor, who was   
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…By virtue of [his] position, clothed with supreme legislative, executive and judicial 
authority in the areas occupied by forces under [his] command.  This authority will 
be broadly construed and includes authority to take all measures deemed by [the 
military governor] necessary, appropriate and desirable in relation to military 
exigencies and the objectives of a firm military government.43 
 
The authority of the military governor was delimited most significantly by a stringent 
denazification policy that did not allow flexibility in returning Nazi party members to civil 
authority.44  Here apparently, military necessity did not necessarily prevail, and the 
requirements to denazify held sway even over the fundamental tenet of American 
military government to return power as quickly as possible.  As events would prove, 
however, even that stricture would not be absolute: denazification policy would also be 
modified to fit actual, on-ground conditions by the American military government.   
Despite the SHAEF planners’ beliefs about the temporary nature of JCS 1067, its 
apparent interim guidance was the most explicit the American occupiers would receive 
from any source during the first two years of the occupation.  Indeed, the published 
papers of the wartime Yalta and Quebec Conferences among the main Allied powers 
never had any longer range policy or plan beyond ensuring Germany’s permanent 
military defeat.  For example, the Yalta Communiqué, released to the press on February 
11, 1945, stated that the requisite steps for Germany’s occupation were “disarmament, 
demilitarization, and dismemberment” but did not discuss the establishment of a 
permanent German democracy.  And in the agreed upon “Principles to Govern the 
Treatment of Germany in the Initial Control Period” adopted by the Allies at the Potsdam 
Conference in August 1945, democracy was portrayed much more as a future project: 
“The purposes of the occupation of Germany by which the Control Council shall be 
guided are…to prepare for the eventual reconstruction of German political life on a 
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democratic basis and for eventual peaceful cooperation in international life by 
Germany”45  Whatever  discussions there were related to democratization were in fact  
linked explicitly with more pragmatic ones such as ensuring that German militarism was 
destroyed and that government authority decentralized in order to prevent the 
reemergence of Germany as a major military power.  The Potsdam Principles were 
explicit on this point in stating that while local self-government was to be restored 
throughout Germany on democratic principles and in elective councils, this would only 
occur in accordance with requirements for “military security and the purposes of military 
occupation.”46   
Lucius Clay and the American Military Government in Germany  
 
While Eisenhower served as the first Military Governor of the U.S. zone in Germany 
until November 1945, to be followed by General Joseph T. McNarney until 1947, the 
real wielding of power and authority in the American zone was by Lieutenant General 
Lucius Clay, Deputy Military Governor from 1945 to 1947 (and Military Governor from 
1947 to 1949).47  He was not an initial first choice.  FDR himself initially wanted the job 
to go to John McCloy.  But after Roosevelt, in mock fashion, held up his hand in a Hitler 
salute and said to McCloy in 1944, “Heil, Commissar for Deutschland,” McCloy 
responded: 
We haven’t won the war yet … and I don’t think this is the time for a High 
Commissioner in Germany.  …  There’ll come a time when a civilian will be needed 
there, someone with military background who’s had some civilian experience as 
well, but I don’t think this is the occasion now.  It’s more like a Mississippi River 
disaster—it’s a month of keeping body and soul together.  There’s going to be a lot 
of distress and questions of food and supply, and this is a job for a soldier at this 
stage, who can move with other soldiers.48 
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After FDR remarked that he knew of no one in the Army able to do this, McCloy 
responded that he knew Lucius Clay, “a sort of right hand man for General [Brehon] 
Sommerville [the Commander of Army Service Forces]—really running to a large 
degree Somerville’s office over there… .”49   
The Cabinet Committee for the President had, in September 1944, in fact 
recommended the appointment of an American High Commissioner for Germany.  
Although not explicit, its recommendation seemed to recommend a high-ranking civilian, 
an “official of high political ability and considerable prestige who can speak with 
authority for the Government in all matters where a common policy must be worked out 
the U.K. and the U.S.S.R.”50  But there were no takers for the assignment.  Clay later 
remarked that he did not believe there was anyone who had volunteered to have taken 
the assignment, given its breadth, complexity, and the possibility of its failure.51   
Clay was an Army engineer who had worked on a series of complex logistical 
problems throughout the war.  He also came from a political background: his father had 
been a prominent Georgia senator, and Clay had even been a page in Congress.52  By 
most accounts, he possessed high intelligence, organizational ability, and an intensity 
and a work ethic that many found intimidating and even frightening.  He had also been 
involved in civil affairs disputes, especially during the North Africa campaigns.53  Clay 
had desperately wanted a combat command during the war, saying he would have 
“given his eyeteeth to have commanded a division.”54  But his essentially civilian work in 
the Washington bureaucracy proved invaluable to Sommerville, Marshall and others, 
and it provided excellent training for his role as military governor.   
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FDR apparently did not dispute McCloy’s recommendation, another example of 
his deference to War Department decisions.  Allegedly Roosevelt said to McCloy 
that he was too tired to argue with him, and he allowed Clay to be the choice.55  
And while Eisenhower preferred initially his own Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General 
Walter Bedell Smith, Clay got the job and arrived in Germany shortly after V-E Day 
in May 1945.  Clay sometimes ran afoul of political leadership, particularly at the 
State Department, some of whom felt that Clay ran matters in Germany too 
autonomously and free of higher Washington influence.  Clay, however, was not 
afraid of taking his grant of authority as military governor and using it to the fullest to 
meet what he perceived as the Army’s objectives in Germany. 
Even before Clay’s arrival, American military government officials came into the 
Reich some as early as December 1944, eventually to occupy the U.S. zone in 
figure 9 below.   They relied on the explicit of authority of Proclamation No. 1, 
issued by General Eisenhower, who for an interim period served as supreme 
military authority over all the areas occupied by the Western Allies.  The 
proclamation reiterated the underlying principle of military government in that he 
asserted that “[s]upreme legislative, judicial and executive authority and powers 
within the occupied territory are vested in me as Supreme Commander of the Allied 
Forces and as Military Governor.”  Furthermore, all Germans were to “obey 
immediately and without question” all the enactments and orders of the military 
government, and resistance to the Allied Forces would be “ruthlessly stamped out.”  
Further reflecting basic military government doctrine, the proclamation stated that all 
officials charged with the duties of remaining at their posts would do so until further 
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orders were issued, to include all those at “public undertakings and utilities and to 
all other persons engaged in essential work.”56 
American military government officials moved into the occupation zone (in figure 9 
below) with a wealth of information, including template documents for curfews, the 
surrender of firearms, the use of carrier pigeons, and wireless; travel restrictions, how to 
set up military courts.  The years of planning and organizing seemed to have at least 
resulted in some benefits, and there was a measure of purpose and organization when 
the occupiers came that reflected a detailed level of planning unprecedented in this 
history of war.57  The work of Military Government Detachment F-213 in Munich from 
May 1945 to January 1946 was not uncommon.  Composed of 24 officers and 48 
enlisted men, it spent a year prior to its occupation duties preparing for its mission, 
poring over maps and air photos, and studying all aspects of the location of its 
assignment.  The unit’s members knew Munich “better than their own towns.”  Upon 
arrival, the detachment went to work: its commander appointed an Oberbuergermeister, 
established law and order, got utilities working, and empowered those on the so-called 
“White list,” that is those officials who were determined not to be Nazis, to act as 
temporary mayor and heads of municipal departments.58   
But the very vastness of the project of the occupation sometimes seemed to 
overwhelm even all the preceding planning efforts.  For example, one military 
government sergeant sent to conduct surveys on industry, commerce, mining and 
agriculture reported after his occupation service that the efforts were weak, and 
another, as part of a nutritional survey team in Bavaria, noted that the efforts were 
worth doing but less than successful.59  The scope of urban destruction could be at 
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times staggering: one observer called Germany a “country without cities.”60   There 
was also the fundamental practical problem of preventing a highly advanced society 
from starving.  According to an American military government official in Leipzig, 
“[T]he first and foremost [problem was] food for a thoroughly dislocated industrial 
population… .”61 
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Allied Occupation Zones in Germany62 
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The overall situation, one of chaos and collapse, thus looked quite unlike the placid 
Rhineland occupation following the previous World War.  And yet the attitude of the 
German people in the American zone was typically reported as calm, with few overt acts 
of resistance.  A June 1945 intelligence report asserted that “The Germans look at the 
Allied Forces with fairly understanding eyes,” noting that it was not a novelty for the 
Germans to have large numbers of troops billeted throughout the country.  The same 
report noted that hooligan and Nazi resistance activities were “infinitesimal.”63    Clay 
wrote to Hilldring in July that political activity was dormant: “German masses seem 
totally unpolitical, apathetic and primarily concerned with everyday problems of food, 
clothing, and shelter. … There is no evidence of an attempt to organize a Nazi 
underground.”64  Even after the cold and brutal first occupation winter of 1945-1946, 
intelligence reports indicated that the population in the U.S. zone was outwardly 
placid— the Germans apparently expressed their greatest concerns about local military 
government detachments withdrawing too quickly, since many still placed relatively little 
faith in German administrations. 65  What the American occupiers noted was a 
“monotonous repetition of the usual complaints” that centered on the theme that the 
occupation authorities did not show enough interest in the immediate reconstruction of 
Germany.66   
In a fundamental respect, then, the Second World War’s occupation in the American 
zone did resemble the First’s—not in the level of destruction, but in the relative 
compliance of the Germans themselves, and in their apparent desire not to engage in 
an extensive guerrilla uprising, much less return to their Nazi past.  Accordingly Clay 
was able to separate military government from tactical command rapidly.  In his 
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estimation, military government did “not belong in one of five staff divisions at theater 
headquarters.”67  He achieved it faster than in Austria, a nation far less damaged.  
During the summer of 1945, command and control of military government flowed 
through the tactical commanders of the Eastern and Western Districts in the American 
zone.  But by September 1945 Clay had created Directors and Offices of Military 
Government directly linked to the respective Laender the American forces occupied, 
thus moving to the territorial model of military government.  By October, the G-5 civil 
affairs staff sections in tactical district commanders detached and fell under the Laender 
Military Governments.68  From January 1, 1946 onwards, the Directors of the Offices of 
Military Government in  Bavaria, Wuerttemberg-Baden, and Greater Hesse each 
became completely independent of the district tactical commanders and reported 
directly to General McNarney (de facto to Clay).  The Directors themselves were in turn 
responsible for all activities related to military government in their districts, which 
included coordinating with German civilian police and all other German agencies.69 
American Military Government and the Soviets 
The separation of tactical units from military government control also meant a 
corresponding lack of oversight by military authorities over the activities of the Germans.   
American military government was moving at a pace and in a direction not necessarily 
consonant with American civilian policymakers in Washington.  This was especially 
apparent in the difference between the views of civilian leaders and military leaders in 
Germany, especially Clay himself, regarding the Soviet Union.   
When Truman assumed the Presidency following Roosevelt’s death in April 1945, 
he did not initially intend to reverse FDR’s cooperative strategy with the Soviets.70  At 
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the same time, he was much more prone to rely on counselors, many of whom held 
suspicious or at least skeptical views of the U.S.S.R.71  On May 5, 1945, then Director 
of the Office of Strategic Services William J. Donovan sent a memorandum to new 
President Harry Truman entitled “Problems and Objectives of United States Policy” in 
which he focused almost exclusively on the Soviet Union.72  The Soviet Union was 
perceived as unpredictable.  The U.S.S.R. put “little store by proposals of compromise 
or by international agreements.”  He went on to say that “If she [the Soviet Union] 
should succeed in such a policy, she would become a menace more formidable to the 
United States than any yet known.”73  Donovan also keyed in on the importance of 
Germany in the future of U.S.-U.S.S.R. relations.  To Donovan, the “German problem” 
was at the center of any possible conflict: 
The problem of Germany is largely separate and distinct from that of Western 
Europe, and is at the same time by far the most crucial problem on the Continent.  A 
Russia that dominates Germany will dominated Europe.  On the other hand, Russia 
will almost certainly fight to prevent the Western domination of Germany.  The only 
remaining possibilities are the total partition of Germany between the East-
European and West-European spheres, or the establishment and maintenance of a 
democratic-socialist Germany balanced between the Eastern and Western blocs but 
aligned with neither.74 
 
Donovan’s perception of the Soviet Union was inextricably linked with the German 
problem.  Thus, from the outset, before the war was even over and the occupation and 
rebuilding of Germany had begun, Soviet conduct and action in Germany were seen as 
the key to post-war Europe.    
Truman himself placed the “point of departure” of policy towards the Soviets in early 
January 1946.  He was particularly disturbed by the continuing Soviet policy of keeping 
troops in Iran, saying that there was no justification for it and that it apparently paralleled 
Russian aggression in the Baltic States and Poland.75  As he stated in that same 
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correspondence: “I’m tired [of] babying the Soviets.”76  The same month, Secretary of 
State James Byrnes gave the first public expression of the Administration’s new policy 
towards the USSR in a speech to the Overseas Press Club in New York.  Though not 
mentioning the Soviet Union by name, Byrnes stated that while the US welcomed the 
USSR as part of a postwar polity, America would not abide with aggression or threats of 
force contrary to the purposes and principles of the UN Charter—a clear reference to 
the Iranian situation.77 
On the ground in Germany, however, Clay viewed the Soviet Union in quite a 
different light.  In his memoir of military government, Decision in Germany, written in 
1950, he portrayed the Soviet Union as a nation that appeared to be only temporarily 
kept in check.78   Clay wrote that, at the time of Potsdam, the Soviet Union seemed to 
be willing to accept four-power control, but only grudgingly.  He attributed this grudging 
acceptance, at least in part, to the fact that American military strength in 1945 was “at 
its peak” of dominance and influence in Europe: “Our armies were deep in Germany, 
Austria, and Czechoslovakia.”79  The Soviet Union’s policy of “world domination” had 
only been temporarily been in “moth balls” because of the war and “clearly formed the 
basis of [its] day-to-day planning.”80 
But this was Clay’s view in 1950, when the United States was well in the midst of 
the Cold War.  Initially after the war, relations between American and Soviet general 
were fairly good in Germany.  Eisenhower and Field Marshal Zhukov were, for example, 
very friendly, and the record is indeed replete with statements of warmth between the 
two men.81  Clay himself apparently did see the Russians as political and military allies: 
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as his biographer Jean Edward Smith said, “He discounted their revolutionary ideology, 
and he was profoundly committed to making four-power government a success.”82 
A prime example of the divide between Washington and OMGUS was Clay’s 
attitude toward George Kennan.   Kennan would later remark on “being taken severely 
to task in a private meeting with Clay in 1945 for what the general then viewed as the 
excessively anti-Soviet attitudes of the State Department.  The military, I was given to 
understand, would have known far better than the diplomats how to create a 
collaborative relationship with the Russians.”83  Clay, according to his biographer Smith, 
was “appalled” by Kennan’s famous 1946 long telegram and profoundly disagreed with 
Kennan’s conclusion about Soviet conduct, and thought that Kennan’s influence on 
American foreign policy was “pernicious.” 84   
Clay permitted the Communist Party to proselytize rather freely. He also refused to 
provide assistance to either conservative or moderate parties during the crucial 
elections in heavily Communist Berlin.85   The record of the period reveals almost no 
outright suppression of any political parties.  The only party the Americans suppressed 
existed on the far-right, the monarchial Bavarian Home and King Party.86  In the first 
year of the occupation in Germany, political ideology was far less important than the 
pragmatic requirements of meeting the requirements of military government.  It was this 
very lack of ideology that characterized the American military government’s initial moves 
in 1945-46—moves that were premised on non-ideological objectives, primarily, the 
disengagement of military government from German civil government as rapidly as 
possible.  
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The Dismantling of JCS 1067 and Clay’s Federalist Experiment  
 
Occupation historians have noted the discrepancies between the policies expressed 
in JCS 1067 and the practice by military government, with the American military 
government generally being considered much “softer” than the directives, which on their 
face demanded a much harder peace. 87  Richard Merritt, for example notes that 
American goals were, regardless of the sweeping language in some pronouncements, 
more modest than they appeared, and that policymakers “embraced the doctrine of 
imposed social change, but at the rhetorical level only.”88  But Clay especially worked 
right away to do two things: to delimit JCS 1067’s authority and to return power to 
Germans as quickly as possible.  Clay exercised his military governor’s authority to do 
the former and in so doing illustrated how fundamental were the Army’s doctrinal 
imperatives regarding military government.  Clay, in fact, fairly early on began to 
interpret rather loosely the strictures of JCS 1067.  He often chose to overlook them, or 
just as often, to undo them quietly.  In his words, “We began to slowly wipe out JCS 
1067.”89  Step by step, the draconian measures that had been placed in the document 
to make it more palatable to those in civilian agencies who wanted a harsher treatment 
of Germany, were removed, as Clay noted, by “cablegrams, conferences, and so on.”90   
Even denazification, the most ambitious of the social transformative projects, was 
carried out only briefly and unevenly by the American occupiers.  Clay very much 
wanted to involve the Germans themselves in the denazification.  Under pressure from 
a domestic audience who felt the American occupation force had not sufficiently rooted 
out Nazism, Clay promulgated Military Government Law Number Eight in late 
September 1945, which made sweeping attempts to purge Nazis from public life.91  But 
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the process was simply too overwhelming for the American military government to 
perform, and, by November, Clay had ordered a review of the policy, which concluded 
that greater German participation was needed.92  And in March 1946, Clay along with 
the American-selected Minister-Presidents of the Laender in the American zone passed 
the “Law for Liberation from National Socialism and Militarism,” which effectively gave 
German authorities almost complete responsibility for denazifying in the American zone 
for the remainder of the occupation.93 
Turning denazification over to the Germans was consistent with American military 
government efforts to cede overall civil authority back to Germans as well.  Clay was not 
alone in thinking this way.  Eisenhower, who was the military governor in name during 
the first months of the occupation (although again, deferring almost all of the decision-
making in matters to Clay), also believed that American military government in Germany 
was to perform military functions and not to oversee German society and run its 
government.  In a letter to President Truman in October 1945, Eisenhower wrote: 
The matter of civil government of Germany is entirely separate from the 
occupational duty of the Army, which responsibility will persist as long as our 
Government deems necessary.  The true function of the Army in this region is to 
provide for the United States that reserve of force and power that can insure within 
our zone the prompt enforcement of all law and regulations prescribed… .94 
 
Clay’s motivations for returning power to Germans were similar.  He did state that he 
wanted to educate Germans in democratic principles by allowing them to do it 
themselves.  But he also indicated another in moving so quickly to return power to 
locals.  He did not believe that a long occupation was sustainable by the Army, and 
there were the immediate realities of wartime demobilization.  Clay was candid to 
McCloy about the twofold purpose of his approach: “If the Germans are to learn 
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democratic methods, I think the best way is to start them off quickly at the lower levels.  
Besides, this will help us reduce substantially the personnel required for military 
government.”95   
On the other hand, efforts to embed democratic concepts by the American military 
government were sparse.  Harold Zink, one of the first to write about the military 
government efforts in Germany, noted that American efforts were overly focused on the 
process and “machinery” of government and not enough on the substance of 
democracy:  
Too much emphasis was placed on the holding of elections, the framing of 
constitutions and laws, the setting up of the machinery, and other more or less 
mechanical techniques.  Too little attention was given to cultivating Germans 
disposed to support a democratic system in Germany, filling public offices with able 
Germans who could be expected to fight for a democratic cause during critical 
periods of attack in the future, and educating the Germans as to the meaning of 
representative democracy.96 
 
The focus on such mechanics, however, was entirely consistent with the underlying 
focus on returning power to Germans as rapidly as possible, a key imperative, indeed a 
fundamental tenet of American military government.  The notion of a long lasting 
occupation was not only unworkable in Clay’s eyes, it was fundamentally unworkable, 
because American military occupation was not doctrinally oriented, and hence not 
organized, trained, or planned, for a long lasting occupation that sought the very 
societal transformation Zink desired.   
Rather, according to some notable historians of the occupation, the reason for the 
long-lasting embrace by Germans of western democracy owed little to the American 
military government policies.  That acceptance was instead, almost entirely due to their 
own recognition that their immediate past was not usable that they had to accept a 
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different version of political order. The apparent success in Germany, in which Germans 
accepted the tenets of democracy and became a partner in the West’s liberal 
internationalist order, was fundamentally a choice the Germans themselves made.  
According to historian Richard Merritt, the Germans chose democracy and the West 
because few alternatives were available.  The Allies would not permit a return to 
Nazism, and Germans had little interest anyway in returning to a disastrous and 
disgraced past.97  Historian Edward Peterson concludes that the American occupiers 
succeeded precisely when they allowed the local German officials to exercise their own 
authority: “The occupation worked when and where it allowed Germans to govern 
themselves.”98   German historian Konrad Jarausch notes that Clay, and later High 
Commissioner McCloy, saw themselves forced to defer to the Germans’ desires.  Clay 
especially was a pragmatist in his dealings with the Germans, and his political efforts 
were as much a practical solution to a slew of problems—from manpower shortages to 
a realization that the occupation could not sustain itself.99 
The return of Germans to power in the American zone was swift, so swift that many, 
apart from Clay and others in the American military government, thought it could be 
disastrous in its attempt to accelerate a process that should take a generation.100  
Political parties were allowed in the American zone as early as August 1945, and by the 
late fall of 1945, Clay began withdrawal of military government detachments from rural 
areas where the first elections were to be held.  In September, the military government’s 
stated policy was “not to govern the German people but to control and supervise them 
in governing themselves.”101   
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 The following month, Clay established the so-called Laenderrat, comprised of 
representatives from the three U.S. German states.  The purpose of the Laenderrat was 
to serve as a Council of the American appointed Minister-Presidents in the U.S. zone.  It 
had the power to recommend, if not promulgate, legislation that the U.S. military 
government would enact. 102  It rapidly became a powerful body within the U.S. zone, so 
much in fact that many in Bavaria, the most independent of the districts, felt that the 
Laenderrat had too much authority and operated too much as an autonomous 
government.103  Clay also pushed toward a consolidation of German authority, at least 
economic authority, for both the U.S. and British zones—a process that took longer to 
accomplish, but which ultimately resulted in the creation of the so-called U.S.-U.K. 
Bizone in mid-1947, which fused economic agencies in the two zones and which 
contributed significantly both to German independence from the two occupying powers, 
as well as a separate western German governmental identity, culminating in the 
establishment of a West German constitution and state in 1949.104   
  Clay also publically directed in October for Germans to prepare election codes to 
set the stage for elections in early 1946.  As officially stated, the American goal was, by 
the spring of 1946, to contact only German governmental structures at the Land level, 
with almost complete reliance on the Germans themselves to conduct governmental 
functions below that level.105 Guidance for the elections in the U.S. zone was published 
in November 1945.  It stated that all Gemeiden elections (those towns with less than 
50,000) take place by the end of January 1946.  Those voters who joined the Nazi party 
prior to May 1, 1937 were excluded, as were all active members who jointed thereafter, 
as well as known Nazi sympathizers and collaborators.106  
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Following a steady pattern of elections without incident throughout the U.S. zone, by 
the summer of 1946, Germans were electing Land Assemblies, with the primary 
responsibility for the elections resting upon the German Land and local government 
officials themselves.  Military government officials were explicitly told to maintain a 
hands-off policy towards the elections, other than to ensure their honesty and 
orderliness.107  The results for the American military government officials were 
gratifying.  In the Gemeinde elections, for example, 87% of the eligible population voted, 
and 76% of the military government appointees remained in office.108 
Some critics of the American occupation argue such swiftness actually meant that 
true grass roots movements never had the ability to flourish.  Arthur Kahn, who served 
in military government during the period, points out that especially in Bavaria, this 
effectively meant the short-circuiting actual democratic processes, since urban centers 
were where embryonic political parties were actually located and where, conversely, 
reaction intimidation was prevalent.109   But whatever the merits of such a critique, the 
return to German authority was driven as much, if not more, by the on-ground policy of 
the American military governor, as by long-range planning by U.S. policymakers in 
Washington.  The return to power of German authorities was entirely consistent with 
U.S. military government doctrine, overriding social transformation efforts for 
democratization and denazification.  Indeed, the very structure of the occupation 
governance could not have sustained such long-lasting social projects.   
That such a gap existed between strategy at policymaking levels and execution at 
military/operational levels was indeed inherent in the military-political divide that 
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characterized American strategy during World War II.  George Kennan, with whom Clay 
disagreed so strongly, pointed this out lecturing at Grinnell College in 1950: 
We are a nation which has no traditional concepts of military strategy or of the place 
of military power in the structure of our national life.  … We have never had the 
tradition of maintaining standing armies in peacetime.  We have never learned how 
to fit that practice in with the other habits and needs of our society in point of 
education, civic training, and manpower use.  Even worse than that, we have not 
been able to find any very rational way to relate to the other processes of our 
society the industrial and financial effort required to maintain a great armed forces 
establishment in what is nominally a time of peace.110   
 
Kennan was correct: there was no methodology, no system in place at the time, and, 
perhaps more importantly, no mindset that provided for a postwar governance model 
that could have promulgated U.S. long-range policy in Germany.  Such long-range 
policy itself had been subordinated to military goals, and logically and inevitably, a 
military postwar governance model executed those goals.       
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Chapter 7 - Planning and Implementing Military Government 
in Austria, 1943-1946 
Far less studied than the more famous occupations of Germany, Japan, and even 
Korea, the American occupation in Austria, especially during 1945-46, proved highly 
important for the future of the country.  What is most interesting is while the American 
military government focused on short-range military objectives and goals, it nonetheless 
contributed to the very long-term success of the occupation.  Indeed, given that Austria 
was the only divided nation that would ultimately be unified and neutralized during the 
Cold War, the American military government in Austria oversaw perhaps the most 
successful of all of America’s postwar occupations.  This ultimate outcome was not 
exclusively dependent upon a successful occupation:  Austria was nowhere near as 
important as Germany was to the U.S. or U.S.S.R. in Cold War geopolitics, and 
therefore neither nation had as much invested in Austria falling into its respective 
sphere of influence.  Nonetheless, upon close analysis, what becomes evidently clear 
was that postwar Austria most resembled what American military government doctrine 
asserted was the standard “template” for occupations: a relatively placid population, and 
a governmental structure, in Austria’s case, a provisional government, that was allowed 
to come to power soon in the course of the occupation, and that thereby quickly took 
over the majority of governmental functions in the country.  The occupation’s relative 
success was not entirely a matter of serendipity.  In particular, General Mark Clark’s 
insistence on recognizing the provisional government of Karl Renner was essential to 
that success.  Nonetheless, the occupation offered the fewest deviations from past 
practice and doctrine: as such, power was returned to the Austrian people relatively 
soon, and the fact that a unified Austrian government existed proved effective in 
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preventing Cold War partition of the country—resulting in all the Allied powers leaving 
the country in 1955, and effectively leaving Austria a neutralized state.         
Initial Strategic Considerations  
The basis for the Allied occupation of Austria was the Moscow Declaration of 1943, 
which stated that the policy for its occupation would differ significantly from Germany.  
Austria would be treated not as a conquered country, but as a liberated one.  Indeed, 
the Allies considered Austria the first free country to fall victim to Hitler’s aggression.1 It 
was to be separated from Germany and made into a viable and independent state.2  As 
a result, the Allies placed Austria in a different light.   It was to be rehabilitated and 
economically restored.  The Allies would enter into a peace treaty granting Austria 
sovereignty, and they generally accepted that occupation forces would eventually be 
withdrawn.3     The European Advisory Commission, created at the same Moscow 
Conference, was tasked to prepare initial plans for postwar Austria, though as with 
Germany, its charter was fundamentally limited.  Unlike Germany, however, there was 
no formal surrender document drafted.4 
The European Advisory Commission did not begin organized planning until early 
1944 in London.  It eventually determined that, like Germany, the Allies would occupy 
Austria using zonal occupation structure, with a respective nation in a demarcated area, 
and an overarching control council machinery that would pronounce policies that each 
respective zonal commander would then implement.   While this choice of governance 
mechanisms was predictable, it was not necessarily ideal.  In Germany, where the need 
to break up the aggressive German militarist state was seen as paramount, zonal 
division seemed logical.  In Austria, on the other hand, the goal was to reinvigorate a 
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state that had been swallowed up by Hitler’s Reich.  Austria’s absorption into Germany 
had dissolved the Austrian governmental system entirely—the nation no longer existed, 
and the Nazi government had reconfigured the local governmental structure as well, 
leaving only seven old provinces that received orders from Berlin.5 
Where the zones of occupation would be, and which nation would have control in 
them, was primarily the work of British planners at the European Advisory Commission.  
The British planners primarily relied upon the logic of troop movements into central 
Europe, and they demarcated zones approximately where the nations’ armies moved 
into the country.  The British marked the Austrian region bordering Bavaria (and in 
Germany, southwest Germany, to include Bavaria) as the future U.S. zone.  But both 
the President and the Joint Chiefs were reluctant to undertake a U.S. occupation of 
Austria at all, or even to participate in a possible control council structure, because they 
feared that doing so might conflict with military objectives.  Throughout much of 1944, 
FDR had been adamant about having the U.S. occupy the northwest of Germany, 
primarily so U.S. forces could readily redeploy to the Pacific for the expected invasion of 
Japan.  Additionally, there was concern, particularly among the American Joint Chiefs, 
that having a U.S. zone in Austria was a British-led maneuver to entangle America in 
traditional great power rivalries in the Balkans—and thus to enmesh them in the sort of 
long-term political struggles American military leaders deliberately sought to avoid.6  
Only after a year long struggle with the President and the Joint Chiefs did Ambassador 
John Winant, the American representative at the Commission, finally get an agreement 
by the U.S. to take a zone.  But this was only conditions demanded by the Joint Chiefs 
were met, primarily about troop strengths, but also because assurances were met 
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regarding U.S. access to and from Vienna.  Even more importantly, the United States 
would control the Bremen and Bremerhaven enclave in northwest Germany in order to 
enable American troops to be shipped to the Pacific.7     
Yet beyond discussions of zonal boundaries, there was little in-depth planning done 
by the U.S. at the civilian high policy level for the Austrian occupation.  This was at least 
partially because there was no government in exile to work with to establish a plan of 
restoration.  But it was also due to the lack of direction and the reluctance of FDR and 
the President to become invested in Austrian occupation in any significant way.8  
General Mark Clark, who was to serve as the American High Commissioner from 1945 
to 1947, was particularly emphatic about the lack of detailed postwar guidance provided 
to him by civilian superiors.   He contrasted how British military leaders seemed to be 
aware of larger political purposes:  “In America, no such thing at all.  Never did I know in 
particular what the objective of my country was except to win the war or what their 
thinking would be on a subject of that kind.”9  Clark noted that while given the objective 
to “fight war, defeat the enemy, and so forth…you don’t know what the big political 
questions are.”  Clark came into the job admittedly not up to date on the larger issues 
regarding either the German or Austrian occupation. 10   The zonal divisions also 
seemed to Clark careless and poorly chosen.  Reflecting back especially on the food 
shortages during the occupation’s early years, he noted that whereas the Soviets 
“carved Austria up…in such a manner that they got the grain basket where all the food 
[was] produced,” the United States was “perfectly happy to get the ski area, and the 
Chamois hunting and the fishing and things of that kind.”11   
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What was notable to American military leaders were the apparent political purposes 
and designs of the other Allies, who seemed to have a much clearer idea of their 
purpose.  Clark himself stated that the British commanders, at least down to the army 
and army group level, knew “exactly what their government was thinking” in order for 
them to have a “unified position.”12   The Soviets also seemed to have purposeful long-
range designs for Austria.  In a letter from future Austrian political advisor John Erhardt 
to General McNarney, then-commander of U.S. Mediterranean forces (from which was 
expected to come the occupying forces), Erhardt relied on an April 1945 article in 
Pravda in discussing what was thought to be Soviet views on Austria.  According to 
Erhardt, these views were “guided largely by a desire to prevent Austria from being 
used by a Central European or Western European structure in opposition to Soviet 
aims.”  The Soviets, in Erhardt’s words, felt that “Austria should be a bulwark of the East 
against the West.”13  
The uncertainty and confusion manifested by these leaders, and also by American 
military planners who would set up the operational plans for the occupation, revealed 
that in a very real and ironic way, they were caught in a circumstance aided and abetted 
by the Army’s own institutional thinking.  Such military leaders and planners wanted 
more definitive guidance, and lamented the fact that Allies appeared to move with 
greater purpose.  But the planning agency that had been established to provide 
precisely such long-range planning, the European Advisory Commission, had been 
rendered powerless precisely because American strategists, especially the President 
and the Joint Chiefs, did not want the Commission dictating so-called “military 
objectives” and thus reduced to setting up zonal boundaries and general surrender 
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terms.  And there was no other coordinating body outside the War Department with the 
particular ability of the Civil Affairs Division to organize and implement either postwar 
governance policy or administration.  The American military planners at the operational 
level in Europe would therefore have to improvise and come up with much policy on 
their own.    
U.S. Military Planning 
Even without higher specific guidance, U.S. military planning for the Austrian 
occupation began in 1944, though it came from disparate sources.  The Civil Affairs 
Division provided overall direction and oversight.  Primary direction in the European 
theater came from the G-5 at the Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force 
(SHAEF) under Eisenhower.   Other guidance also came from a G-5 group in the U.S. 
Army headquarters in Italy and from a team established to determine requirements 
specifically for Vienna.  Planners were aware, as they began their tasks, that progress 
was likely to be slow and hesitant.  There were open questions, to include the question 
of the extent of Russian participation in military government.14  Another complicating 
factor was that in determining the direction of Austrian postwar policy, there was an 
inherent distinction between the hostility and post-hostility phases of the Austrian 
occupation.  The European Advisory Commission was by its charter only responsible for 
Austrian occupation policy after the fighting stopped occurred: to have been empowered 
to determine policy while fighting continued would be an encroachment on battlefield 
prerogatives of commanders, in which military necessity would require the commanders 
have the ability to make decisions to ensure complete victory.  Military planners were 
aware that the distinction could lead to disconnection, and the answer was for the 
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military planners themselves to come up with an interim political directive to cross the 
divide between hostilities and post hostilities, which they did, and which they then sent 
up to the European Advisory Commission for acceptance in May 1944.15  
As for what exactly the machinery of military government would look like, the 
planners could only speculate.  At least in the spring of 1944, what was contemplated 
was a fully integrated and joint military government, in which American, Soviet, and 
British participation was full and equal at a national headquarters, one-third each, and 
with such a governmental structure running downward into the local level as well, with 
one Gau (the name for province) being headed by some combination of Allied officers.16 
The type of military government which eventually did occur—that of zonal division along 
national lines—was seen as possibly problematic, with language and administrative 
problems that could form an “effective barrier towards the complete unification of all 
seven Gaue, which is the primary purpose of the establishment of a Military 
Government separate from that of Germany.”17  
While awaiting final guidance from higher authority, the pronouncements of the 
Moscow Declaration could provide at least a starting point to determine how to proceed 
with the Austrian occupation.  The overarching design of such plans was likely to be 
premised on the complete defeat of Germany.  With this occurring, Austria’s people 
could be, using the Moscow Declaration’s term, “liberated” from Nazi domination, along 
with Austria’s territories and institutions, and Austria’s government, economy, and 
society would all be disentangled from Germany.  Denazification would also occur, with 
Nazi racial laws repealed, Nazi political activity suspended, and Nazi public officials 
removed.18  
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Beyond this, however, it was difficult to do more specific planning.  As of late 
summer, 1944, there was still no clear direction on SHAEF’s Austria occupation plans, 
though there was some thought to occupy Austria with four divisions from the Allied 
Command in the Mediterranean if there was a sudden German collapse.19  In late fall, 
1944, some proposed proclamations had been drafted by British planners and 
forwarded to the Combined Civil Affairs Committee for approval.20  The documents 
were similar to proclamations drafted for Germany. Draft Proclamation no. 1 discussed 
destroying German militarism and overthrowing Nazi rule, as with Germany.  It vested 
supreme legislative, judicial, and executive authority in the Supreme Commander of the 
Allied Forces, and the Austrians were to obey all military government orders 
“immediately and without question.”  It further directed that all officials except those 
dismissed or suspended would remain in their posts.21  Regardless of the progress, the 
difficulties in coordinating the efforts and gaining information from these groups slowed 
down planning. As 1944 ended, no American high commissioner had yet been 
designated, and a deployment plan for occupation forces had yet to be developed.22 
What higher purpose that did exist in the wartime planning for Austria largely 
reflected the Army’s doctrinal precepts on military government.  In an exchange 
between Brigadier General Lester Flory, who would be the American commander in 
Vienna, and Major General John Hilldring of the Civil Affairs Division, Hilldring disagreed 
with Flory’s suggested method of establishing military governance.  While Hilldring 
shared Flory’s view that in Austria the centralization of authority in an Allied control 
council was an appropriate objective, he did not believe it could be achieved initially.  
Instead, military government would proceed initially under the total authority of the 
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military commanders of the respective occupied zones, who would operate relatively 
independently of each other.  To have the control machinery be permitted to deal with 
all problems outright was to Hilldring an “unfortunate attempt to jump directly into the 
last phase of operations.”23  What was preferably was a model that allowed the military 
commanders the ability to reempower the civilian authorities of the zones that they were 
in and thus have a “new national administration and government bubble up form the 
roots as a creature of the Austrian people themselves.”   
As events unfolded, Hilldring’s proposal, which was in fact the kind adopted in the 
U.S. zone in Germany, proved somewhat unnecessary in Austria, given that a national 
leader, Karl Renner, was already on the scene and apparently willing to take 
responsibility for governance as soon as the Allies arrived.   But Hilldring’s proposal 
nonetheless revealed specifically the nature of American military government in Austria, 
very much in keeping with the standard doctrinal template for an occupation.  In 
Hilldring’s proposal, the total authority of the military governor in his respective zone 
was absolute.  He could thus administer as required by military necessity.  Just as 
importantly, he could and should seek the re-empowerment of civilians under his control 
as soon as he determined it was militarily practicable, even though it appeared to run 
contrary, as Flory believed, to the particular problem of re-empowering Austrian 
government.  In Hilldring’s view, the early return to power by civilian authorities, at the 
local level, was a greater imperative than centralized Allied Control Council authority 
itself, which presumably formed the strategic basis of the Allied occupation.       
The major guidance from the strategic level finally came in February 1945, with the 
British-driven proposal to divide the country into four zones of occupation and with 
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Vienna setting up as a jointly occupied city.  The U.S. Joint Chiefs, having been 
forwarded the proposal, finally approved, and their approval of the zonal structure 
clearly illustrated the American strategic mindset during the war.    The zonal area given 
to the Americans would be contiguous to Bavaria, which would allow any U.S. forces in 
Austria easy passage into Germany, especially since any such troops might eventually 
have to move further north to the U.S. controlled enclave in Bremen in order to be 
transported to the Pacific.  With this zone secured, the Joint Chiefs were satisfied that 
the occupation was militarily feasible and in accordance with wartime objectives.24   
The April 1945 Handbook for Military Government in Austria, published by Allied 
Force Headquarters, also illustrated how those objectives framed the occupation’s 
goals.  It was a coalition product, based on policy provided by the Combined Chiefs of 
Staff and intended for use by either U.S. or U.K. forces.  Meant for use by military 
government officers in the field it was the most comprehensive operational document on 
Austrian occupation.  The Handbook intended to serve as a bridge to eventual postwar 
governance, in its words, to “prepare the way for implementing the Moscow 
Conference.”25   
According to the Handbook, in the interim period while awaiting the higher policy 
guidance to implement the Conference’s Austria Declaration, the concept of military 
necessity would prevail: “Considerations of military necessity or practicability are in 
every instance over-riding and will be treated accordingly in the application of this 
handbook.”26  Accordingly, the authority of the local military commander would be 
absolute.  There would be “strict, complete, and immediate obedience” exacted for all 
orders given, and all functions would be subordinated to the military aim of victory.  The 
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“first duty” was “assistance in the prosecution of the war by enabling the high command 
to reduce garrison troops for tactical use elsewhere and to provide from the resources 
of the country whatever materials are available to assist in the prosecution of the war.” If 
there were to be economic development provided to Austria, “military requirements 
must come first.”27 
Indeed, much of the document followed many of the precepts set forth in the Army’s 
doctrinal manual, FM 27-5.  Thus while acknowledging that there would be no 
functioning government to which to turn over control, military government would have to 
operate as much as possible through indigenous organizations and to “initiating, 
supervising, and controlling executive work carried out by Austrians at the levels of 
Reichsgaue and below.”28  The extant Gaue likely to be the highest level of function 
Austrian governmental administration, and the occupation would thus be likely operated 
on a zonal basis, with the respective Allied forces enforcing military control exclusively 
in their zones.29  The emphasis would be on always trying to work through Austrians, 
and the military government official’s success would depend “in great part upon the 
degree of co-operation he elicits form the local population.”30  Civil officials not removed 
from their posts would be ordered to remain and to continue to work.31  This would be 
governance, as much as possible, by indirect rule, by supervisory control over the 
existing administrative machinery, though subject to appropriate denazification.   
Denazification, of course, was likewise ultimately governed by the exigencies of 
military operations.  Seeking to eliminate active Nazis and Austrian anti-democrats from 
politics, the Handbook acknowledged that nearly all administrative officials were, at 
least nominally members of the Nazi party.  It would be impossible to intern them all: 
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“This would cause the breakdown of all technical services, such as transportation or 
utilities.” Therefore, key Nazi leaders would be removed, whereas those in subordinate 
positions who were Nazi party members could be employed pending further 
investigation.32  
The final arrangement for the Austria occupation was finally decided in July 1945, 
two months after Germany’s surrender.  The control machinery was remarkably like 
Germany’s.  Austria would be governed by a four-party Allied Council, with each 
occupying power exercising supreme command of occupation forces in his zone, with 
an inter-allied governing authority (called the Kommendatura) jointly governing Vienna.  
The Allied Council would be composed of commissioners, all of whom were military 
commanders (although technically this was not required), and would meet once every 
ten days.33   
The unresolved central problem in the postwar setup lay in two related areas.  The 
first were the primary tasks, which included the enforcement of the Berlin Declaration of 
June 5, 1945 regarding Germany’s defeat; the complete separation of Austria from 
Germany; the establishment of a central Austrian administrative machine; and 
eventually a freely elected Austrian government.  These difficult tasks would have to be 
achieved through a partition structure (now fourfold, since France had an occupation 
zone) of wartime allies that would likely have competing if not contradictory postwar 
goals.  Even more problematic was the authority of the Allied Council vis-à-vis the 
respective occupational zones themselves.  The agreement indicated that “Supreme 
authority…will be exercised jointly, in respect of matters affecting Austria as a whole by 
the Military Commissioners.” 34  At the same time, the commissioners would exercise 
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supreme authority in their respective zones in their capacities as Commanders-in-Chief 
of the forces of occupation furnished by theirs Government.  And while the agreement 
did say that the respective zonal authority was “subject” to the joint authority, that joint 
authority was only extended to matters that affected Austria “as a whole.”35  This 
ambiguity allowed, in other words, for the possibility that the four Allied Commissioners 
would jointly rule Austria, yet if a particular policy might prove contradictory to his 
nation’s postwar goals, the military commander could either attempt to prevent the 
policy from going into effect, or if unsuccessful there, simply fail to implement it in his 
own occupation zone.  The stage, therefore, was seemingly set for an outcome that 
could quite possibly run contradictory to the expressed overarching policy of an 
independent, unified Austria.  
Clark’s postwar directive that he sent to the U.S. military commanders for both the 
U.S. zone and the U.S. district in Vienna had language that was quite consistent with 
the wartime directives and the April 1945 Handbook, which remained applicable.36   Its 
basic objectives, just as the wartime directives, were related primarily to the 
accomplishment of strict enforcement of the Berlin Declaration, which included the 
elimination of Nazism and militarism, the separation of Austria from Germany, and 
eventual self-governance.  The standard practices of military government applied, to 
include establishing courts and the establishment of local administrative governing 
bodies composed of “reliable Austrians.”  The emphasis on early return to Austrian 
sovereignty was prevalent throughout the document.  The commanders were directed to 
permit political activity and organization by democratic groups “[a]t the earliest possible 
moment” and “[t]o the maximum extent possible” to “use Austrian authorities and 
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agencies.”37  As stated in a later military government instruction, military government 
activities were guided by the principle of maximum responsibility placed upon Austrian 
governmental agencies, with the military government providing general supervision and 
advice to such agencies, and there was a preference for local enactments issued by 
responsible Austrian authorities over military government legislation sent directly from 
U.S. officials.38      
American Military Government in Austria      
Allied armies made their way into Austria in the spring of 1945, with Soviet forces 
advancing westward into Vienna and surrounding areas (units from the Second and 
Third Soviet – (UK) Fronts), the Americans coming southward from Bavaria (units from 
the 12th Army Group), a Franco-American Army force eastward (the 6th Army Group), 
and British Forces coming northward from Italy (units from the 15th Army Group).  The 
actual advances of units largely confirmed planners’ expectations as to where Allied 
forces would enter into the country.  Accordingly, zonal occupations conformed to the 
Allied troop placements in Austria (figures 10 and 11 below). 
The man who would serve as the U.S. High Commissioner was a high ranking field 
commander, General Mark W. Clark.  Clark had held key positions throughout the war, 
serving initially as Eisenhower’s deputy in the North African campaign, where he also 
conducted a noteworthy secret mission by submarine to win over French forces to the 
Allied side.  Later he commanded the U.S. Fifth Army in Italy, and later the 15th Army 
Group (a U.S./U.K. command) there as well, commanding forces that fought up the 
Italian peninsula in a series of bloody engagements.  His command had sometimes 
been controversial, especially his actions during the Battle of Monte Cassino, and his 
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Allied Routes of Penetration into Austria39 
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Austrian Zones of Occupation40 
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handling of the deployment of the 36th “Texas” Division led to a postwar congressional 
inquiry.  While his battlefield tactics were sometimes questioned, he was nonetheless 
regarded by both Marshall and Eisenhower, who was a personal friend, as an excellent 
organizer, and as highly competent, intelligent, and forthright, even to the point of 
abrasiveness.  Having served as a key member of a coalition staff and later commander 
of a coalition force, he had wide experience in international matters.  Furthermore, he 
had dealt extensively with civil affairs matters in North Africa and Italy and he had 
integrated military government units and G-5 staffs into his command.41   
Despite his experience in political-civil matters, Clark neither sought nor expected 
the job as U.S. High Commissioner.  He had speculated that he might be sent to the 
Pacific theater after the surrender of German forces near the Italian-Austrian frontier.  
He later said that his appointment to the position came as a “complete shock,” noting 
further that he had no idea where the U.S. troops that would occupy Austria would come 
from, and what arrangements had been made with the Soviet Union in particular.42  His 
lack of preparation notwithstanding, Clark was a quick study.  His adept handling of 
many of the more complex issues, and prominently, his efforts in  preventing Austrians 
in the U.S. zone from starving as well as offering to provide food to others outside the 
U.S. zone, won him general support from the Austrians themselves.43 
Clark’s relationship with the Soviet Union, especially during the early period of the 
occupation, was far more nuanced than his later pronounced views would lead one to 
believe.44  He would later write that he began dealing with the Soviets “confident that I 
would be able to get along with them even though others failed.”45  Though he never 
built up the deep friendship that apparently existed between Eisenhower and Zhukov, 
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his relations during 1945 and early-to-mid 1946 did not indicate strong anti-Soviet 
sentiment.46 Clark had been concerned about Soviet influence in Austria during the 
early months of the occupation, as evidenced by his concerns expressed to the Head of 
the Provisional Austrian Government, Karl Renner, about the presence of Communist 
party members in Renner’s Cabinet.47  At the same time, he was willing to accept them, 
given Renner’s reassurances.  Furthermore, his desk diary entries, which provide his 
message traffic to the Joint Chiefs and other officials, reveal a consistent pattern of real 
and attempted amicable relations with the Soviet officials in Austria during the period.  
Occasionally, he sided with the Soviets against other occupiers in the so-called 
“Western bloc,” as he did when he agreed with them and disagreed with the British over 
the supervision of the November 1945 Austrian elections, with the British wanting a 
much closer supervision over the elections than the U.S. or U.S.S.R. thought was 
necessary.48  In that same month, Clark sent a message to Eisenhower noting the 
positive results that he had in conversations with the commander of the Soviet zone, 
Marshal Ivan Konev, who was much concerned about the negative treatment that Soviet 
policies were receiving in the American press.  Clark went on to ask Eisenhower 
whether it would not be a good idea if his Public Relations Bureau collected favorable 
articles on Soviet-American relations and have them sent to him.49  And in an April 6, 
1946 message to the Joint Chiefs, Clark noted that he had recently had dinner with 
Konev and that the evening was “most pleasant and extreme friendship prevailed,” and 
going on to say that he actually detected a “pronounced improvement in [Konev’s and 
his staff’s] attitude.”50 
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With this apparent sense of friendship, Clark and the other Allied Commanders 
began the Austrian occupation, according to an official account, in a spirit of harmony, 
unanimity and “concrete accomplishment.”   Throughout 1945 and most of 1946, it 
appeared as if most of the serious differences of opinion were indeed resolved by four 
party agreement, culminating in the Control Agreement that would be signed on June 
28, 1946, and which served as the primary directive for the remainder of the 
occupation.51  The Allies all apparently agreed on fundamental principles, primarily that 
at some point after a competent and independent Austrian government was established, 
all four powers would gradually withdraw their respective forces.52   
While the early meetings were not as harmonious as the above official account 
relates, there were quite often agreements.  Even when there were not, Clark not only 
seemed to get along with his Soviet counterpart Konev but acknowledged that Konev 
himself often seemed powerless to act, the Soviet general apparently being unable to 
take action without having received instructions from Moscow.53  Clark even termed his 
early dealings as a form of “appeasement,” noting, “We gave in often.”54 Not all of the 
obstruction—sometimes not even the most significant obstruction—came from the 
Soviets.  Perhaps the most important initial impediment to the Allied Council meeting 
came from the British commander, who refused to have any formal meeting of the 
Council until there was a resolution on food issue that the British government thought 
the Soviets were not pursuing.  Clark recommended to the War Department, which 
agreed, that it was appropriate to pressure the Commander, General McCreery, to 
meet.55 
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Nonetheless, the above friction was indicative of some of the larger problems that 
would threaten to cause serious disruptions in the four-power occupation.  The Soviets, 
as Konev had noted to Clark, were suspicious of the Western Allies forming a bloc, and 
they were also in a considerably different position than in control councils in other 
central European countries: Allied Control Commissions in Rumania, Bulgaria, and 
Hungary were totally Soviet-dominated, primarily because there were no Western 
occupation forces in separate zones.  Accustomed to dominating such commissions, in 
Austria they often felt outnumbered and in an inferior bargaining position.56 
As for Soviet military government, the opinions on it varied.  On the hand, one 
American official commented on the lack of military government organizational 
structure.  Though there were political commissars, there was nothing remotely 
comparable to a G-5 in the Soviet command structure, and certainly there was no 
control mechanism as sophisticated as the American military government apparatus, 
with its numerous specialists carefully monitoring Austrian government officials at all 
levels.57  As one American official noted during his visit to Vienna, the Soviets made 
little attempt to control or supervise the local governments.58   On the other hand, 
another U.S. official noted that U.S.S.R. control seemed firm and effective and that the 
commandants of various districts seemed hardworking, able, and efficient.59   
Regardless whether the officials were competent and hardworking, there was 
simply no way, given the lack of command and control structures, the Soviet command 
could monitor and supervise the Austrians or the occupying forces, and there was little 
doubt that the Austrian people themselves viewed the Soviet occupation as anything but 
benign.  U.S. military government officials heard numerous stories of rape and 
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mistreatment: one U.S. official was apparently told by a retired Austrian general that his 
invalid 64 year old wife had been raped four times by Soviet soldiers.60   While rape and 
mistreatment occurred in the U.S. zone, and indeed throughout the western zones, such 
crimes occurred far less often than in the Soviet zone.61  The abuse by Soviet soldiers 
compounded a problem of perceived cultural collision: Americans and Austrian 
accounts alike referenced perceived savage and backward “Asiatic” soldiers given to 
brawling, drunkenness, living in filth and squalor.  Particularly in Vienna—in which the 
Viennese could see differences from one zone to the other—the Soviets were viewed 
as cultural inferiors incapable of understanding the sophisticated, refined city that they 
had conquered.62 
The contrast to the Americans, at least in their relative benignity, and in their 
decided greater ability to provide material necessities, was pronounced.   U.S. 
occupying forces and U.S. occupation policy benefited significantly from this contrast in 
the eyes of Austrians.  When the Americans first arrived in their zone of occupation in 
late May, the situation was by all accounts chaotic, with over 750,000 displaced 
persons, 200,000 refugees, and schools and courts closed down.  But by the end of 
June, the situation had dramatically improved.  Most Austrians were compliant and 
grateful to receive American-provided foodstuffs, and by early August, the caloric intake 
of Austrians in the American zone had gone from 700 to 1300 calories per day.63     
The Austrians noted that initial postwar food relief was provided primarily from U.S. 
warehouses.64  The very abundance of the United States, and its apparent ability to 
provide Austrians with the basic necessities of life, provided a significant comparative 
advantage to the United States occupiers.  Though the U.S. zone was not primarily 
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agricultural but mountainous, the Austrians in the zone received the daily ration of 1550 
calories as prescribed by the Allied Control Council as long as the Americans controlled 
the food distribution.  In the French zone, the 1550 caloric ration could only be 
maintained until March 1946, and in the Soviet zone, the ration varied throughout the 
early occupation years from around 800 to 1200 calories a day.  In fact, when the 
United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Agency began to distribute food, per Allied 
Control Council direction, throughout all of Austria, the rate in the U.S. zone actually 
decreased to 1200 calories per day.65  This apparent ability to provide may have 
accounted for the general level of confidence Austrians felt—or at least as perceived by 
the American occupiers themselves—in the United States’ ability to materially improve 
their situation.  Even in the first months of the occupation, when hunger was apparently 
rampant, Clark believed that Austrians were confident in U.S. ability to improve 
materially their situation.66   
Both the reality and perception of American abundance seemed to pay off in helping 
maintain a remarkably placid occupation.    And though many Austrians felt either the 
“sting of American arrogance or the shallowness of U.S. consumer democracy,” in a 
significant way, the cultural superiority many Austrians felt over the Americans may 
have worked as a rationalizing mechanism.  In a series of interview of some 60 
Salzburg citizens who lived through the occupation, few interviewees questioned the 
right of the Americans and other occupiers to take control of their affairs, though many 
provided comments that clearly showed that they viewed Austrian culture as superior to 
that of the conquerors.67  
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The American occupiers themselves felt the benefits of occupying what was for the 
most part a compliant population in some of the most beautiful surroundings in all of 
Europe.  Clark had disdainfully noted that while the Soviets got Vienna and the 
industrial hub of Austria, the U.S. got the picture-book provinces.  But to the U.S. 
military government officials, such surroundings were idyllic.  Despite the effort in 
getting basic governmental functions established, and even occasional acts of 
sabotage, Americans quite often appeared to be enjoying themselves.  Colonel Clifton 
Lisle, who commanded military government detachments in the vicinity in the spring and 
summer of 1945, remarked on the “clearly enchanted locale, despite the chaos and 
destruction,” and that alpine Austria was “truly a magic place,” with “unbelievably 
beautiful” mountains.68  Even more revealing were the comments of Donald and 
Florentine Whitnah, who both served in military government positions in Salzburg.  At 
times, in their account, the Austrian occupation seems fully enjoyable and pleasant.  
They noted that by the summer of 1945, a limited version of the annual Salzburg festival 
was held with a concert by the Mozarteum Orchestra provided first for Americans and 
later to the Austrians.69  By September of that year, Donald Whitnah wrote home: “Here 
we are in Salzburg situated in nifty, modern, well heated apartment houses…with the 
snow-capped Bavarian Alps on three sides… .  We have civilian help for our kitchen, 
cleaning of rooms and clothes.”70   
Indeed, the conditions in Austria were so favorable to the American occupiers that 
by the end of August 1945, Clark wrote to Eisenhower stating that he was “in 
wholehearted agreement” with a plan that would allow groups of enlisted men to travel 
“under their own supervision to points of their own choosing within our area.”  He began 
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sending out groups of ten, and each group was free to choose its own itinerary, 
provided its own transportation, gasoline, and necessary rations and camping 
equipment.  The only restriction Clark made was to avoid entry into the Russian zone.71  
By January 1946, Clark felt sufficiently comfortable enough to survey married officers, 
non-commissioned officers, and civilians in the occupation force regarding their desire 
to have their spouses and children come to Austria to live with them in exchange for an 
additional year of occupation service.  Clark felt that the situation in Austria “was 
different” than in other parts of the European theater and that greater numbers of 
dependents could come to the country, and that they could be housed in existing 
buildings without additional requisitioning.  The results of the survey were strongly 
positive.72 
The relative placidity of the occupation facilitated with ease the transition to the so-
called territorial model of military government, as envisioned in FM 27-5.  As the 
occupation progressed, Hilldring expressed to Clark the clear preference—in 
accordance with the doctrinal model—for a separation of military government from 
tactical personnel, the so-called “territorial model,” as soon as was practicable.  
According to Hilldring, “Such clear separation will facilitate transition to civilian control 
without confusion at whatever time may later be designated.”73   Accordingly, by April 
1946, U.S. military government followed the territorial model, separating the military 
government headquarters and detachments from the tactical units in the zone with little 
to no difficulty.  Specifically, while the Commanding General of the 42d Infantry Division 
would be the actual commander of all forces in the U.S. zone that contained Land 
Salzburg and Land Upper Austria, below him, military government authority separated 
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and ran to the Chief Military Government Officer, and then to the respective 
commanders of military government detachments, which were “completely separate 
from all other military organizations or staffs.”74  Tactical commanders still had 
responsibility for disarming and demobilizing German armed forces and handling 
prisoners of war, but were directed to deal with Austrian civilian authorities only through 
military government channels except in emergencies.75   
The American Occupation and the Recognition of the Renner Government 
During the Austrian occupation, it was commonly acknowledged that the central 
impediment to Austrian recovery and autonomy was in the “abnormal position in which 
Austria was put in by Allied occupation and diplomacy.”76  The occupational structure 
directly interfered with the ability of Austria to gain any economic momentum.  Military 
government structures impeded centralization of Austrian central government, which in 
turn caused problems in the free flow of internal and external trade.  As stated in Joint 
Chiefs of Staff Directive 1369/2, as soon as Nazi and Fascist governmental influences 
had been eliminated from public offices, a governing body should be established that 
would allow for the “nationwide administrative and judicial machinery as may be 
required to facilitate the uniform execution of its policy throughout Austria.”77  
U.S. military government greatly benefited from the fact that, prior even to the arrival 
of Western troops, Karl Renner stepped forward and claimed authority to lead a 
provisional government prior to the election of a popular one.  Renner had been 
Chancellor from 1918-1920 and was the last president of the Austrian Parliament.  He 
was a confirmed socialist who had had personal contacts with both Lenin and Trotsky, 
and he had kept himself in relative obscurity in Lower Austria following the Anschluss.  
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In April 1945, as the Soviets swept into eastern Austria and Vienna, he presented his 
credentials to Marshal Tolbukhin, whose armies had conquered Vienna, and ingratiated 
himself to the Soviet commander by stating that “The special trust of the Austrian 
working class in the Soviet Republic has become boundless,” he offered a provisional 
government that would freely allow Communists in his cabinet.78  The Soviets, in a 
move that they would later regret, cautiously took up Renner’s offer and accepted him 
and his Cabinet as able to speak for Austria within the Soviet zone.  Renner for his part 
appointed three Communists to his Cabinet, to include Karl Honner as Minister of the 
Interior, a position that would ostensibly control the incipient Austrian police force.79  
Many Western Allies viewed Renner with skepticism, if not outright suspicion.  The 
quick Soviet acceptance of his government, his clear socialist affiliation, and his 
appointment of Communists to his cabinet gave Western leaders pause.  But Renner 
was a capable and shrewd politician, and his Cabinet appointments and statements 
praising the U.S.S.R. were calibrated to get the acceptance of one side of the Western 
alliance early, prior even to surrender, while wartime goals were still overriding and 
while there was still an alliance.  His next, equally critical task was to win acceptance 
from the West, especially the United States of extending, if not outright recognizing his 
provisional government for all of Austria. 
This was by no means assured.  The U.K. especially seemed strongly opposed.  At 
an Allied Council meeting on September 11th, 1945, the British representative strongly 
objected to extending Renner’s government throughout all of Austria, wary of Renner’s 
apparent communist leanings.80  Renner, however, was supported by the United States, 
and most importantly, by Clark, which was particularly noteworthy given Clark’s later 
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hardline anti-Communist reputation.  Throughout September, Clark and Renner met and 
had multiple exchanges on Renner’s plans for Austria, and his commitment to a 
Western-style system of government.  Early in the month, Renner drafted a series of 
questions, to which he prepared answers, which were then forwarded to Clark.  In the 
questions and answers provided, Renner plainly set forth the case for an Austrian 
provisional government, with the eventual goal of an autonomous and independent 
state.  When asked whether the system of zonal occupation was adversely affecting 
Austrian life, Renner noted that while the four “world-powers” were preoccupied with 
larger affairs and perhaps lacking sufficient time and attention to deal with Austria’s, the 
damages suffered by occupation were “enormous and not amendable any more.”  
Goods and services could not be moved readily; raw materials had to be exported in 
order to buy bread to prevent starvation.  And in response to any claim that the Renner 
government might be too acquiescent to the U.S.S.R., Renner noted that, “three of the 
four powers have seemingly decided not lend us an ear… .  If perhaps, they think to 
have reason to complain about one-sided leanings of our Government, they alone are to 
be blamed… .”81  Furthermore, Renner stressed any fears about a Communist 
takeover, given that party member Karl Honner was Minister of Interior (and in charge of 
police) were misplaced.  Renner said that Honner was trustworthy, and, at any rate, the 
Communists were not favored by the Austrian people.  Establishing a provisional 
government would provide the administrative machinery for an early election which 
would “clear the political solution” and would ensure that the rightward leaning People’s 
Party and Renner’s Socialist Party would “remain the only two big parties as 
heretofore.”82 
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Renner indeed had met with Clark before the September 11 Allied Council Meeting 
and personally assured him of his anti-Communist credentials.  On the day before that 
meeting, Clark sent a long message to the Joint Chiefs that set out the case for 
supporting Renner’s provisional government as a way to return to power quickly an 
effective Austrian government.  For Clark, there was agreement among the powers in 
establishing an Austrian central administrative machine except for the “possible 
exception” of the British.  He further added that the other powers and the Austrian 
people considered such administrative machinery an urgent necessity.  He then 
provided several reasons to support Renner’s position.  First, and interestingly, he 
proposed support precisely because Renner’s government was made up of Socialist, 
Communist, and People’s Parties members, which were the three democratic political 
groups in Austria.  This cross-representation effectively legitimized Renner’s 
government.  Renner’s government commanded the Austrian population’s confidence 
and sympathy “to as great an extent as a non-elected group can,” and it would be 
acceptable to foreign public opinion.  Renner’s government consisted of “patriotic and 
able men” who were also “free of Nazi taint.”  It had unity in its ranks, its legislative 
record was so far good, had held conference in each province to solicit input, and had a 
suggested date, November 25th, to hold nationwide elections.83   
While there were some arguments against supporting Renner, to include that he 
and his provisional government were “unduly susceptible” to Soviet influence, Clark 
nonetheless supported it:  “the Renner regime in its composition and on its record is 
probably as satisfactory  from all standpoints …[I]t is my considered opinion that the 
United States should agree to extension of the authority of the Renner government 
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throughout Austria providing we can satisfy ourselves that the present police set up will 
permit free elections to be held.”84 
The British continued to resist extension of Renner’s government throughout 
September.  In a September 30 note to the Joint Chiefs, Clark noted that the U.K. 
representatives strongly pushed for a de novo government rather than the existing 
Renner one and to have all new laws of such a government sent to the Allied Council 
for approval.  The British proposed a much tighter supervision over any possible 
government, to include placing a Scotland Yard officer in charge of the Austrian 
police.85   
What were the reasons for Clark’s seeming willing acceptance of the Renner 
government in light of the suspicions of the British?  Here, ironically, a lack of long 
range policy planning worked to Clark’s favor.  After all, there was no long range 
American plan for Austria, and therefore there was not much to be suspicious of, other 
than vague fears that, in the relatively placid Austrian occupation, likely remained 
inchoate.  Undoubtedly, Renner’s own credibility and responsiveness impressed Clark.  
Clark was also keen on reducing the occupation forces in Austria as much as possible.   
The British particularly found this both “irresponsible” and acquiescent in the face of an 
imminent Soviet-Communist threat.86  In November, Clark wrote to the Joint Chiefs 
requesting a steady drawdown from the current strength of 31,000 to 16,000 by July 1, 
1946, though wanting to ensure this occurred as part of an overall multilateral reduction.   
The plan called for only 5000 soldiers from each of the Allies to be in Vienna by 
November 1946, and by then for only 12,500 U.S., 18,500 French, 20,000 British and 
28,000 Soviet soldiers to been the entire country.87  And although he would later 
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complain about the relative ineffectiveness of the United Nations Relief and 
Rehabilitation Agency, Clark nonetheless advocated progressively turning over relief 
efforts to the Agency, corresponding with a steady relinquishment in the Allied Council’s 
authority.88  
At the same time, Clark was also aware, and concerned with, the presence of 
Communists in Renner’s cabinet.  In a conversation he had with Renner on September 
28, he noted Honner’s presence in the cabinet, and he was concerned that Honner 
might have undue influence over the Vienna police chiefs.  Renner replied that he would 
keep Honner.  Removing him would anger the Soviets and would be cause for agitation 
and troublemaking from the Austrian Communists.  He also did tell Clark that most of 
the Vienna chiefs were Communists because the Soviets had appointed them after they 
conquered the city.  Nonetheless, he assured Clark any elections would be open and 
free, and that the election machinery would bypass Honner completely, and that the 
voting monitors would be ninety percent Peoples’ Party and Socialists.89 
Renner’s assertions apparently sufficiently satisfied Clark.  Renner did not get all he 
wanted: the Allied Council granted extension of Renner’s provisional government to all 
of Austria, not full recognition, which he preferred.  But Renner accepted all of Clark’s 
conditions: he continued to acknowledge the Allied Council held supreme authority and 
that it reserved to itself certain governmental functions such as frontier control.  In 
agreeing to all this, Renner closed by noting that he strongly felt the political tug-of-war, 
but between the U.K., not the U.S. and the Soviets.  Clark felt Renner “needed…to lean 
on an objective friend like the United States.”90  No doubt the remark was a deliberate 
attempt at gaining favor, but in light of Allied Council issues throughout mid-to-late 1945, 
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it had a ring of truth.  The more “political” maneuverings of the British were the cause of 
more friction with the Soviets than those of the United States, which more often seemed 
more concerned about both meeting other militarily-related objectives and in genuinely 
seeking some rapprochement with the Soviets. 
The Allied Council granted Renner’s government authority to extend throughout 
Austria on October 20.  After the Council granted Renner extension, he was not above 
attempting to push his authority beyond what the Council deemed appropriate and tried 
to pass laws without referral first to the body.  He made unsuccessful arguments, for 
example, that the Council did not possess a “superveto” over standard, non-political 
legislation.91  But this did not cause serious friction within the Council:  Clark noted 
throughout November that Council relations, especially with the Soviets, remained 
good.92   Furthermore, Renner was generally compliant to the Council’s demands, and 
most importantly, he kept his side of the agreement and organized the governmental 
machinery that would oversee elections at the end of November. 
The elections, held on November, 25th, were for representatives to the Landtage, 
the provincial legislatures, and the Nationalrat, the elected lower house of Austrian 
Parliament, were the first since 1930, with heavy registration and turnout.  The outcome 
proved to satisfy fully the United States, though was bitterly disappointing to the 
Soviets.93  The voters elected 85 People’s Party, 76 Socialists, and only 4 Communists 
to the Nationalrat, and 213 People’s Party, 179 Socialists, and only 15 Communists to 
the Landtage.94  The following month, the Parliament was organized, and Leopold Figl 
of the People’s Party was elected Chancellor, with Renner elected as President.  In 
January, the Allied Council unanimously recommended to their respective governments 
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that the Figl government be recognized as the legitimate government of Austria.95  In 
June 1946, a new Allied Council agreement effectively turned over most its authority to 
the Figl government and crucially stated that unanimous disapproval was required by 
the Council before any law passed by the Parliament could be nullified.96   
The extension of Renner’s authority, the November elections, and the new Allied 
Council agreement in 1946 set the conditions for the ultimate successful outcome of the 
Austrian occupation.97  By June 1946, Secretary of State James Byrnes proposed a 
draft treaty to the Council of Foreign Ministers in Paris that recognized the 
independence of Austria and provided for the withdrawal of occupying troops, with the 
British and French going along, but with the Soviets submitting a counterproposal that 
stated further denazification and other actions were required.98  And indeed there would 
be difficult negotiations as the Cold War fully continued well into the 1950s.  Both the 
Americans and Soviets at varying time expressed reluctance about granting total 
independence and complete withdrawal of occupying forces.  In the 1950s, for example, 
Secretary of State John Foster Dulles was reluctant to grant Austria neutral status 
absent a sufficient Austrian force capable of resisting a Soviet invasion and defeating a 
Communist coup d’etat.99   
But absent total Soviet control, Austria lacked strategic value in and of itself to the 
U.S.S.R.  Indeed, it appears as if the eventual grant of Austrian neutrality originated in 
Moscow.100  The May 1955 Austrian Treaty was indeed part of a larger Cold War 
geopolitical struggle, the Warsaw Pact Treaty had been signed the day before the 
Austrian one, and Moscow’s decision to go along with neutrality may have even been 
part of an last-ditch effort to stop Austrian’s outright absorption into a Western 
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alliance.101  But these machinations took place in light of the fact that Austria had a 
functioning, anti-Communist government in place that was recognized as having 
authority over all of the country, and not simply the western zones, as in Germany, and 
it would be very difficult to attempt to undo what the USSR had explicitly permitted in 
1945.  Austria’s occupation thus ended in 1955 with a peaceful withdrawal of all 
occupying forces, and the nation became, no doubt happily to the Austrians themselves, 
relatively uninvolved in the remainder of the Cold War.  It is hard to quarrel with the 
assessment of political scientist David Edelstein, who judges the Western Allies’ 
occupation of Austria a success and the Soviet occupation a failure.  Vienna, after all, 
was the one city mentioned in Winston Churchill’s famous Iron Curtain speech that fell 
outside of the Soviet orbit during the Cold War.102 
The underlying success of the occupation should be traced back to its first days, 
when military objectives still predominated and when the ideological and political 
construction of the Cold War had not yet occurred.  From the outset, the structure of the 
occupation was militarily focused.  The United States indeed resisted any construction 
that the British offered that did not conform to military objectives.  And the four-power 
zonal configuration, in which each Allied power held supreme authority in its respective 
zone, largely conformed to where the military units of the respective powers were 
positioned at the conclusion of combat operations.  This construction shaped the 
subsequent dynamics of Allied Council dealings.  G-5 SHAEF planners thought the 
division was problematic to attaining ultimate Austrian autonomy and independence.  
While militarily practical, the zonal solution seemed set to cause political failure, and 
indeed it no doubt did slow down Austrian’s ultimate neutralization in 1955. 
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Yet the occupation, from a U.S. perspective, nonetheless succeeded.  Why was this 
so, in light of a configuration that should have led to the partitions that divided Germany 
and Korea?  To understand this, once again, requires an examination of the early period 
of military government.  First, from a U.S. perspective, the Austrian occupation, of any 
conducted after World War II, most resembled that described in the Hunt Report, and 
most resembled the Army’s doctrinal understanding, as set forth in FM 27-5.  In the 
report and doctrine, the American military government presumed a relatively placid 
population and presumed a return to normalcy, particularly in governmental structures, 
as early as possible.  Both these conditions were met in Austria.  The Americans 
conducted an occupation that, while not free of rancor and criminality, was remarkably 
benign, conducted in for the most part in a landscape that was near idyllic.  Despite no 
doubt hard work, accounts of American occupiers showed they found the occupation as 
an enjoyable experience as could be imagined.  Furthermore, that Karl Renner so soon 
stepped forward with a provisional government ready to govern all of Austria satisfied 
the doctrinal premise of early governmental return.  
Indeed, Renner and the Austrian provisional government were the keys to ultimate 
success, for both were palatable, at least initially, to the Soviets, who mistakenly 
thought they could use Renner to gain political advantage in Austria.  Renner shrewdly 
maneuvered into having the Soviets grant his provisional government control over the 
Soviet zone, which then meant the only impediment to achieving central government lay 
with the Western powers.  Ironically, the militarized and relatively apolitical stance of the 
Americans in the early occupation period proved beneficial.  Without the ideological 
hardening of the Cold War, there was a certain ideological and political breathing space 
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in this period between World War II and the early crises of the Cold War for 
compromise, negotiation, and even a relatively amicable relationship with the Soviets.  
More than once, it was the British, the more “politically” minded of the Western powers, 
who blocked or attempted to block Austrian governmental unification.  And Mark Clark 
in particular deserves notice and credit for his adept understanding of the situation in 
1945.  Regardless of his later strong anti-Communism, Clark correctly judged that 
Renner could be trusted and that the U.S. could deal with the Soviets during the early 
period over setting up centralized Austrian governmental machinery.    
It would be a mistake to say that the U.S. military government doctrinal model set 
conditions for ultimate U.S. success in Austria.  Instead, it is more correct to say that 
that model fit well with the conditions in Austria’s particular environment and that the 
American leadership in Austria was astute enough not to hamper the development of 
incipient Austrian self-governance.  In other circumstances, the U.S. military 
government doctrinal model, and U.S. leadership, would fare much differently, as the 
occupation of Korea would reveal. 
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 Chapter 8 - Planning and Implementing Military Government 
in Korea, 1943-1946 
Some historians see the postwar struggles in Korea that resulted in full-scale 
conflict from 1950 to1953 as a product of superpower geopolitical strategic calculation 
at the expense of the desires and needs of the Korean people themselves.  Bruce 
Cumings, for example, notes the confrontational attitudes of the Truman administration, 
which preferred the establishment of boundaries between spheres of influence, and, if 
necessary, the use of shows of military force.1   Yet, as at least the example of Austria 
shows, Cold War confrontation did not inevitably lead to war or to permanent partition in 
occupied territories.  While the attitudes or apparent interests of the superpowers are 
often studied to determine how and why Korea became the Cold War’s first “hot” 
battleground, what is examined less is how American military government during the 
initial phase of occupation influenced the outcome that ultimately resulted in war and 
permanent partition.  The U.S. Army’s military government in Austria helped produce a 
benign outcome in that nation.  But the American occupation of Korea clearly showed 
the limitations of the Army’s occupation methods when confronted with a situation and 
environment both more complex and far more alien than what the Army experienced in 
Germany and Austria.   
Events during the Korean occupation also revealed the disconnection between 
long-term political goals that the American government presumably espoused and the 
military instrument meant to foster those goals, which was military government in 
accordance with American Army doctrinal principles and organization.    The military 
governorship of Korea was meant to be short-lived, but as Cumings points out, even by 
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December 1945, when the U.S. and U.S.S.R. first discussed a long range plan toward 
trusteeship of the country, the occupation already had taken on a momentum that could 
not be reversed—a momentum, that, in Cumings’ view, was far more driven by the 
military governorship in Seoul than in Washington, the latter being, in Cumings’ words, 
“far behind and out of touch.”2       
How this occurred, though was the opposite of Cumings’ assertion that “American 
planners in Washington thought of military occupation as an extension of political policy 
and infantry troops as the agents of policy implementation.”3   Rather, the Army’s 
occupation was an extension of a militarized policy that generally subordinated longer-
range political goals to military objectives.  Indeed, the very ambiguity and uncertainty of 
the long-term political objectives helped guarantee their subordination.  The prevalence 
of this thinking during wartime in turn left the occupation of Korea barely planned at all 
until Japan’s surrender was imminent.  Since Korea’s military value during the war was 
of little consequence, American planners largely ignored the details of its occupation, 
and when the Army began to administer the occupation, the Army’s military government 
model provided the guide and template for the, the occupation’s first, crucial steps.  
Initial Planning 
Japan had occupied Korea since 1905 and had annexed it since 1910.4  The Allied 
powers therefore considered the peninsular nation already to have been occupied and 
under the oppressive yoke of the enemy.  At the Cairo Conference of 1943, Roosevelt, 
Churchill, and Chiang Kai-shek declared:  “The aforesaid three great powers, mindful of 
the enslavement of Korea, are determined that in due course, Korea shall become free 
and independent.”5  The Potsdam Proclamation of July 1945, which stated the terms of 
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Japan’s surrender, reaffirmed the Allies’ apparent commitment to a free and 
autonomous Korea.6   
But the terms and conditions of such diplomatic statements were vague.  There was 
little thought given as to what the Cairo Conference’s phrase “in due course” actually 
meant.  Its conception was likely a product of FDR’s aristocratic background and an 
example of Roosevelt’s confidence that the United States would prevail, whatever 
ambiguities lay within the idea.7  “In due course” very possibly meant to the President 
some period of guardianship under a trusteeship concept such as what the United 
States offered to the Philippines in the 1934 Philippines Independence Act.  At Yalta in 
1945, Roosevelt apparently stated to Stalin that what he had in mind for Korea was a 
trusteeship in which representatives of the U.S.S.R., the U.S. and China would preside, 
and that it might be “twenty or thirty years” before Koreans were fully capable of self-
governance.  Stalin apparently responded that the shorter the trusteeship, the better.8  
Yet many Koreans themselves translated “in due course” quite differently: some 
translated it as either “immediately” or in a period of weeks if not days, and prominent 
politicians established the western oriented, anti-Soviet Korean Provisional Government 
in Chungking under the leadership of Kim Koo and Syngman Rhee, the former having 
unsuccessfully requested that the United States outfit a Korean Army to liberate the 
country in August 1944.9 
Additionally, the Soviet Union was not part of either the Cairo Statement or its 
reaffirmation at Potsdam, because it was at that time not yet at war with Japan.  The 
U.S.S.R. was therefore excluded from any initial discussion and planning, though 
Roosevelt and Stalin clearly expected, as part of the Soviet Union’s eventual declaration 
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of war on Japan, some role for the U.S.S.R. in postwar Korea.10  Such an expectation 
was revealing, for there was an asymmetry of interests in the Korean occupation.  For 
the United States, there was a vague notion of trusteeship to be implemented.  But what 
the only clear postwar goal for the U.S. in Korea was that the Japanese military be 
effectively disarmed and demobilized.  The Soviets, on the other hand, did have 
strategic interests in the country: a small portion of Korea actually bordered the 
U.S.S.R. and the peninsula’s importance to Russia predated the Soviet Union.11  
Instead, American planning for the occupation of Korea operated within a set of 
premises and assumptions that oriented the country’s postwar governance around 
military goals and objectives.  For the most part, there was little detailed attention paid 
to questions of postwar Korean governance from 1943 to 1945.  Japan was the focus of 
attention, and most thought the war would last into 1946 and likely even longer.12  Thus 
there was scarce planning or even thinking about Korea at strategic levels following the 
Cairo Conference.   Indicative of the lack of such thought was a May 1943 conversation 
between Assistant Secretary of State Adolf Berle and Clarence E. Gauss, the 
Ambassador to China.  Discussing the prospects of Korean independence with the 
Ambassador, Berle noted that while the U.S. envisaged an independent Korea, the 
matter of recognition of the Provisional Government of Republic of Korea should “rest in 
abeyance.”13  In May of the following year, in discussion with Secretary of State Hull, 
Ambassador Gauss referred to a conversation he had had with the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs of the Korean Provisional Government, Tjo So-Wang.  Referring to the possibility 
of recognizing the Provisional Government, Gauss noted that he had seen no official 
comment on what the Cairo Conference’s phrase “in due course” meant.  He personally 
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believed that it would come following a “military phase of expelling Japanese from 
Korea…followed by preparation for civil government and in due course 
independence.”14  
A State Department paper produced for the Yalta Conference further revealed how 
vague postwar Korea looked to American diplomats.  The paper envisioned a postwar 
occupation of Korea with a military government.  There would then be some form of 
administration or trusteeship that would be established either under the authority of an 
international organization.  Because the United States and Great Britain had been part 
of the Cairo Declaration’s promise of a establishing a free and independent Korea and 
because China and the Soviet Union were “contiguous to Korea and have had a 
traditional interest in Korean affairs,” the four Allied powers would be prominent 
members of that organization.  The paper discouraged unilateral military occupation.  To 
do so would have “serious political repercussions” in that China and the Soviet Union 
might each be resentful if any other country predominated.  Instead, it proposed a joint 
though not zonal, partitioned administration.15  
The paper mixed vaguely articulated and at times naïve assertions.  It asserted that 
the Koreans would implicitly trust the United States to administer the occupation of 
Korea because of America’s anti-colonial policies, presumably failing to recognize that it 
was President Theodore Roosevelt who brokered the 1905 Russo-Japanese peace 
accord that provided for Japan’s annexation and occupation of Korea.16  It assumed 
that there would be a capable organization of administering the trusteeship between the 
period of military government and Korean independence, though there was no such 
organization yet in existence, and there was little discussion of how long this trusteeship 
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would be.  Lastly, and most importantly, it presumed that the Koreans themselves would 
be willing to accept this arrangement, though the paper did not address why citizens of 
a country with a millenium of autonomous governance would do so.17 
Beyond such speculative work, neither the State nor the War Department 
developed significant, detailed plans.  The Civil Affairs Division did come to the 
conclusion that in Korea, planning for the administration of civil affairs would be a U.S. 
responsibility pending a determination of other nations’ interests, particularly the Soviet 
Union’s.  It was therefore assumed the United States would come to occupy at least a 
significant portion of the country.18  Furthermore, the one key wartime decision made by 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, per the Civil Affairs Division’s recommendation, was that the 
Army would at least initially be responsible for the occupation of Korea, and that 
planning would be integrated into military planning for the defeat of Japan.19  Indeed, 
Korea’s only value to the United States was its linkage to American Japanese wartime 
strategies.  Primarily, it held hundreds of thousands of Japanese troops; it also could be 
used as a possible site for bombing and submarine attacks against the Japanese 
coast.20  The principle reason the Joint Chiefs of Staff wanted the Soviet Union to enter 
the war against Japan was for the Red Army to defeat Japanese armies in both 
Manchuria and Korea.21      
In the absence of any substantive thinking about what postwar Korea would look 
like, the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee contended that the standard military 
government model be followed.  Noting that there was no “agreed United States view as 
to the character of administration of civil affairs in Korea,” the Committee therefore 
recommended a bizonal U.S.-U.S.S.R. administration by American and Soviet military 
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commanders and a joint military administration akin to the Allied Control Councils in the 
European occupations.22  Planners in the War Department also recognized the absence 
of long-range postwar Korea strategy.  The only thing that could therefore be done in 
the immediate postwar period was to bring about, in collaboration with the Soviets, the 
reestablishment of normal political and economic relationships.  However, this could 
only be done “on a military level.”   The ability to bring about permanent political change 
was limited.   Any consequential change in the postwar Korean landscape was vague 
and would occur only after a centralized four- power administration and then some 
period of trusteeship that was even less defined.23  
The result of this lack of either political relevance or military significance was a no 
detailed plan for what to do when American military government first arrived on the 
peninsula.  Unlike Germany and Austria, where the Allies had at least established some 
mechanism for “control machinery,” there was nothing in place for any multinational 
governance plan.  Instead, the primary military plan for the occupation of Korea was 
only part of the larger one that dealt with Japan’s occupation in case of sudden 
surrender, code named BLACKLIST.24  Even BLACKLIST had been created pending 
the  issue of presumably more detailed Joint Chief of Staff directives and was meant 
only to serve as a general guide in the planning and preparation by subordinate 
commanders and units upon the termination of armed conflict.25   
As a military plan, BLACKLIST framed the occupation entirely within military goals, 
stating that the goals for U.S. forces were to “occupy Japan Proper and Korea, establish 
control of armed forces and civil population, and impose thereon those prescribed terms 
of surrender requiring immediate military action.”26  And as with most military plans, 
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BLACKLIST stated a series of planning assumptions, some of which were applicable to 
Korea.  BLACKLIST stated that 270,000 Japanese troops would need to be disarmed in 
Korea, and that surrender of Japanese forces outside Japan proper might have to be 
“imposed by force,” and even that offensive action might need to be taken in the High 
Command in Korea failed to conform to the Japanese surrender.  Yet these 
assumptions were contrasted with another more optimistic one: while some non-
cooperation by the Japanese civil population was expected, “some degree of 
cooperation” could possibly be expected from the Korean populace.27   
There was also great concern in the plan that in a “sudden surrender” scenario, 
military and civil resistance might be expected. Throughout BLACKLIST, the document 
referred to this possibility, which thus framed the occupation as military operations 
against possible enemy forces.  The “primary initial missions” for the occupation forces 
were the “[d]isarmament of Japanese Armed Forces and establishment of control of 
communications.”28  U.S. forces should also be dispatched in strength to major strategic 
centers “against local opposition if offered.”  Furthermore, they should also be prepared 
to “immobilize enemy armed forces, and initiate operations against any recalcitrant 
elements in the two countries.”29   
Reflecting its exclusively military goals, BLACKLIST referred to an initial occupation 
phase only.  Once Japan was disarmed and there was assurance there would be no 
widespread resistance, the task of the occupying forces would be to prepare for the 
establishment of post-war governments in both Japan and Korea “as subsequently 
directed.”30  Yet beyond that, there was little.  The instruments of surrender were not yet 
known, though it was assumed that the Emperor would acknowledge Japan’s total 
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defeat, the Commander-in-Chief of U.S. Army Forces Pacific would assume “supreme 
legislative, executive, and judicial power” over both Korea and Japan, and that civil 
officials would remain at their posts and continue to perform their duties until told 
otherwise.31   
The BLACKLIST document mentioned Korea itself, though in a peripheral way, and 
as little more than an adjunct to Japan.  Apart from the planning assumptions that 
discussed the comparative Japanese troop strengths in Japan and Korea and that 
asserted the civil population in Korea might be friendlier than the Japanese, there was 
no specific plan for Korea’s occupation.  There was not, for example, even a separate 
annex for the Korean occupation within BLACKLIST.  “Japan and Korea” were terms 
seen throughout the document, with the same basic concepts, tasks, and missions 
assigned to both countries.32   The Army units designated to occupy Korea, initially the 
10th Army, and then only a subordinate unit, the XXIVth Corps, were chosen to do so 
exclusively because of their physical location on Okinawa, and its relative proximity to 
the Korean peninsula. 33  (See figure 12 below.)  
The Japanese surrender documents that followed also indicated that little thought 
had been given to postwar Korea.   The initial post-surrender policy for Japan, which 
General Douglas MacArthur sent to President Truman, who in turn approved it, did not 
refer to Korea.34  MacArthur mentioned the country  in his first general order only in 
relation to the Japanese surrender provisions:  senior Japanese commanders and all 
military forces in Korea north of “38 degrees North latitude” would surrender to the 
“Commander-in-Chief of Soviet Forces in the Far East” and south of the 38th degree  
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 Figure 12 
Map Showing Units Designated for Occupation Duties in Japan and Korea 
(note that Korea is called by its Japanese name “Chosen” in this map).35   
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would surrender to the “Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Army Forces, Pacific,” these 
commanders being the Allied powers’ representatives authorized to accept surrender.36  
MacArthur subsequently issued a military government proclamation to the Korean 
people on September 7, 1945.  It stated that U.S. forces would occupy Korea south of 
the 38th Parallel and that all powers of government would be, “for the present,” 
exercised under his authority.  The proclamation restated, for the most part, standard 
U.S. military government doctrine.  Until further orders, all “governmental, public, and 
honorary functionaries and employees” would continue to perform their “usual functions 
and duties.”  All would obey military government orders “promptly” and any acts of 
resistance would be “punished severely.”  English would be the official language of 
government and in any event of “ambiguity or diversity of interpretation or definition” 
between English, Japanese or Korean (Hangul), “the English text shall prevail.”37 
While standard for a U.S. military government document in that it reflected the 
common FM 27-5 doctrine, the proclamation was not well calibrated to meet the 
particular circumstances of the Korean occupation, as the Americans would soon 
discover.  It contained the vague “for the present” language, like that in the Cairo 
Declaration, thus creating another level of uncertainty for the Korean people about when 
self-governance would come.  It also made clear that it would brook no dissent or 
disagreement with military government authority.  Again, while this was standard 
language, the proclamation made little attempt to mitigate any Korean fears that their 
Japanese masters were only to be replaced by Americans, however more benign they 
seemingly were.   
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Most critically, it restated the standard principle of military government that civil 
administration would remain in place, at least until “further orders” were given.  But the 
reality was that Japanese officials had conducted much of the civil administration for 
decades, and the Koreans who cooperated in doing so were considered collaborators.  
Indeed, not only did many Japanese civil officials initially remain in place because of the 
order, to the dismay and outrage of Koreans, later in September an even greater public 
relations fiasco occurred when those same Japanese civil servants were promoted by 
the Japanese government, an action that the U.S. military government in Japan had to 
nullify quickly.38 
Approximately a month and a half after American occupation forces had been on 
the ground and administering military government in Korea, the State-War-Navy 
Coordinating Committee published the primary strategic level document for the conduct 
of the occupation, and it was sent to MacArthur on October 17, 1945.   Designated the 
“basic initial directive” for the administration of civil affairs in U.S. Occupied Korea, it 
indicated that the American military forces were vested with the “conventional powers of 
a military occupant of enemy territory.”39    It set forth a plan that began with a joint 
period of U.S.-U.S.S.R. civil administration, followed by trusteeship of the Allied powers, 
and then eventual Korean independence.40   
Yet the document also revealed how mismatched this ultimate political goal was 
with the means to facilitate it.  It did call for the removal of Japanese administrators, 
though it did allow, providing security factors permitted, the use of Japanese and 
Korean collaborators deemed necessary by the technical qualifications.41 At the same 
time, the document stated that the “ultimate objective” was to foster conditions to bring 
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about a free and independent Korea.  The document also stated that the American 
administration of Korean occupation was “principally” intended to ensure compliance by 
the Japanese with surrender policy, to effect the political and administrative separation 
of Korea from Japan, to foster the establishment of local self-government, and thereby 
to restore a free and independent nation.42  Yet the means to do this, at least during the 
initial stages, was a single Army corps that had no specialized training whatsoever to 
execute such a task. 
The document revealed the inherent, unresolved conflict between the long-range 
goal (Korean independence), the political way this would be accomplished (military 
government that would transition to some form of trusteeship) and the means that at 
least initially would begin the process (the staff and units of a U.S. Army corps).  Indeed, 
the very notion of a lengthy process that contemplated a period of trusteeship conflicted 
quite obviously with the standard doctrinal model of American military government—
primarily in that the model sought to return power to local governmental functions as 
soon as possible.  The situation further complicated because the enemy Japanese 
administrators had been the very officials conducting such governmental functions.  
This conflict was soon recognized by on-ground U.S. leaders.  The Acting Political 
Advisor in Korea, William Langdon, wrote to the Secretary of State on November 20, 
1945, that he was unable to “fit trusteeship to actual conditions” and that the United 
States should stop pursuing it altogether, noting further that military government had 
come as both a surprise and disappointment to the Korean people, who expected true 
and complete liberation.43    
The Dividing of Korea Along the 38th Parallel  
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Fewer decisions highlight the highly militarized American strategic viewpoint toward 
Korea more clearly than the controversial decision to divide the country at the 38th 
Parallel.  That the decision was cloaked for many years in secrecy only added to the 
mystery, as foreign policy experts and historians puzzled over why the decision was 
made.44  As William Stueck has pointed out, actually noting an early U.S. Army official 
historian, the 38th Parallel line followed no physical features and passed through 
streams, rivers, roads, highways, and rail lines with total arbitrariness.45  As the map 
(figure 13) indicates, the 38th Parallel also paid no respect to political boundaries, cutting 
through the two Korean provinces of Kyonggi-do and Kangwon-do.  Indeed, its division 
provided little long-range strategic benefit to the United States: most of the heavy 
industry was in the region north of the 38th Parallel, to include the hydroelectric plants 
that provided power to Seoul, the nation’s capital and largest city.   
Indeed, Stueck’s conclusion that “the thirty-eighth parallel was a line drawn on a 
map, nothing more” has compelling and simple force.46  Senior U.S. leaders at the time 
provided military reasons for choosing this as the dividing line affirmed the short-range 
character of its purpose.  Secretary of State James Byrnes said that the division was 
“for purposes of military operations.”47  John Hilldring, formerly Chief of the Civil Affairs 
Division and later Assistant Secretary of State for Occupied Affairs, said that “In no 
sense was this agreement more than a military expedient between two friendly powers.  
The line of demarcation was intended to be temporary and only to fix responsibility 
between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. for carrying out the Japanese surrender.”48  Indeed, 
a straightforward latitudinal dividing line had specifically military advantages:  if the main  
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 Figure 13 
The Division of Korea Along the 38th Parallel49 
 
334 
purpose was to demarcate surrender lines, a parallel provided a line on the map that 
field commanders with maps could ascertain with relative ease, whereas a more 
political boundary would require greater understanding of local geography.50  
Furthermore, the possibility of combat was not entirely far-fetched either.  There was 
evidence of at least some resistance on the Korean peninsula by Japanese forces as 
late as mid-August.51   
Correspondence between Edwin Pauley, the American representative to the Allied 
Reparations Committee and President Truman underscored how depoliticized the 
division was.  Pauley strongly contended that American forces should occupy quickly as 
much of the industrial areas of Korea as they possible could.52  Yet the actual division 
left the majority of Korean heavy industry in the north.  Indeed, the division’s very 
arbitrariness was later used by the United States as an argument for its temporary 
nature.  In a letter from then Secretary of State George Marshall to Soviet Foreign 
Minister Molotov in 1947, Marshall commented upon the line “arbitrarily assigned for this 
purpose, the 38th degree parallel.”53   
Based on the available evidence, it does appear that the parallel was drawn up by 
American military planners with little consideration to longer-term political consequences 
and that it was done seemingly as a temporary measure to divide the country up 
militarily between the Americans and the Soviets, in large part to make sure that the 
Army could accomplish its occupation tasks of disarming and demobilizing the 
Japanese forces on the peninsula.   The particular decision to divide up Korea was 
done almost immediately after the Soviets had declared war on Japan in early August 
1945.  Two relatively junior staff officers, Majors Dean Rusk, a future Secretary of State, 
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and Charles Bonesteel, a future four-star general, divided the country as Rusk 
recounted: 
Working in haste and under great pressure, we had a formidable task: to  
pick a zone for the American occupation.  Neither [Bonesteel] nor I was a  
Korea expert, but it seemed to us that Seoul, the capital, should be in the  
American sector.  We also knew that the U.S. Army opposed an extensive 
area of occupation.  Using a National Geographic map, we looked north of Seoul 
for a convenient dividing line but could not find a natural geographic line.  We 
saw the thirty-eighth parallel and decided to recommend that.54 
 
Rusk thus made clear that a primary reason for the division was a matter of purely 
military expediency:  the Army did not want a large area to occupy, given the rather 
threadbare occupation force, already downgraded from an army to a corps.  Bonesteel’s 
account largely corresponded with Rusk’s above, though neither apparently was aware 
that following the Russo-Japanese War the Russians and Japanese governments had 
discussed spheres of influence in Korea divided by the 38th Parallel.  Rusk stated that 
had he known of it, they would have chosen another demarcation line, precisely in order 
to avoid any political overtones to their decision.55   
This division, seemingly so random, and yet with such enormous long-range 
consequences for Korea, the United States, and the eventual Cold War, was entirely 
consistent with U.S. decision making regarding postwar governance.  U.S. senior 
military officials had paid little attention to the initial determination of zonal boundaries in 
the European theater.  The decisions to divide up Germany and Austria, for example, 
were driven almost entirely by British planners, and only when specific military 
objectives were involved were American senior military leaders particularly attentive.  In 
the Far East, however, the British were not involved in occupation planning, and there 
was no multinational body such as the European Advisory Commission involved in 
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working out surrender terms or multipartite control machinery.  Instead, the planning for 
the occupation of Japan was almost entirely done by the United States, and in particular 
by the War Department-dominated State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee.     
The United States had stated at Cairo, and then reaffirmed at Yalta and Potsdam, 
its assertion that Korea would be independent under some form of international 
trusteeship.  FDR and Stalin tacitly agreed both their nations would play a role in the 
postwar administration.  Yet beyond that, there was nothing of any substance on how to 
accomplish the task.  The decision to divide Korea at the 38th Parallel was thus simply 
made by U.S. Army officers to shape the Army’s occupation duties within a reasonable 
scope.  The political end of trusteeship to be followed by independence, vague as it 
was, provided no framework or context for the decision itself, which was thus arbitrary 
and supposedly temporary.   
Of course, it would not be temporary, but a decision that determined the fate of 
modern Korea, and caused turmoil for the remainder of the American occupation.  
Lieutenant General John Hodge, the U.S. senior commander in Korea, stated that “No 
aspect of military government can escape the effects of an arbitrary division of Korea 
into two zones of occupation” that occurred north and south of the 38th parallel.56  But 
the 38th parallel was not a nefarious creation either by American Cold Warriors to keep 
the Soviets out or by clever Soviet negotiators to trap half the nation in communist 
totalitarianism.  It was a deeply militarized decision made to meet military objectives. 
US Military Government Command and Control  
The XXIVth Corps, as a tactical formation, served as the initial U.S. military 
government in Korea.  It immediately confronted a difficulty in that there were 
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insufficient numbers of Koreans to conduct governmental responsibilities.  The country 
had been administered by Japanese officials, and the initial attempts to use those 
Japanese had seriously backfired.  Hence, from September 1945 until January 1946, 
the Corps asserted direct control over the Korean people south of the 38th Parallel, 
though in no way adequately manned or trained to do so, having only tactical units, 
whose primary responsibility was to demobilize and disarm the Japanese.57  
Throughout the fall of 1945, more military government units came in and though still 
inadequate in numbers and training, nevertheless allowed by January 1946, the 
standard “territorial” approach to military government to come into being.   By January 
as well, the demobilization and disarmament of the Japanese forces were largely 
completed.  It was at this point that a new organization was established: the United 
States Military Government in Korea.  In turn, its first General Order directed that control 
of military government units would pass from Corps tactical units to designated military 
government detachments, thus relieving those tactical commanders of the 
responsibilities over “non-military activities” and instead placing them “exclusively in the 
hands of Military Government officials.58   
During those crucial opening months, however both Americans and Koreans had 
expressed grave doubts about the military government model the United States had 
chosen to adopt, and those doubts were nowhere more forcefully expressed than by the 
commanding general of the XXIVth Corps, Lieutenant General Hodge, who served as 
the primary senior commander of all U.S. forces and would act as the supreme U.S. 
authority in Korea.59  Described as tough, no-nonsense, and honest to the core, Hodge 
had a reputation as an excellent combat commander and was even labeled as the 
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“Patton of the Pacific.”60   He was a tactically skilled leader with extensive combat 
experience, having fought in the Meuse-Argonne in World War I as an infantry officer, 
and in World War II as assistant division commander of the 25th Infantry Division at 
Guadalcanal, as commander of the Americal Division in the Bougainville Campaign, and 
as temporary commander of the 43rd Division in its combat on New Georgia.61  Rising to 
command the XXIVth Corps at Okinawa, both he and the Corps were battle-tested.   
Nonetheless, Hodge lacked the civil-political experience for the occupation.  In an 
unfortunate irony, the Korean occupation was the most difficult of any occupation 
mission carried out by U.S. troops after the Second World War, and the man primarily 
responsible for it had the least experience of any senior military commander involved in 
occupation duties.  Unlike Lucius Clay, who had spent the war years in Washington, 
Hodge had no in-depth experience dealing with interagency problems or with politicians.  
Unlike Mark Clark, he had never had to deal with leading a coalition of forces into battle.  
And while Hodge had some experience with military government in Okinawa, it could 
not compare with Clark’s experiences in North Africa and Italy. In retrospect, there 
seemed to be little rationale as to why he was selected other than that he commanded 
the XXIVth Corps, which, in accordance with BLACKLIST’s operational requirements, 
was the closest unit to Korea in the Pacific.62 
Historians have tended to treat Hodge rather harshly, whom they have seen as 
narrow-minded, reactionary, oblivious to the nuances of Korean culture, and excessively 
and even obsessively anti-communist.  Stueck asserts that Hodge proved “abysmally 
insensitive to Korean desires for immediate liberation.” 63  He was also, in the words of 
Allan Millett, “personal, confrontational, and impatient.”64    Bruce Cumings calls him a 
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“classic nationalist and containment” figure and more generously but still critically notes 
his “courageous but ill-considered decisiveness.”65  Such criticism can obscure Hodge’s 
insightfulness, despite his lack of experience.  On more than one occasion, Hodge sent 
out correspondence to his unit commanders about his concerns that U.S. personnel 
should not treat Koreans as a conquered people and that better efforts were needed to 
understand them, to respect their customs, and to learn elementary parts of their 
language in order to increase communication.66  Hodge was also politically more aware 
than might be expected, given his reputation.  Shortly after arriving he wrote that the 
situation in Korea was a “powder keg ready to explode.”  He further realized that his 
military government was woefully unprepared for the task:  the XXIVth Corps was “small 
in strength and short of competent staff,” and the military government was having “little 
overall effect.”67   
He also presciently saw problems on the peninsula that derived from the 
occupation.  He saw that the 38th Parallel had become in reality a “closed border” and 
that negotiations needed to be started at once with the Soviets on all sorts of problems 
that crossed the two zones.68  Indeed, Hodge believed that such problems could not be 
solved using military government as structured.  In a message that ultimately went to 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, he wrote that efforts “at the military level” to bring a joint U.S.-
U.S.S.R. collaboration between the occupation governments would likely not succeed.  
The issues between the nations were too fundamental:  before any decision could be 
made, “high level negotiations” between Washington and Moscow would be needed.69   
To Hodge, the situation in Korea during the first year of occupation was “impossible of 
peaceful correction … unless immediate action on an international level is forthcoming 
340 
to establish an overall provisional government which will be fully supported by the 
occupation forces under common policy.”70  Hodge thus was aware that recognition of a 
provisional government was a way to break through to a solution and that could pull the 
country into the direction of unity under one central government,-something that had 
occurred in Austria with the recognition of the Renner government.  However, he also 
noted that the longer the division between the U.S. and Soviet zones, the more the 
separate interim governments would harden, making unity ultimately impossible.71   
Hodge was nonetheless excessively abrasive in his dealings with Koreans.  More 
importantly, Hodge simply acted too much in accordance with standard military 
government doctrine and U.S. strategic policy.  Much of this was done simply because 
no alternative existed.  Hodge, for example, had no choice but to administer the 
occupation through tactical units at first and thus provide a heavy-handed military 
governance style in a nation that had already been occupied for decades, since only 
three military government teams were part of the initial occupation force that arrived in 
early September.72  And, as previously noted, Hodge’s initial approach upon entering 
Korea was to work with the existing civil structure, which meant keeping Japanese 
officials in power, both in keeping with military government doctrine and practice in 
Japan.73  Protests soon broke out, and public opinion surveys showed that retention of 
Japanese in the government was more vexing to the population than immediate 
independence.74  The retention of Japanese officials required major public relations 
damage control, assurances, and thereafter the complete elimination of all Japanese 
officials, though this did not completely occur until the spring of 1946.75   
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Yet even that elimination had consequences that related to the inadequacy of the 
military government that Hodge led.  As a military government agricultural report stated, 
great confusion reigned when Japanese agricultural administrators, technicians and 
policemen left, and “the entire government service to agriculture had to be reorganized, 
staffed, trained, and directed,” a process that consumed months of time.76   Once again, 
the policy reflected not so much malevolence or even ignorance on Hodge’s part as 
much as it reflected the inadequate, military-driven occupation.   
The American Occupation Experience 
While Koreans were at the very least ambivalent about American military forces 
occupying their country, some evidence did suggest that they could accept it as a 
practical, short-term measure, if effectively conducted.  For example, a survey of 
Koreans noted that among top priorities was the lack of military government personnel 
to administer effectively in the countryside, indicating that they were at least somewhat 
tolerant to temporary American occupation.77  It was this very lack of properly trained, 
equipped and motivated military government forces that contributed to an atmosphere 
of distrust and pessimism that predominated during the occupation. 
The American press noted the initial utter lack of trained personnel.  An October 8, 
1945 article in Time magazine noted that the American military government in Korea 
was staffed with officers who are “combat officers and not proconsuls.  They are short-
handed … .  Men already punchy from combat (and anxious to go home) are driving 
themselves 15 hours a day and more, trying to get a country of 25 million people rolling 
again.  Before it is done, the job will take experts.”78   Even the military government 
personnel who did eventually arrive were not trained for the Korean mission.  Much 
342 
training, to include culture and language training, was provided for the Japanese and 
German occupations.  Little to no training was Korea-specific, and most military 
government units were not prepared.79   Furthermore, the sudden surrender of Japan 
had thrown off training timetables, and what instruction was provided was hurried and 
necessarily incomplete.  One officer, who would serve as the provincial military 
governor, noted in a personal account that he had attended the School for Government 
of Occupied Areas at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania (a school that followed the 
original School of Military Government in Charlottesville, Virginia), where over a 
thousand graduates had taken a crash program to meet military government 
requirements.80   
The experience of the 185th Regiment, a unit in the 40th Infantry Division, one of the 
XXIVth’s principle combat formations, was standard.  It landed in Korea in September 
1945, as part of the initial occupying force, with its mission to occupy the city of Taegu 
and surrounding areas.  Its primary tasks were to accept the surrender of Japanese 
troops, take over all Japanese supplies, provide law and order, and administer the area 
until the arrival of military government teams.81  As a combat-hardened unit, it was 
capable of performing the surrender mission and of providing initial security.  Yet it also 
had the responsibility of conducting military government mission until the arrival of 
trained military government units specifically designed to perform those duties.82  But 
there was a host of other complex political issues that went beyond those military tasks.  
The regiment’s history noted the Koreans’  “[h]atred for the defeated Japanese, and the 
unfavorable political setup,” as well as “threats and action by various groups” during the 
first months.  Later, following the Moscow Conference in December 1945, Koreans in 
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the regiment’s occupied areas demonstrated throughout with placards denouncing the 
idea.  As the regiment’s history noted, the situation was “chaotic.”83      
At the same time, the lack of attention paid to Korea by American strategists meant 
a scarcity of resources, which also lowered the morale of the occupying soldiers.   The 
American experience in Korea was in stark contrast to those experienced in Europe or 
even Japan.  In 1946, Frederick Silber from the Department of State’s Office of 
Occupied Areas flew to Korea to determine the usefulness of efforts in political 
reorientation.  Noting that long before he left Japan for Korea, he began to hear 
“repeated warnings about the horrors of the place,” Silber recounted an end-of-the-line 
psychology that prevailed from commanders at the top to the lowest ranks in military 
government.  He noted that the military government suffered shortages of supplies and 
equipment—paper was so scarce that “every square inch [was] the subject of conflict 
between potential rival users.”84  Supply requirements were never met during the 
occupation.   Major General Orlando Ward, the commanding general of the 6th Infantry 
Division, the other principal combat formation in the XXIVth, noted the complaints of a 
group of sergeants who had written to the press about shortages of critical items.  
“These men could not see why service of supply is, in their opinion, adequate in Japan 
and inadequate in Korea.”  Ward essentially agreed that property accountability was in a 
poor state, and that for many important types of supply, the system was fundamentally 
broken.85   
The personal experiences of occupying commanders and soldiers revealed that the 
occupation was fraught with far more hardship than Germany’s or Austria’s.  One 
soldier noted ominously the harassment that North Koreans inflicted by cutting off 
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hydroelectric power to the south:  “They do anything to agitate us.  Every night, just like 
clockwork, the lights go out at 2100 hours and will stay off for 15 minutes.  I think they 
want us to know that they could turn them off permanently if it [suits] them.  They control 
the dam.”86   Furthermore, many of the American occupiers apparently had a low 
opinion of their duties and of the Korean people themselves.   The same soldier 
registered his disapproval at the Koreans for dumping garbage “out in front of the 
houses on the street” and also noted the lack of sanitary sewage.87  Walter Simmons, a 
Chicago Tribune reporter wrote that U.S. soldiers told him that the “only things 
[Koreans] understand are the ball bat and pick handle” and that they unfavorably 
contrasted the Japanese with the Koreans:  “The Japanese are friendly.  The Koreans 
are hostile.  You try to take a picture of a Korean child and he runs.  You treat the 
Korean nice and he cheats you.”88   
Hodge himself noted the poor treatment of the Koreans by the American troops:  
“There seems to be a let-down on the part of Americans everywhere in decency, 
standards of behavior, and in honesty,” he wrote in late 1945.89  By mid-1946, Hodge 
realized that initial expectations had fallen far short of reality.  Addressing the 
occupation forces in June of the following year, he noted that, when the American 
forces arrived in September, they were looked upon as heroes sent from the greatest 
nation in the world, but since that time many Koreans had changed their minds.  Hodge 
also directed the troops to stop using demeaning terms such as “gook,” to learn about 
Korea customs, and to “[g]et over the idea that the Korean is servile.  He isn’t.”90  
       Hodge’s recognition of the gap between ideals and on-ground realities was equally 
evident in the ordinances, directives, regulations, and legal interpretations that guided 
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the lives of Koreans south of the 38th Parallel.  American military government officials 
had to reconcile after all that they were military occupiers in a nation that they had 
ostensibly had been sent to liberate from occupation.  Nowhere was this reconciling 
difficulty more prominent than in determining the reconstitution of political parties.  
Hodge, by following military government doctrine too literally in allowing Japanese to 
stay on in government, even though temporarily, had already caused initial alienation 
among the Korean people.   
Despite this initial error, Hodge remained committed to returning Koreans to power 
as soon as possible as a way to facilitate eventual independence.  As already noted,  
Hodge opposed trusteeship altogether, arguing it would be better to restore an 
independent Korean government as soon as practically possible, and he did seek to put 
Koreans in power.  But in doing so, he fell victim to the inadequacies of the military 
government structure that he had on hand.  His staff completely lacked the experience 
and even the basic language skills to evaluate and to determine which parties could 
best represent the Korean people across the spectrum and who could fruitfully work 
with the occupation force.   
Instead, the Koreans who became most influential in the American military 
government were those whose mastery of the English language allowed them to best 
represent their interests—and to marginalize those who opposed them.  Most of these 
had been educated by American missionaries and tended to follow Rhee and the 
provisional government in Chungking.  This “government of interpreters” deliberately set 
themselves in sharp contrast to other political bodies, such as the moderate leftists 
under Yo Un Hyong, which had established the Committee for Preparation of Korean 
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Independence prior to the arrival of the Americans, and which soon became labeled by 
the American military government as a Soviet puppet.91   
If the military government’s organizational structure proved inadequate in assessing 
the Korean political system, the occupation’s legal system revealed the problem of 
attempting to use the Army as the means to facilitate the move toward independence 
and democracy.  The U.S. military government, for example, issued hundreds of legal 
opinions on a wide variety of issues, from property and political rights to free speech.   
One opinion referred to a charge brought by U.S. officials in the provost (military 
government) court against particular newspaper owners.  The owners had published 
“false and defamatory statements” against the military government and thus were in 
violation of Military Government Ordinance #19.  Specifically, articles in the papers had 
statements such as “People came to the city hall to ask for rice but got guns and 
beatings instead.”  The provost court ruled that the statements were false and 
deliberately intended to disturb the peace and that the Korean newspaper editors were 
guilty.92  Upholding the court’s decision, the military government’s Department of 
Justice noted that military government ordinance #19 recognized freedom of the press 
in Korean newspapers.  The opinion went on to say, however, that the freedom was 
subject to restrictions necessary for the successful survival and operation of military 
government.  Furthermore, the Justice Department pointed out that there were times 
when statements that could cause disorder or the imminent possibility of disorder could 
be prosecuted, because Military Government Proclamation #2 made such acts 
criminal.93  
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Looking at the requirements of occupation against the “privileges and liberties 
recognized by America as being fundamental principles of civilized and progressive 
states,” the Department then attempted to square American notions of liberty with the 
requirements of military government.  It noted that the statements made by the Korean 
newspapers did not rise to the level of subversion and that therefore the editors could 
not be criminally prosecuted for violating Proclamation #2.  On the other hand, it noted 
that the requirements of military government did allow suppression of freedom of the 
press in this instance, and it ruled that the papers that published the statements could 
be suspended.94    As the opinion stated, “In this entire matter, we must balance military 
necessity against privileges and liberties recognized by Americans as being 
fundamental principles of civilized and progressive states.”95   Particularly revealing was 
the opinion’s use of the term “military necessity,” the doctrinal standard for determining 
the requirement in an occupation: the Korean occupation tested the ability of the United 
States to facilitate both a transition to independence and democracy, though the means 
it employed to do so, military government, was a problematic method to accomplish this 
task.  It was a difficult task of the American military occupiers to balance what seemed 
like competing interests—to ensure military government was obeyed without question, 
and also to attempt to convey to Koreans that Americans were not hypocritical in 
facilitating the transition in Korea to an independent and democratic nation. 
The Soviet Occupation, the Moscow Conference, and the Joint Commission 
The contrast between the American and Soviet occupations was significant.  The 
U.S.S.R. entered the war against Japan in August 1945, virtually at the point of Japan’s 
surrender, and thus was not included in any planning for postwar occupations.  There 
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were no comparable wartime coalition organizations such as the Combined Chiefs of 
Staff or the European Advisory Commission to provide Allied strategic oversight.96  The 
Soviets, in undertaking their occupation, did not follow a doctrinal model such as the 
Americans, and in many ways displayed a shrewder political understanding of postwar 
governance matters than the Americans did.  Even though over 250,000 Soviet troops 
swept into the upper half of the Korean peninsula and quickly lost their reputation as 
Korean liberators, given the widespread looting and raping that occurred, the U.S.S.R. 
did not establish much of a military government at all.  A proclamation by the 
Commander of the Twenty-Fifth Occupation Army stated that the objective of the Red 
Army was to “rid the area of all the plunderers” and that the Red Army had no 
“intentions of territorial gains or running the Government of Korea under a Russian 
system.”  Rather, the proclamation stated that a democratic system of government 
would be permitted, along with unions, and that religious freedom would be 
guaranteed.97  More recent scholarship has demonstrated that Soviet intentions and 
actions were far less benign than proclaimed and that the best indication of this was 
displayed by Koreans who began to escape the north and head below the parallel.98  
Nonetheless, the Soviets did not establish an elaborate, Soviet-run military government 
apparatus to administer the territory north of the 38th Parallel.  Instead, they simply 
allowed Communist-controlled people’s committees (which they had engineered to get 
to power) to do so.99  Furthermore, the senior Soviet general did use Japanese 
administrators to run the government, but quickly replaced them with Koreans, many of 
whom had returned from training in the U.S.S.R.100   
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Much of this, and much of the Soviet occupation generally, was unknown to the 
American military government, for the militarily created 38th parallel had quickly become 
a militarized frontier.  Unlike the four-power occupations in Europe, no ties or wartime 
alliances had previously existed between the two Korean occupiers, and relations 
started and remained at a distance.  Efforts by Hodge to establish contact and begin 
discussion with the Soviet commander during the first crucial weeks of the occupation in 
September failed.101  By November, the borderline between the two zones prevented 
any significant interchange of information, goods, or persons.102  By the following 
month, there was only one U.S. convoy heading into the north per week.103  
Accordingly, the information that American military government officials gained 
about the Soviets was vague and uncertain.  They knew little of actual Soviet activities, 
much less Soviet intentions.104  Reports of the Soviets forcibly replacing local 
autonomous governments with People’s Political Committees that marginalized or 
suppressed all others fit with other narratives that indicated that political parties in the 
South were infiltrated and swarming with Communist agents receiving support and 
direction from the U.S.S.R.105   
U.S. military government officials came to see, rather inaccurately, though perhaps 
understandably, the Soviet occupation as part of a campaign of ultimate annexation.  
One such official later wrote that the actions of the Soviets during the years of 
occupation indicated that the U.S.S.R.’s goal was to “take over North Korea and make 
of it a Soviet Socialist Republic for ultimate union with South Korea and incorporation in 
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.”106 
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The result was a rapid establishment of two wholly dissimilar governmental 
systems, and the first significant contacts between the occupiers did not occur until 
December 1945 in Moscow, in an attempt to work out a joint solution towards ending 
the occupation.  The Moscow Conference was in fact the only detailed plan by the U.S. 
and U.S.S.R. regarding the future of Korea, though it occurred four months into the 
occupation itself. Per the conference’s direction, military government in the two zones 
would continue, though a U.S.-U.S.S.R. military commission would attempt to move 
toward joint administration.  Presumably during that period basic administrative and 
logistical problems in the country could be solved by American and Soviet cooperation.  
A trusteeship period of several years would follow.107 
Many Koreans, however, by December 1945 were tired of being dictated to by the 
Allies.  Kim Koo led a major demonstration in Seoul on December 31st, with the streets 
of Seoul packed with flags and banners in protest.108  A resolution of the Korean 
Congress of Political Parties, made up of groups across the ideological spectrum, 
addressed to the Allied Powers and sent to the Department of State was quite clear:  
“We want our independence… .  We demand our right to restore our territorial, political, 
and administrative prerogatives as a sovereign nation.”  The Korean Congress of 
Political Parties contended that, while the Allies believed that the Koreans were “unfit to 
be free” because they were divided among themselves, the truth was that Korea had 
been divided “by forces outside ourselves, like a body cut in half.”  They went on to say 
that they could establish a government within a year, holding national elections after a 
provisional government had been fully recognized by the Allies.109   
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But those demands were overtaken by bilateral superpower attempts at discussion.  
The Moscow Conference directed that U.S. and Soviet representatives from the 
respective military governments as a Joint Commission would meet shortly to begin to 
discuss urgent problems, and to seek agreement on many issues of contention between 
the two zones.110  There were procedural and substantive problems from the start.  The 
U.S. and Soviet commission members saw the problem from widely divergent 
viewpoints.  An American goal was to remove the 38th Parallel and consider Korea as a 
single unit.  But the Soviet delegation wanted to discuss far more narrow economic and 
administrative matters, such as electrical power, rice delivery, and the evacuation of 
Japanese personnel.111   
The Moscow Conference decision placed Hodge in a particularly difficult position, 
for he felt ill-equipped to attempt to resolve occupation problems with the Soviets, and 
he fundamentally disagreed with the long-range American plan for trusteeship.  He felt 
that he should not approach the Soviets until he had clear understanding of what 
American policymakers wanted him to do.  In fact, he believed that he should not be 
approaching the Soviets on strategic issues at all.  He therefore suggested that political 
meetings be convened pursuant to intergovernmental communications rather than his 
own initiative.  For Hodge, communications between military government officials could 
not get at the larger, political questions that transcended what he understood his ability 
to solve.  Hodge furthermore believed that the trusteeship idea should be abandoned, 
reporting to MacArthur that the results of the Moscow Conference had thrown Koreans 
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into deep despair and that Koreans were forming a belief that they would have to fight 
for their independence:   
“Trusteeship” connotes only one idea to Koreans, even after all efforts at  
reasoning … .  Their idea stems from what the Japanese did to Korea starting from 
a trusteeship.  As a result of press releases from the Moscow Conference, we are 
now confronted with a passive resistance and a non-cooperative campaign by 
Koreans… . .”112  
 
The Joint Commission met several times in the first months of 1946 but eventually 
deadlocked: the Soviets would not do anything but propose minimal administrative and 
economic changes; the Americans wanted something more ambitious.  The distrust 
continued to mount through the spring of 1946.  As an alternative, the State-War-Navy 
Coordinating Committee determined that the American military government should form 
independently a “[Korean] group to act in an advisory capacity to the United States 
members of the Joint Commission in matters relating to the creation of a provisional 
government.”113  This body, the Representative Democratic Council, fell under the sway 
and control of Rhee, who used it to increase his own power (and then later distanced 
himself from it as a way to continue his rise to the Presidency of the Republic of Korea).  
Rhee, both strongly anti-trustee and anticommunist, would eventually successfully align 
himself with American interests and become president of the south’s government in July 
1948.114   
What resulted in these maneuvers was political polarity with Rhee and his faction 
representing American-style democracy and others labeled as communists and 
therefore to be distrusted.  Hodge established a Democratic Representatives Council 
made up of Rhee’s strongly anti-trusteeship party.  Yet when the United States 
proposed making Rhee’s rightist party part of a consulting body for the Joint 
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Commission, the Soviets vehemently opposed such a move, claiming that anti-trustee 
parties by their definition could not be included in negotiations in a future that the Allies 
agreed would include trusteeship.115  By the spring of 1946, the Joint Commission had 
largely broken down as a vehicle to discuss Korean unification.  The U.S. and U.S.S.R. 
were now firmly locked in superpower geopolitics and both were on a trajectory to 
pursue their own interests in Korea.  Rhee subsequently successfully ensured that his 
political party would dominate South Korean politics and thus allow him to establish a 
government there.  Hodge correctly assumed that Moscow would push parties north of 
the 38th Parallel more fully into Moscow’s sphere of influence.  What was thus set in 
motion paved the way for separate north and south Korean governments.   
By August 1946 the American Chief Political Advisor in Korea stated that the “basic 
job of the U.S. in Korea has been done.”  The Japanese had been disarmed and sent 
home, and the framework of administrative and judicial systems were in place: 
“communications have been restored, the school systems have been rebuilt, the 
currency has been saved, stark famine and distress have been overcome, and the 
change-over from the Japanese regime has been smoothly accomplished.”116  There 
had been some accomplishment in the past year by the Americans, working in harsh 
conditions, undermanned and under-resourced as they were.  Yet the advisor’s 
assessment could not hide the very real failure of the Joint Commission, which was 
indicative of the larger failure to establish a unified government in Korea—an essentially 
political problem for which the structure of military government as established provided 
no means to move towards and which promoted the conditions for failure.  Hodge was 
honest enough to admit this:  he recognized that further negotiations with the Soviets 
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were pointless and that the “Korean problem” could not be solved at his level.117  But 
moving to a higher political plane at this point was only to enmesh the situation further 
into geopolitics.  As Stueck points out, the Cold War had come to Korea with the 
adjournment of the U.S.-U.S.S.R. Joint Commission in May 1946.  Locked into division, 
neither the U.S. nor the Soviets could find any common agreement.118  The two were 
two far ensconced in their own separate halves—they were moving in radically different 
political directions.119 
 Conclusion  
The crucial first year of occupation was, in Bruce Cumings’ words, the “crucible from 
which sprang the political and social forces that continue to play upon the Korean 
peninsula,” with Cumings further noting how the division between north and south short-
circuited indigenous ways to true Korean independence, autonomy and democracy.120   
That division and the hardening of that division that resulted following the collapse of the 
Joint U.S.-U.S.S.R. council are often seen as fundamentally a result of Cold War 
geopolitics.  As sociologist Robert Schaeffer points out in his work on partitions, 
“Because superpower states played important roles in partition and formed alliances 
with divided states, post-partition conflict…triggered superpower intervention.”121  The 
troubles in Korea, which started in around 1948, exploded into full-scale conventional 
war in 1950 and then led to a superpower clash with the Chinese intervention in 1951, 
have their origins in the postwar superpower involvement, starting with the vague 
“trusteeship” formula that Roosevelt and others conceived of in 1943.  
In so examining the working of the superpowers, it is also necessary to examine the 
method by which they occupied the country they came to liberate.  South of the 38th 
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parallel, the particular doctrine and subsequent actions of the U.S. Army, which played 
a dominant role in constructing postwar governance planning and policy, bear 
responsibility for much of what occurred during that first crucial year.  The zonal 
occupation model, driven by military purposes, later hardened into a permanent partition 
and not only denied Korea from fully participating in the international community, but 
also dragged the occupying powers themselves into the midst of Korean political 
disputes even as both nations sought exit from the peninsula as soon as possible.   
One could ask what alternatives could have existed.  Could Korea have been 
neutralized, as what eventually occurred in Austria?  This was only a possibility—but it 
could only have happened, as it did in Austria, if a provisional government had been 
jointly recognized by both superpowers.  Indeed, the fact that the Soviets did not 
attempt to occupy Seoul, even though Soviet forces could have, could lead one to 
believe that a joint solution, much less an agreed-upon neutralization, could never have 
been achieved.122  Certainly, however, an alternative in which the 38th Parallel was a 
border without significance, porous, open to traffic, and unmilitarized, would have 
helped with unification.  So too would have a less militarized form of government in the 
South, such as a multinational commission from the outset, made up of several nations,  
that stressed Korean autonomy, and that made Japanese demobilization and 
disarmament the sole function of the military leadership on the ground.  This, however, 
would have been model that was not the doctrinal American military government 
solution. 
Yet the reality was that the division was in fact exacerbated by a poorly resourced 
and applied American military government—one ill-suited to the complex realities on the 
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ground.  By the fall of 1945, however, no alternative save that of standard military 
government existed.  The American postwar governance model, with all its advantages 
and disadvantages, was a template that called for a stable postwar context in which 
power would be turned over in relatively short order to an indigenous government 
capable of running the country.   Its model was that of a European-style nation with a 
tradition of functioning civil government and a placid population.  That model had little 
relevance in Korea in 1945, and the strivings of the U.S. military government officials, 
however relatively benign and well-intentioned, were nonetheless wrongheaded, 
impractical, and ultimately counterproductive.  The 38th Parallel hardened into a 
permanent frontier; and civil conflict raged over and with the frontiers of the frontier after 
the American military government ended in 1948.   And in June 1950, the United States 
Army would return to Korea, this time to fight in a protracted and bloody conflict that 
would cost tens of thousands of American and hundreds of thousands of Korean lives. 
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Chapter 9 -  Conclusion 
The Postwar Occupation Experience and Beyond, and Its Lessons for the Army 
Military government did not end as rapidly as either Army or civilian leadership 
desired.  By 1947, however, both saw the need to begin doing so.  Secretary of War 
Kenneth Royall in a message to Lucius Clay indicated that he was trying to “induce 
State to take over Military Government” and that he expected an answer from new 
Secretary of State George Marshall by the early fall.1  Speculation rose during the 
summer of 1947:  in July, Assistant Secretary of State John Peurifoy stated before the 
House Executive Expenditure Committee that while the Army would maintain policing 
constabulary forces until peace treaties were signed with various occupied nations, all 
other occupation activities would be turned over to the State Department.  Recently 
designated Secretary of State Marshall also stated that he believed that it was time that 
State took over the occupation governance functions and that the takeover should begin 
at the end of 1947. 2 
In reality, however, even though two years had elapsed since the Axis defeat, 
planning for civilian-run governance was still very embryonic.  Despite all the wartime 
and postwar discussion about the efficacy of the State Department and other civilian 
agencies being in the lead, fundamental questions remained.  As indicated by General 
Clarence Huebner, the last American military governor in Germany,  they included the 
following for Germany specifically, though the questions could be asked of any of the 
postwar military government occupations: what the size, composition, and mission of 
the force remaining in Europe would be when State took over;  what the relationship 
between the senior commander of military forces and the senior State Department 
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representative would be; who, in view of protocol and other considerations, should 
represent the United States at the various control councils; what the timetable was for 
the State Department’s assumption of control; and what precisely the role of military 
forces in occupied territory would be once State had assumed complete occupational 
responsibility.3 
The failure even to ask these questions, much less to do significant planning for 
them, was indicative not only of the uncertain situation of the early postwar period, but 
also highlighted how little long-range thinking had been done regarding policy in the 
postwar world.  While the Army’s predominance in postwar governance had gradually 
waned, there was nothing remotely comparable in existence that could manage to take 
over fully postwar governance in conquered and liberated territories in the first years of 
the Cold War.  The Civil Affairs Division, though it was in matters of policy subordinate 
to the State Department’s Office for Occupied Areas under Assistant Secretary of State 
John Hilldring, still had major influence.  The Division’s Government Branch, for 
instance, initiated the various comprehensive directives for military government and 
continued to provide personnel to State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, which in 
turn approved the directives and sent them to the various military commanders, also 
serving as governors, in the field.4  
In fact, while the Army reduced its personnel involved in military government, it 
continued to provide the leadership for the occupations throughout.  Clay, the deputy 
military governor from 1945 to 1947 in the American zone in Germany, became the 
military governor in 1947 and remained in that position throughout the early 
implementation of the Marshall Plan and the Berlin Airlift.  When he was replaced by a 
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civilian high commissioner in 1949, his successor was John J. McCloy, who, as 
Assistant Secretary of War, had done so much to protect and expand the Army’s 
prerogatives in postwar governance.  Lieutenant General Geoffrey Keyes replaced Mark 
Clark as the American High Commissioner in Austria in 1947 and remained in that post 
likewise until 1949.   John Hodge was the senior American in Korea until the actual 
creation of a state in South Korea in 1948.  In all these occupations, then, the Army 
played a much more substantial, longer-lasting role than had ever been contemplated 
by either military or civilian leadership, and very much against the desires of either.   
Indeed, the Army and the U.S. government as a whole were caught in an 
organizational dilemma, though, admittedly, the Army itself was somewhat responsible 
for it.  Public pressure, particularly to demobilize troops, was immense after V-E and V-J 
days, and while there had been much work done on demobilization during the war, 
there was no indication that such efforts were in any way integrated with the possibility 
of large-scale occupations.5  Such lack of integration, in retrospect, was another 
indication of the paucity of long-range postwar thinking by American strategists during 
the war.  Focused overwhelmingly on securing victory, little thought went beyond what 
the requirements for an initial occupation force would look like.       
Furthermore, Army senior leadership came to see that the Army’s role in the 
occupations was a drain and a distraction from its primary functions of deterrence and 
combat.  This was evident in Eisenhower’s final report as Chief of Staff.  He wrote to 
Secretary of the Army Kenneth Royall that while occupation was “worthy and 
necessary,” it had to be seen as “preventive rather than positive security.”  Occupation, 
in other words, was not seen as forward-looking and as actively advancing American 
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interests, but as backward looking and as simply preserving what had already been 
won, at high price: 
[I]ts physical magnitude and manifold problems demand such concentrated effort 
that relatively few men and little time are left for the Army’s primary job.  The purely 
security mission—organizing, training, and sharpening for national defense—has 
necessarily taken second place to the problems imposed by the defeat of Germany  
and Japan.6 
 
Eisenhower’s opinion represented a powerful and influential strand of thinking about the 
Army’s role as the occupations continued on into their second and third year.  
Unsurprisingly, the Army’s primary agency for occupation planning, the Civil Affairs 
Division, did not survive the decade and was dissolved in 1949.7 
A series of reports, findings, and recommendations done during the early postwar 
period commented upon both the successes and failures of the Army’s role in the 
occupations and its uncertainty as to whether postwar governance would be part of its 
long-term mission.  One of the most comprehensive studies was conducted by 
researchers at Johns Hopkins, with the results being published in 1956.  Over 4700 
questionnaires were sent out to former civil affairs/military government officers who had 
performed some sort of occupation duty, with 1080 being returned.8  The results were 
mixed.  Many thought that certain aspects of training were effective, particularly at the 
Charlottesville School of Military Government, though some thought it was at times 
excessively theoretical.  Most thought relevant country training was sufficient.  Yet 
despite the vast amount of time and effort put into creating the hundreds of country 
manuals on a whole spectrum of topics, most found them unhelpful—indeed nearly a 
third (29%) had never even heard of their existence.9  
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Unsurprisingly, many of the conclusions revealed the consequences of the narrow, 
militarily focused set of occupation goals.  For example, one conclusion of the report 
was that personnel performing occupation responsibilities often did not understand the 
purpose of their duties and the occupation’s relationship with the overall larger Army 
mission.  Concomitantly, most noted that directives were from higher were often not 
received in time, not clear in content, and of limited utility in the field.  Overarching 
strategic objectives in “purge” programs such as denazification were, according to the 
surveyed officers, seldom clearly defined, thus resulting in “confusion in the minds of 
both the [military government] personnel responsible for the conduct of the purge and in 
the minds of the occupied people.”10 
Equally unsurprising, and in keeping with the doctrinal principles upon which the 
military government officials had been trained, those interviewed indicated that the most 
important responsibilities they undertook were directly related to immediate military 
objectives, such as relieving tactical commanders by reestablishing order and obtaining 
supplies and services in direct support of military operations.  Listed as less important 
were longer range “political” goals such as “laying the basis for a democratic form of 
government” and “leaving friendly local people in control of a peaceful and stable 
community.”  Such views were virtually identical in both occupied and liberated 
nations.11 
Other studies stressed the need to institutionalize the lessons of the postwar 
occupations.  Former Undersecretary of Army Karl Bendetsen (himself a former civil 
affairs officer during the war) proposed that a “Special Assistant for Politico-Military and 
Civil Affairs”  be established within the Army in 1952, and another committee in 1953 led 
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by Paul Davies, a  prominent American corporate executive, proposed among several 
organizational changes greater emphasis on civil affairs and military government.12  
Another comprehensive study was completed in 1951 for the Secretary of the Army by 
Daniel Cox Fahey, Jr., which looked not only at the Army but also at postwar occupation 
policy in terms of civil-military integration.  In certain aspects, the Fahey Report 
validated the American approach to postwar governance.  For example, it concluded 
that future occupations should be run by the military, at least during the combat period 
and for a certain time until stability had been attained.13 
Nonetheless, the Fahey report pointed out several problems with the model 
developed within the U.S. government for postwar governance.  For example, State and 
War Departments (and other agencies) were often at cross-purposes.  No single 
individual or agency had been in a position to “see and understand all of the broad 
forces, obstacle and controversies” that arose regarding postwar occupation policy.  
What was needed was a high level interdepartmental committee for coordination of all 
U.S. occupation policy, with both State and Defense having membership, though not to 
the exclusion of others.  Other agencies participating in occupations should have 
members, and a secretariat should be authorized.14   According to Fahey, what had 
occurred in the absence of such overarching and integrated guidance was that great 
authority and discretion had been given to military leaders on the ground.  The State 
Department had an “area/desk” approach that was only partially resolved by the 
postwar Office of Occupied Areas, and that office had only come about a year after the 
war had ended.  Furthermore, the State Department had been removed from the 
problems of day-to-day administration in the occupied territories, in large part because 
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State had lacked the personnel, training and capability to perform such duties, and 
timely political advice was thus hard to obtain.  As a result, over and over again, military 
personnel stepped in to fill the vacuum.  The result often was troublesome problems 
were resolved in accordance with a military point of view.15  However, the findings and 
recommendations of the various reports, to include Fahey’s, were not followed.  In 
1949, in accordance with Army staff reorganization, the Civil Affairs Division was 
absorbed into the Army Staff G-3 section and never regained autonomy.16  
Yet it was not simply prejudice against the messy work of postwar occupation that 
made implementation of some of the recommendations difficult to envision, much less 
achieve.  For example, the Fahey Report’s proposed solutions revealed some of the 
tensions in civil-military relations, especially in defining and categorizing “political” and 
“military” goals and requirements.  While it seemed that providing more “political” 
direction would cause an efficient and straightforward application of the military to 
achieve those ends, such “polticizing” of the Army was precisely what the War 
Department leadership feared during wartime would impede the accomplishment of the 
military mission.  The immediate, exigent military end, in its view, was not consonant 
with the long-term political goal.  Indeed, the very problem had a temporal basis:  the 
political end was vague, uncertain, contingent, and open to many possibilities and 
interpretations.  Furthermore, assumptions made in wartime, especially about wartime 
allies, did in fact become dubious or incorrect in a different peacetime context.  Such 
was the point of Henry Stimson:  he pointed out that making secondary military goals 
that were precise, time-bound, and measurable, at least in comparison to vague and far 
more elusive long-term political goals, looked very possibly foolish in a conflict such as 
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World War II, where military victory, defined as the defeat of Axis military forces, was 
necessarily paramount.17    
Military Governance and Postwar Policy in Post-World War II Conflicts 
The subsequent history of military governance in post-World War II conflicts reveal 
that, despite the vast experience gained and the numerous studies conducted of 
postwar occupation policy and implementation, many lessons were not learned.  A 
study conducted for the Army by Johns Hopkins University regarding civil affairs in 
Korea concluded that the experiences in Korea “further demonstrate that responsibility 
for CA/MG [civil affairs/military government] tends to devolve upon the Army whenever it 
is engaged in combat operations.”18  Even so, the Johns Hopkins study determined that 
there had been no substantive organization or planning for civil affairs within Eighth U.S. 
Army, the primary U.S. warfighting headquarters, when the conflict erupted, even 
though within one year the U.S. Army was conducting such operations on such a scale 
that it required an organization of over 400 personnel.19  The study’s conclusions were 
similar to those in the Fahey Report.  It further concluded that greater attention should 
be paid to civil affairs and postconflict governance and greater attention paid to civil-
military and political matters, and that there should be greater stress on such matters at 
institutions such as West Point, the Army’s Command and General Staff College, and 
the Army War College.  Like the Fahey Report, it concluded also that there needed to 
be a single focus of responsibility for civil affairs and military government functions and 
that the “vague locus of responsibility” for civil affairs in Korea, both within the Army and 
between the Army and other U.S. and U.N. agencies, made it difficult for field 
commanders to obtain the complete picture required to conduct effective civil affairs.20  
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In other words, the report clearly indicated that very little regarding military governance 
policy and practice, either during or after conflict, had been institutionalized within the 
Army, even though the country where the fighting was raging had been under American 
military occupation just two years prior.   
Nonetheless, the Army never abandoned the concept of postwar governance.  It 
did, to some degree, institutionalize certain organizational and doctrinal practices 
regarding military government and other forms of governance and civil administration.  
By 1949, for example, the Army had created seventy peacetime U.S. Army Reserve civil 
affairs/military government units and by the mid-1950s had developed a postwar 
governance doctrine set forth in the Field Manual (FM) 41 series.  But the use of such 
units and doctrine was narrowly confined to scenarios following typical conventional 
conflicts.  As the next decade got underway, counterinsurgency doctrine supplanted 
postwar governance as the Army prepared for and performed missions in South 
Vietnam. 21  Despite its widespread experience in governance, and perhaps because its 
energies were focused on combat operations, the Army was not tasked with the overall 
pacification effort in Vietnam.  Instead, both the State Department and the Agency for 
International Development were given primary roles in a conflict that did not follow the 
linear conflict model of defeat and occupation.22   Regardless of civil affairs units’ rather 
limited role during Vietnam, they suffered from guilt-by-association with the “hearts and 
minds” approach of that conflict.  By 1977, the Army indicated it would no longer support 
the twelve civil affairs units it had in its contingency plans.23     
And despite the U.S. Army’s experiences in the 1990s in Somalia, Bosnia, and 
Kosovo, throughout that last decade of the twentieth century and in the first years of the 
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twenty-first leading into the Iraq invasion, post-conflict operations were so-called Phase 
IV “stability” operations and generally given little to no attention in the various exercises 
performed by tactical units, whose focus, overwhelmingly, was on training to complete 
the numerous complex tasks involved in high intensity conflict.  The comment of 
General Tommy Franks, commander of the American forces in the 2003 Iraq invasion, 
reflected this mindset aptly when he referred to his civilian superiors: “You pay attention 
to the day after and I’ll pay attention to the day of.”24   
Indeed, the planning of the Iraqi War that began in the spring of 2003 has been 
widely criticized for its lack of depth, as well as its failure to integrate properly postwar 
governance into the actual wartime plan.  Indeed many of the problems that emerged in 
the days after Saddam Hussein’s overthrow, such as disagreements between State and 
Defense Departments, ineffective interagency cooperation, and unclear guidance from 
higher levels, seemed to replicate the same difficulties that occurred during and after 
World War II with State and War Departments.  The Iraqi War strategists did, in fact, 
make long-range planning assumptions.  As has been noted, however, the principal 
problem was that these assumptions were relatively unchallenged during planning and 
were often flawed and themselves reflected a militarized way of thinking about the 
operation, particularly the assumption that the success of the initial combat phases of 
the operation would end decisively and therefore lead to a safe and stable environment 
within Iraq, that government ministries would continue to function, and that therefore 
only minimal troop levels were needed in the country.25 
In recent years, the emphasis on counterinsurgency doctrine in both Iraq and 
Afghanistan has, just as during the 1960s, overshadowed post-conflict stability 
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operations, though there has been a recent effort to establish an interagency body, 
headed by the State Department, that attempts to deal effectively with civil-military 
operations in stability and reconstruction operations.  Called the Office of the 
Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, its success to date remains unclear.26  
Indeed, the Guide for Participants in Peace, Stability and Relief Operations, published in 
2007 by the United States Institute of Peace, reveals how difficult such interagency 
cooperation can be: the guide itself is essentially an explanation of the various agencies 
involved in such operations, from the United Nations to nongovernmental organizations, 
to U.S. civilian agencies to the U.S. military.  The section in the book on the military has 
several pages devoted simply to explaining “military culture” (according to its author 
premised on “predictability, planning, and precision”) and how that culture differs 
significantly from civilian culture, the point ostensibly being that such an undertaking is 
so complex and difficult that one first must have a rudimentary understanding of the 
various players involved before any substantive recommendations can be made.27 
The complexities involved in attempting to establish coherent interagency 
processes simply indicate the larger, more complex, and even paradoxical problems 
involved in post-conflict governance.  A frequent criticism of the “American way of war” 
is that it is short-focused and lacks longer-range political ends (admittedly, the Army’s 
recent emphasis on counterinsurgency may cause a reevaluation of this criticism; 
though counterinsurgency’s hold on the Army’s strategic culture is still a matter of 
debate).  One recent work stresses that the American method of war making is 
“apolitical,” “astrategic,” “ahistorical,” and “impatient.”28  Such a view implicitly leads to 
an American way of postwar.  Accordingly, the 2003 Iraq invasion led to such a dismal 
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state of affairs because while a quick victory over Iraqi conventional military forces was 
achieved, decisive political success was not.29   
In contrast, some look to the postwar World War II governance doctrine, planning 
and implementation and regard it as a gold standard that has not since been matched.30   
Truthfully, in many ways, American military planners during World War II were more 
astute and thorough than their counterparts in 2003, in large part because they had the 
time, resources, and unity of purpose that their successors lacked.  The World War II 
planners created a doctrinal template that provided basic assumptions required to 
conduct everyday occupation duties; they created a relatively impressive, if not always 
properly implemented, training program; and they created organizational structures, 
both to promulgate policy at the strategic level and to implement them at the tactical 
level.  Despite the praise often given to the World War II planners, they seemingly 
suppressed long-range “political” objectives in order to focus on military objectives.  
Over and over, high and lower level military government officials bemoaned the utter 
lack of long-range policy goals.  Yet the Army was a victim of its own success in winning 
responsibility for postwar governance.  Having done so, it thus caused the occupation to 
focus on immediate military objectives.    
The focus on such objectives did nonetheless influence much of the early Cold War 
period.  Dividing Korea for military purposes led to a partition that fostered conditions for 
war in 1950.  At the same time, the militarized “apoliticism” of the early occupation could 
actually work to the advantage of both occupier and occupied, precisely because, in the 
absence of more sharply defined Cold War policy goals that included a forceful 
anticommunism, the initial occupation period allowed for a more pragmatic, non-
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ideological discourse initially to be conducted.  This localized, less “political” space in 
the first months after the war, for example, allowed Clark to support Renner, a socialist 
with communists in his cabinet.  In the first year of occupation, Lucius Clay was seen as 
less a hardliner in Germany than most in the State Department, who far more quickly 
saw an emergent Soviet threat.  Clay’s federalist experiment, which helped realign the 
western zones of Germany toward American interests and the American sphere of 
influence, was effective, while at the same time not expressly disallowing the 
Communist or other parties.  Indeed it provided a space for local authorities to regain 
control without resorting to censorship or political prohibition.     
Postwar Governance and the Limits of Practice and Doctrine 
It is tempting to search the historical record of the post-World War II occupations 
and to glean a better set of practices or a more suitable doctrine that could have 
applicability today.  The more relevant lesson is that standard doctrinal solutions are 
dangerously deceptive.  The doctrinal model for post-World War II occupations, after all, 
was largely based on what the Army had actually learned and experienced during the 
Rhineland occupations of 1918-1923, in which the populace was complacent and the 
civil government in relative good order.  As might be expected, that model worked best 
in a country which postwar situation most resembled it (Austria), somewhat effectively in 
Germany itself, and poorly in Korea.   
Such attempts at “lessons learned” as ways to create coherent doctrine to apply in 
future contexts are fraught with peril.  The current fixation for viable counterinsurgency 
doctrine illustrates this point.  One work particularly looked upon as prescient and 
relevant for counterinsurgency is David Galula’s Pacification in Algeria, 1956-1958. 
380 
 
Galula, a French officer who had served in the Algeria insurgency, has been viewed as 
prophetic, and his book is widely considered as having a “remarkable, almost timeless 
resonance nearly half a century later.”31  There are numerous apparent doctrinal 
lessons to be drawn from Galula’s work that have contemporary relevance.  These 
include the need to recognize the signs of a budding insurgency, the need to emphasize 
policing rather than military tactics, the need to avoid a “decapitation strategy” as a 
means of defeating an insurgency, the critical need for information operations, the 
importance of sealing off borders, the importance of promoting women’s rights, and the 
importance of according humane treatment to captured insurgents.32  
Such lessons have as an implication the idea that the counterinsurgent force is the 
primary actor in the insurgency.  It is noteworthy that not a single one of Galula’s 
lessons mention the local populations themselves, except to be acted upon by the 
counterinsurgent.  No lesson states that a primary imperative is to listen to local actors, 
to adapt to local practices, and even to abandon, as required, doctrinal imperatives or 
lessons such as above to fit with local cultural norms.  Instead, in the above example, 
the counterinsurgent is the primary force that seeks to impose its will on the population.  
In this paradigm then, doctrine is a unilaterally imposed construct in which the outside 
force imposes its will on the populace in order to fulfill a larger strategic imperative. 
What the post-World War II occupation experiences should instead reveal is that 
notions of strategic imperatives presumably imposed from on high are often illusory 
intellectual constructs. Such notions of overarching strategic imperatives as guiding or 
as providing an ultimate vision mislead because, as the World War II occupations 
revealed, it was a single agency within the U.S. government, the United States Army, 
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that drove and shaped larger American strategic concepts during the early postwar 
years.   Its conceptions of postwar governance drove U.S. policymaking, conceptions 
which came with their own particular understandings of what should be the occupations’ 
primary focus, in particular the need to ensure the primacy of military objectives.  Its 
doctrinal model—more broadly, its intellectual construct for how postwar governance 
should be conducted—was applied, for good or ill, in the postwar occupations in 
different environments throughout the world. 
Imperatives that decidedly enabled the accomplishment of military objectives had a 
significant influence on policy outcomes—from the doctrinal template set forth in FM 27-
5 that was applied in different contexts, to the decentralized decision making authority 
provided to on-ground commanders, to the decisions on troop placement and zonal 
division.  Such an understanding of these imperatives is necessary to understand how 
those decisions can ultimately influence larger social-political outcomes.  Cold War 
studies, for example, have often looked beyond traditional bipolar explanations such as 
U.S.-U.S.S.R. geopolitical competition and have examined possible social, political, 
economic, technological and ideological origins for the decades-long conflict.  Curiously 
however, relatively little attention has been focused on how military decisions 
determined the early configuration of the Cold War.  American military history has 
tended to stop at V-E and V-J Days, to resume five years later when the conventional 
“hot” Korean War broke out.   
This is not to say that very good histories of the occupations have not been 
produced, but they have tended to be considered separate from the cataclysmic conflict 
that preceded them.  The postwar occupations, viewed in the context of wartime 
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decisions, should be seen as significantly influencing larger Cold War outcomes.  The 
very decision for military government meant that military commanders would have wide-
ranging policy influence in postwar governance, whether in pushing for recognition of a 
provisional government, as in Austria, or in aligning that military government with a 
representative body that would eventually govern a partitioned half of the country, as in 
Korea.  Essentially then, much of the early Cold War policy making was conducted by 
U.S. Army officers, often on their own prerogatives.  A Cold War scholar such as John 
Lewis Gaddis has recognized this, pointing out that no one ordered Clay, for example, 
to allow German press criticism of his policies or to encourage their review by the 
American Civil Liberties Union. 33  Likewise Clay’s decision to return authority to local 
German governments was actively resisted.  He carried it out nonetheless.   
The Army as an agency within the U.S. government not only drove the strategic 
outcomes for the United States.  Just as important were the local conditions and actors 
in the various occupied territories.  In fact, such local conditions and actors came to be 
more important than the Army’s doctrinal precepts: instead of local practices being 
successful bent to fit such imperatives, the reverse occurred.  Where the doctrine fit in 
most neatly to the occupied territory, the U.S. occupation was able to function relatively 
successfully, as in Austria, where the U.S. officials on the ground wisely decided to back 
local Austrian governance structures early.  On the other hand, when the doctrinal 
template was applied in Korea, the local practices and conditions resisted it and refused 
to fit the doctrinal model.   
If anything, what the postwar occupations should teach is that complex social-
political problems such as postwar governance of other territories are highly complex, 
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so-called “wicked” problems—problems that resist definitive, doctrinal solutions, 
problems that depend on as much about the questions asked about them as about any 
possible answers.34  Accordingly, what is clear in dealing with such problems is that 
how one frames and understands such issues is of greater importance than any 
preconceived doctrinal constructs.  Indeed, such constructs may impede fuller 
intellectual understanding of the problem.   Such efforts at framing and “meta-
questioning” have been termed in military thinking as “systematic operational design.”  
In such design, context is as important as doctrine and practice, and indeed particular 
context must trump either in order to adapt to existing situations.35  A “design” approach 
to post-World War II governance problems, for example, would have noted the utility of 
the Rhineland/FM 27-5 military government construct in a nation such as Austria and 
drastically altered, if not dispensed with altogether, the construct in Korea.   
The design approach has another utility in its continuous questioning in that it 
exposes the illusion of control in postwar environments.  The World War II planners 
actually to some degree recognized this problem—they recognized that attempting to 
integrate far-off and elusive political goals with military objectives was perhaps a task 
beyond their ability to solve.  As a result, they often simply chose to ignore those 
political goals and instead focused on immediate military ones.  However this may 
appear to have been short-sighted in hindsight, it was also a recognition of the limits of 
what even the most powerful actors can foresee or control in such environments.  
Perhaps then the ultimate lesson of the post-World War II American occupations is that 
control, in the form of an overarching strategic vision, cannot be forcefully imposed and 
maintained.  The United States’ interests during the postwar occupations were often 
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driven by the particular interests of the United States Army, which trumped and 
subordinated other agencies in establishing its priorities.  And in the occupied countries 
themselves, American interests were also shaped by the interests of the occupied 
actors, and the particular imperatives of the various actors within those nations were 
generally more important than the doctrine or practices of the United States military 
governing them. 
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